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The overall aim of this dissertation is to investigate the implications of the decision to 
close the abalone fishery and the impacts of this decision on abalone rights holders in 
the Kleinmond community in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. This 
dissertation also looked at the role that marine resources play in the livelihoods of 
fishers and the impact of the closure on the livelihoods of rights holders. Potential 
opportunities and constraints associated with alternative livelihoods options for fishers 
were also identified. 
Data were collected by means of a literature review, focus group sessions, interviews, 
and questionnaires. Interviews were conducted with a wide range of stakeholders, 
including rights holders, officials from Marine and Coastal Management in Cape 
Town, key informants including local and provincial government authorities, 
representatives of community organisations, local business people, local fishery 
control officers (FCOs), and personnel from abalone processing factories. 
The recent controversial decision by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism to close the abalone fishery was centralised, top-down and science based. 
Abalone rights holders were not consulted and played no role in the decision making 
process. With the announcement of the closure, the Minister announced the 
development and implementation of a Social Plan for fishers who were to be affected 
by the closure of the fishery. This Social Plan allegedly included the development of 
alternative livelihoods for fishers. However, no Social Plan has been forthcoming and 
no alternative livelihoods have been implemented in affected communities. 
The closure of the fishery has resulted in numerous impacts on rights holders. Rights 
holders managed to improve their socio-economic standing by acquiring rights, the 
loss of which will impact on their current lifestyle. The lack of identification and 
implementation of suitable alternatives by government has further alienated rights 
holders who feel that government has "let them down". Rights holders generally feel 
"hopeless" as they do not know where they will find money to pay debts or put food 










This dissertation highlights the need to adopt an integrated and holistic approach to 
small-scale fisheries management. Resource management decisions in South Africa 
are still centralised and science based with very little concern for the socio-economic 
and cultural context of coastal communities. Participation by rights holders in 
management and decision-making has been lacking in the abalone fishery due in part 
to capacity constraints, but also to the lack of willingness on the part of fisheries 
scientists to engage with socio-economic and cultural issues relating to resource 
management. In light of the rhetoric regarding co-management and the laws and 
policies in support of this approach, the decision making process is considered to be 
flawed and inadequate. 
The layout of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter 1 provides a background on 
resource management trends in the international and South African context, 
information about the abalone fishery in South Africa, and the methodology and 
limitations. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theoretical and conceptual ideas 
underpinning the study and includes a review of the literature alternative livelihoods, 
the sustainable livelihoods framework and co-management. Chapter 3 provides a 
review of the legal and institutional framework relevant to small-scale fisheries and 
abalone in South Africa. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the abalone fishery in 
South Africa as well as the case study area, describing Kleinmond, the fishers and the 
resource. Chapter 5 presents the findings of the study. It looks at the decision-making 
process that led to the closure of the fishery, the impact of the closure on fishers and 
possible alternative livelihood options. Chapters 6 and 7 present the discussion of the 










1.1 Background and rationale for the study 
1.1.1 Decline in fisheries resources 
Worldwide, there has been a decline in marine resources as a result of ineffective 
management and overexploitation, and most fish stocks are classed as fully exploited 
(Myers and Worm 2003; Sunde 2003b; FAO 2004; Mahon et al. 2008). According to 
a 2002 report by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (F AO), 
fisheries around the world are in crisis (McGoodwin 1990; F AO 2002; World Bank 
2004; Mahon et al. 2008). F AO (2002) estimated that 18 percent of the world's fish 
stocks are overexploited, whilst 10 percent have become significantly depleted. 
Resulting reductions in the biomass of target species and the degradation of 
ecosystems threatens livelihoods and undermines food security (Mahon et al. 2008). 
South Africa is no exception, and recent decades have seen a decline in marine 
resources to such an extent that many linefish species are commercially extinct and 
most marine stocks are fully exploited or over utilised (Branch and Clark 2006). 
Benthic shellfish populations are under particularly heavy pressure due to the inherent 
characteristics of these resources I and the high value of the product (Defeo and 
Castilla 2005; Maharaj et al. 2007; Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). Abalone stocks 
worldwide are under pressure due to overfishing, disease, habitat loss and failed 
control of illegal catch (Maharaj et al. 2007). Abalone fisheries in California, Canada, 
Alaska and the Sultanate of Oman are or have all been closed at one point, whilst 
fisheries in Australia, New Zealand and Mexico are all under threat (Maharaj et al. 
2007). Often described as "one of the most difficult fisheries to manage" (Hauck 
2006), the South African abalone fishery, which is based on the species Haliotis 
midae, is under pressure due to poaching and the lucrative illegal trade, the movement 
of west coast rock lobster (WCRL) into abalone areas, and the 'flawed' rights 
allocation process (Daniels et al. 2006). 










1.1.2 The shift towards holistic resource management 
Resource management has historically been the responsibility of central government 
who have controlled fisheries activities in a largely centralised, exclusionary and top 
down manner (Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Hauck and Sowman 2001; van Sittert 2003; 
Raakjaer Nielsen et af. 2004; Branch and Clark 2006). Resources have largely been 
managed by fisheries biologists, with little attention paid to the local indigenous 
knowledge of traditional fishers (Raakjaer Nielsen et af. 2004; Pauly 2006; Hauck 
2008). Fisheries management worldwide has struggled to find a balance between 
protecting resource sustainability, ensuring equitable access to resources and 
promoting economic efficiency and stability (Hauck and Kroese 2006). As a result, 
the goals of fisheries management have been largely 'biological' whilst social goals 
(e.g. employment, food security) have been neglected (Raakjaer Nielsen et af. 2004; 
Hauck 2008). 
Conventional centralised regulation has failed in ensuring the long term sustainable 
use and management of a number of fisheries and has contributed to increased conf1ict 
between stakeholders (Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Raakjaer Nielsen et af. 2004; Beem 
2007). Centralised and highly regulated approaches to fisheries management are now 
considered to be inappropriate, particularly in the developing world due to the down-
scaling of government departments, limited financial resources, a lack of human 
capacity to manage resources over large areas, limited knowledge of local conditions 
and an increased demand from the public to be involved in decisions that affect their 
livelihoods (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Hara 2003). Thus issues of governance have 
become an important factor in resource management (Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Jentoft 
2007). Governance should be interactive and multi-stakeholder driven, as opposed to 
the more traditional unitary, single minded, top down and instrumental systems 
(Jentoft 2007). The term "interactive governance" emphasises an integrated and 
communicative approach to fisheries and coastal management (Jentoft 2007). It is 
"appreciative of contextual factors and local knowledge" and the involvement of 
state, market and civil society is essential (Jentoft 2007). Systems to be governed are 
partly social and partly natural and therefore, in order to halt ecological degradation, 
the governing system or institutions must work with the social system, which includes 










In response to continuing resource degradation, overexploitation and conflicts among 
users there has been a shift away from centralised, top down, resource based 
approaches to one that is more holistic, systems-orientated and people centred (Hauck 
and Sowman 2003). Increasingly, there has been a transfer of responsibility away 
from the state to local communities: "The philosophy changedfrom excluding people 
from their local resources to promoting shared management responsibility, 
encouraging community participation in the ownership, management and enforcement 
of sustainable resource utilization. " (Hauck and Sweijd 1999). This people-centred 
approach is a result of an increased understanding and acceptance of the complex 
relationship between natural and socio-economic systems (Hauck and Sowman 2003). 
The increased role of social sciences in fisheries management has illustrated the 
importance of "understanding broader social issues (such as social justice, 
livelihoods and food security) and linking disciplines to secure both resources and 
people" (Hauck 2008). It is vital that we recognise and understand the link between 
social and ecological systems (Hauck 2008). 
1.1.3 South African context 
In South Africa, coastal communities have utilised marine resources to sustain their 
livelihoods for centuries (Masifundise 2006). However, throughout the colonial and 
apartheid periods, marine resources were exploited mainly by large, white-owned 
companies - excluding traditional fishers (Sunde 2003; Masifundise 2006; Branch and 
Clark 2006). Although it was acknowledged that resources were reasonably well-
managed during this time, the distribution of wealth and power was extremely uneven 
(Hersoug and Holm 2000). Further, management of marine resources was by top-
down control (Branch and Clark 2006). South Africa's transition to democracy in 
1994 resulted in the transformation of government institutions and a process of 
legislative reform to address the inequalities of the past (Hauck and Sowman 2003; 
Hauck and Nursey-Bray 2006; Witbooi 2006). Policies and legislation governing 
coastal and fisheries resources were introduced and these have included principles of 
"equity, participation, social justice, stewardship, sustainability and accountability" 
(Hauck and Sowrnan 2003; Branch and Clark 2006). Transformation in marine 
fisheries took place through the redistribution of access rights, internal transformation 










2006). The trend at a policy level has been to move away from top-down, centralised 
approaches to resource management toward a more cooperative and participative 
approach (Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Hauck and Sowman 2003). 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was published prior 
to the 1994 democratic elections, focused on poverty reduction, developing human 
resources, addressing past inequalities and injustices and emphasising equitable 
access to resources and participatory decision making (Masifundise 2006; van Sittert 
et al. 2006). The RDP created expectations amongst historically disadvantaged 
individuals (HDls) in fishing communities that they would get rights to access marine 
resources as well as participate in the management of these resources (Masifundise 
2006). However, the RDP was replaced by the GEAR (Growth, Employment, and 
Redistribution) programme in 1996. Under this programme the government embraced 
"privatisation, subsidy removal, downsizing the public sector and encouragement of 
small black entrepreneurs" (Masifundise 2006). Consequently, the focus on social 
policies (particularly within the fishing sector) decreased and in many respects the 
GEAR policy displaced some of the aspects of the RDP (Masifundise 2006; van 
Sittert et al. 2006). Van Sittert et al. (2006) state that the effect in terms of fisheries 
reform has been to "sideline issues of poverty and food-security in pursuit of 
economic growth, efficiency and stability". 
The Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) Chief Directorate within the National 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), is the government 
authority primarily responsible for the management of marine resources and is the 
chief authority responsible for putting in place the provisions of the Marine Living 
Resources Act (MLRA). MCM is responsible for allocating and managing fishing 
rights, regulating recreational fishing, managing Marine Protected Areas, protecting 
and monitoring coastal and estuarine resources and is responsible for conducting 
research into and advising on the status of fish stocks (MCM-DEAT 2008). 
The MLRA was promulgated in 1998, and it recognised subsistence fishers as a 
distinct group for the first time (Hauck and Kroese 2006). The goals of the MLRA are 
the sustainable utilisation of marine living resources, equitable access to marine 










manne resources should be used to contribute to the socio-economic needs of the 
people of South Africa. This created expectations in terms of increased access to 
resources and the improvement of socio-economic conditions for poor fishers (EEU 
2008). This also created a huge challenge for MCM, in that they had to fulfil a new 
role of trying to achieve equity in access to marine resources and include as many new 
rights holders as possible; whilst at the same time ensuring sustainable harvesting of 
resources using minimum viable quotas. Despite this process of legal and policy 
reform, small scale fisheries are still managed in a top-down, centralised manner 
because South Africa's fisheries management authority was originally set up to deal 
with firms and large companies, which operated in a competitive business 
environment. The management authority thus had no experience or capacity to deal 
with the developmental and social issues that characterise small scale fisheries, as this 
was never included in their management framework. Thus South Africa's 
management authority still seems ill-equipped to deal with the relatively new 
challenge of small-scale fishers. Further, in terms of the new rights allocation process, 
bona fide traditional fishers have largely been denied legitimate access, even though 
they have a historical dependence on fishing (van Sittert et al. 2006). 
Further, numerous constraints hamper the goals of the MLRA from being met and its 
provisions from being implemented successfully (EEU 2008). In some cases, the 
resource base has not been sufficient to cope with the increased demand and quotas 
were typically too small to be economically viable (Isaacs 2006; EEU 2008). 
Legislation and institutional arrangements have not been able to adequately 
administer the diverse fishing sector and the Draft Policies for the Allocation and 
Management of Medium-term Subsistence Fishing Rights and Small-scale 
Commercial Fishing Rights2 have not been well received by coastal communities 
(EEU 2008). Further, complicated administration procedures and high costs have 
made applying for access rights difficult for poor coastal fishers (EEU 2008). 
Additional obstacles to fisheries management in South Africa include allegations of 
corruption of authorities which results in mistrust and skepticism and hinders the 
development of relationships between community members and government officials, 
the complexity of institutional arrangements, the limited power and status of DEA T 
who is charged with overall management, and the lack of human and institutional 










capacity amongst resource users and government (Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). These constraints, and others such as illegal harvesting and 
population pressure, have led to livelihood disruptions for many fishers, and thus 
provide a need to consider alternative livelihoods for coastal fishers. 
Poverty and in-migration into coastal towns has further exacerbated the pressure on 
marine resources. There has been an influx of people into the fishing industry and due 
to what was considered a flawed rights allocation process, many bona fide fishers did 
not gain access to resources that they had traditionally harvested (Sowman 2006; 
Isaacs 2006). Consequently, the rights allocation process is not considered legitimate 
and many traditional fishers engage in harvesting marine resources without a legal 
right to do so. 
The traditional approach to achieving compliance in fisheries, such as the abalone 
fishery, has been to increase policing efforts and to enforce rules that have been 
determined by the state. However, due to the costs involved in such enforcement 
efforts these initiatives are often short lived and consequently have little overall 
success in protecting marine resources. Increasingly, research is suggesting that the 
long-term protection and sustainable exploitation of natural resources does not require 
increased law enforcement or policing, but instead the management of human impacts 
through user participation and establishment of cooperative management structures 
(Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Hauck and Sowman 2003; Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). 
Research suggests that joint management (also referred to as co-management) will 
assist in the legitimization of management measures, rules and regulations since the 
assumption is that fishers are less likely to obey regulations that they perceive to be 
illegitimate (Jentoft 1989 in Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Raakjaer Nielsen et al. 2004). 
Similarly, participation increases ownership of the management system, thereby 
enhancing compliance (Masifundise 2007; Pedersen and Sunde 2007). Further, the 
decentralization of management activities can be cost-effective by reducing 
transaction costs (Pedersen and Sunde 2007). Pedersen and Sunde (2007) further state 
that participation in management may also contribute towards poverty alleviation. 
Jentoft (2006) argues that participation in management could lead to empowerment, if 










These three aspects of empowerment are all closely linked to poverty alleviation and 
community development (Pedersen and Sunde 2007). 
Small-scale fisheries play a crucial role in job prOVISIOn and livelihoods in the 
developing world, thus contributing to poverty alleviation, food security and the 
development of local economies (Sowman and Cardoso 2008; F AO 2005; Bene 
2006). It is widely recognised that small-scale fisheries can generate considerable 
profits and demonstrate resilience to shocks and crises (F AO 2005). Fishing therefore 
does not only contribute directly to food security through the supply of fish but also 
contributes indirectly through revenues created from production, processing and 
marketing activities (F AO 2005; Bene 2006). 
According to Sowman and Cardoso (2008), South Africa does make legal provision 
for subsistence but government has not put in place adequate measures to allocate 
fishing rights and protect food security of these fishers. Furthermore, while fisheries 
can playa pivotal role in contributing towards increasing food security and alleviating 
poverty, research suggests that fisheries in Africa are becoming more and more export 
orientated with most benefits accruing to big companies, whilst small-scale producers 
are being marginalised (Sowman and Cardoso 2008; Bene 2006). 
1.1.4 The abalone fishery in South Africa 
Abalone has been harvested commercially in South Africa since 1949 and plays an 
important role in the livelihoods of many fishers. Regulation of the fishery started in 
the 1970s and the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the next 25 years was 
approximately 600 tonnes annually. However, the TAC for the 1996/1997 season was 
set at only 550 tonnes, and since then the TAC has been steadily decreasing. Reasons 
for the decreasing TAC are twofold. Over the years, illegal harvesting or poaching of 
the resource has become an increasing problem because of the increase in demand for 
abalone and the accompanying financial incentive. In addition, environmental changes 
have resulted in the movement of west coast rock lobster into abalone areas and this 
affected abalone survival rates (DEAT 2006; Maharaj et al. 2006). Consequently, due 
to concerns about the state of the resource, the Total Allowable Catch (TAe) for the 










In 2003, the Policy for the Allocation of Commercial Fishing Rights in the Abalone 
Fishery (Abalone Policy) allocated long term rights to abalone divers in the hope that 
it would instil a sense of ownership over the resource and facilitate collaborative 
management of the resource. A TURF (Territorial User-Rights Fishery) based system 
was introduced, but has had little success. Small-scale commercial allocations, 
ranging from 150-600 kilograms were allocated to 302 persons or legal entities for a 
period of 10 years. Compliance in the fishery has been difficult. Apart from what is 
perceived by many fishers to have been a flawed rights allocation process, the 
common property nature of the resource, the ease with which the abalone can be 
harvested and the vast coastline that needs to be patrolled has made enforcement 
efforts costly and difficult to maintain. 
MCM has effectively transformed the abalone fishery from an industrial fishery 
controlled by five large white owned companies into a true small scale fishery, which 
redistributed rights and allocated small quotas directly to previously disadvantaged 
entrants (Hauck 2006). However, following this transition, a number of things "went 
wrong" in terms of management decision making which has resulted in the current 
closure situation. This thesis presents a "post mortem" of what went wrong in terms of 
management and decision making relating to the abalone fishery. 
A recent controversial decision by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
in October 2007 has seen the indefinite suspension of commercial abalone harvesting 
in South Africa. Due to the scale of poaching and the estimated impact of this on the 
resource in terms of long term sustainable resource utilisation, an emergency3 was 
declared in the fishery. 
With the announcement of the closure, the Minister also announced the development 
and implementation of a Social Plan for fishers who were to be affected by the closure 
of the fishery. This Social Plan allegedly included the development of alternative 
livelihoods for fishers, such as boat-based whale watching and shark cage diving. 
However, no Social Plan has been forthcoming and no alternative livelihoods have 
been implemented in affected communities. It appears that little research went into 










investigating the feasibility of the alternatives proposed or the suitability in terms of 
the assets of fishers. 
Abalone harvesting makes an important contribution to the livelihoods of many 
fishers in South Africa and small-scale fisheries in general playa vital role in food 
security in coastal communities (Cardoso et al. 2006). The Abalone Fishery Report 
(2006) indicates that the average abalone diver earns between R60 000 and R 105 000 
per year (Hauck 2006). It is estimated that between 700 and 800 people were 
employed in the abalone industry at the time of its closure. This dissertation focuses 
specifically on the impact of the closure of the abalone fishery on rights holders in the 
coastal community of Kleinmond. Prior to the closure there were 15 individual rights 
holders and 3 entities with rights to harvest abalone. Consequently fishers have been 
left without an income and with few economic or livelihood alternatives. Further, 
fishers do not usually posses the skills or capital needed to become involved in 
another occupation; fishing is all that they know. Fishing also has strong cultural links 
for many traditional fishers, and often their fathers and grandfathers were also 
involved in fishing activities (Cockroft et al. 2002). 
In order to decrease the pressure and reliance on manne resources III coastal 
communities, the development of alternative livelihoods for fishers needs to be a 
priority. Studies, such as those conducted by the Environmental Evaluation Unit (EEU 
2008) and Glavovic et al. (2002) on sustainable livelihoods, as well as programs such 
as Coast Care and Poverty Relief funded projects (DEAT 2002) indicate that this is 
becoming a priority. However, there seems to be little follow up on the progress and 
success of these initiatives. Alternatives need to be tailored to the needs of the 
community as well as to focus on available assets. This requires an understanding of 
livelihoods and the assets and constraints inherent in livelihood strategies. The 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework is a tool that aids the analysis of livelihoods and 
allows thinking about livelihoods that orders the complexity of the various factors 
(Allison and Ellis 2001). The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework is discussed in 
more detail in Section 2.2. 
This dissertation will also explore the decision making process that led to the ban of 










alternative livelihood opportunities that could be pursued by the group of fishers. The 
focus of this study was to determine the impact and implications of the closure of the 
tishery on abalone rights holders in the Kleinmond community. 
1.2 Aim and Objectives of Research 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to investigate the implications of the decision to 
close the abalone fishery and the impacts of the closure on the abalone rights holders 
in the Kleinmond community in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. 
Specific objectives include: 
1. To reVieW the literature relevant to sustainable coastal livelihoods, co-
management and fisheries management in South Africa and abalone 
harvesting in particular; 
2. To examine the policy and legislative framework relevant to managing small-
scale fisheries, including abalone, in South Africa; 
3. To identify the range of stakeholders that have been affected by the abalone 
ban; 
4. To document and discuss the decision-making process associated with the 
closure of the abalone fishery; 
5. To determine the extent to which the ban on abalone has impacted on the 
livelihoods of individuals and the Kleinmond community in general; 
6. To determine the role that marine resources, specifically abalone, play in the 
livelihood strategies of fishers in Kleinmond; and 
7. To identify possible alternative livelihood opportunities available in 
Kleinmond, what alternatives fishers would be willing to consider, and what 
the constraints and opportunities associated with these might be. 
1.3 Methodology 
Information to address these objectives was largely obtained from a review of relevant 
literature, including: international and local publications, reports, grey literature, court 










Kleinmond by means of focus groups with fishers, one on one key informant 
interviews and questionnaire surveys with fishers. Interviews were also conducted 
with MCM officials, local business people, local and provincial government officials 
and other persons who had insight into the abalone industry and the decision to close 
it. Data was mostly qualitative and the best objective interpretation of that data was 
made. 
Research for this dissertation was conducted in Kleinmond, which provided a good 
opportunity to understand issues surrounding the closure of the fishery. Given that 
Hauck (Hauck and Nursey-Bray 2002; Hauck and Hector 2003) had previously 
conducted research in the area for several years and was linked to this research 
project, access to the community by the author was easily facilitated as trust had 
already been fostered during past research interactions. 
Furthermore, this study formed part of a larger project funded by the National 
Environmental Advisory Forum (NEAF), which conducted research on sustainable 
coastal livelihoods for fishers in three coastal communities, namely Doringbaai, 
Mbotyi and Kleinmond. The key focus of this research project was to investigate the 
feasibility and desirability of developing alternative coastal livelihoods in poor coastal 
communities in South Africa. At a preliminary workshop held on 13 February 2008 
with the research team and officials from Marine and Coastal Management's 
Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods sub directorate, 4 key research themes were 
identified for investigation. These themes have been used to guide this research 
process (See Appendix 9.1): (1) Resources and resource users; (2) Current livelihood 
strategies; (3) Potential livelihood options; and (4) Mechanisms to explore future 
livelihood opportunities. 
Literature Review 
A review of the literature dealing with fisheries management, co-management, small-
scale fisheries, alternative livelihoods, and the sustainable livelihoods framework 
(SLF) as well as the relevant laws and policies relating to the management of the 
abalone resource was conducted. This review provided the background for this study 










of fishers. The review also assisted in the development of the questionnaire. Whilst 
the SLF was not used as a tool of analysis, it did assist in the understanding of the 
various factors that influence livelihoods. 
Field Visits: Scoping Exercise, Focus Group Meetings and Key Informant 
Interviews 
Four fieldtri ps to the study area were undertaken over the period 13 March through to 
06 June 2008. The first field trip was a scoping exercise to meet with key informants 
and community representatives from Kleinmond and to inform them of the intended 
research. 
The second field trip consisted of focus group meetings as well as interviews with the 
local municipality, key informants, NGOs working in Kleinmond and informal 
interviews with fishers at the Harbour. Two Focus Group Meetings were held (one for 
abalone and another for WCRL) which involved small gatherings of fishers and was 
organised through a community representative. The Abalone Focus Group was 
attended by approximately 10 fishers and lasted an hour and a half. The WCRL Focus 
Group was attended by about 60 people, and lasted three hours. This method allows 
large amounts of information to be collected in a relatively short period of time whilst 
at the same time allowing for debate and discussion amongst fishers. 
During the third and fourth field trips additional key informant interviews were held 
and a questionnaire survey was administered amongst 10 fishers. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, emphasis was placed on those fishers who were historically involved 
in fishing activities and who access abalone and WCRL resources legally through a 
system of rights and permits, thus the reference to 'rights holders'. 
Questionnaire Survey and Interviews 
The questionnaire survey consisted of a structured questionnaire that sought to gather 
both quantitative and qualitative information specifically from resource users (See 
Appendix 9.2). Fishers were contacted and a time and place was determined to meet 










the survey was on gathering household socio-economic data, livelihood approaches, 
as well as perceptions pertaining to the closure of the abalone fishery. 
Interviews were also conducted with selected MCM officials in the directorates 
involved in aspects of abalone management at their offices in Cape Town. Questions 
were tailored depending on the role of the person in the organisation. Interviews were 
conducted with officials from the following Chief Directorates: Research, Antarctica 
and Islands (4), Marine and Coastal Resource Management (2), Monitoring, Control 
and Surveillance (2) as well as Integrated Coastal Management (2). In total, 10 MCM 
officials were interviewed. Further, three UCT scientists were also interviewed. 
Interviews were also conducted with key informants including local and provincial 
government authorities, representatives of community organisations, business people, 
local fishery control officers (FCOs), and personnel from abalone processing 
factories. These interviews provided a better understanding of social and economic 
issues in the community as well as institutional arrangements, livelihood options 
available and the key opportunities and obstacles to income or livelihood 
diversification. 
For a comprehensive list of people that were interviewed for this dissertation, refer to 
Appendix 9.3. 
All data were gathered by the author and initial fieldtrips were conducted in 
collaboration with a PhD student based at the Environmental Evaluation Unit (EEU), 
University of Cape Town (UCT). Data collected were mainly qualitative and this 
thesis represents the best objective interpretation of the information provided by 
fishers and other informants. 
Interviewees were assured anonymity and thus only their title or role will be provided 
in parentheses, for instance: (Research Official). This facilitated more open and 
honest discussions, as interviewees were less concerned about any repercussions that 
may result from expressing their opinions. Further, the aim of this study was not to 











Research for this study commenced soon after the fishery had been closed. Initial 
discussions with rights holders, revealed that many were hopeful that the fishery 
would be reopened and had consequently not given much thought to alternative 
livelihood opportunities. However, on returning to Kleinmond a few weeks after the 
announcement of the closure, it was clear that rights holders had been considering 
alternative economic opportunities. This could have been as a result of the initial visit 
(which had encouraged rights holders to start thinking about alternatives), or because 
meetings between MCM and rights holders revealed the lack of a Social Plan to 
address alternative livelihood options. 
It is possible that certain rights holders may have been investigating alternatives, yet 
seemed reluctant to offer these alternatives for fear that MCM would close the fishery 
permanently and concentrate on the alternatives which the fishers themselves 
suggested. Further, they were concerned that if these ventures did not prove 
successful, that they (and not MCM) would be held responsible. On returning to 
Kleinmond for a second visit, some fishers were more forthcoming regarding 
economic ventures they were involved in or opportunities they had been investigating. 
Time is a huge factor in building a relationship of trust with the fishers, and although 
there was an existing relationship with colleagues in the EEU, time was needed to 
build a trusting relationship between the author and the fishers. In Kleinmond, this is a 
particularly important limitation due to the contentious nature of the resource, as well 
as a history of mistrust and empty promises. There is also deep-rooted conflict and 
tension in the community due to competition regarding access to resources and the 
permit allocation system which has resulted in tension between those who received 
allocations, and those who did not (Hauck and Hector 2003). 
Although the study aimed to target both the boat owners and their crew, in general 
crew members were difficult to track down as they were usually at sea, acting as crew 
on other boats, catching fish or doing informal work as builders or gardeners. As a 
result, mainly boat owners or rights holders were interviewed. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the perceptions of crew, rights holders were asked questions 










Further, a number of challenges presented themselves during the data collection 
process. Firstly, many respondents used the interview and focus group sessions as an 
opportunity to advance their own agendas. Thus some questions were not answered in 
full or the answer did not pertain to the question asked. Secondly, the timeframe for 
research was shott and thus there was little flexibility in terms of the research 
schedule - thus opportunities for interviews were lost when fishers had to go to sea. 
Third, due to the sensitivity surrounding the closure of the abalone fishery one needed 
to be cautious not to raise expectations as often researchers are perceived to be 
bringing opportunities. And lastly, scepticism and lack of trust towards MCM resulted 
in fishers being reluctant to answer certain questions, particularly those related to their 
income; current livelihood activities as well as potential future opportunities. Fishers 
were wary of answering these questions because they believed that MCM would use 
the information "against them". 
1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theoretical and conceptual ideas underpinning 
the study and includes a review of the literature on poverty and food security, 
alternative livelihoods, the sustainable livelihoods framework and co-management. 
Chapter 3 provides a review of the legal and institutional framework relevant to 
small-scale fisheries and abalone in South Africa. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the abalone fishery in South Africa as well as the 
case study area, describing Kleinmond, the fishers and the resource. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings of the study. It looks at the decision-making process 
that led to the closure of the fishery, the impact of the closure on fishers and possible 
alternative livelihood options. 
Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the study. 










2. Theoretical and conceptual ideas underpinning the study 
2.1 Alternative Livelihoods 
Cheung and Sumaila (2007) state that it is essential to develop alternative livelihoods 
for fishers who are affected by fisheries management and conservation policies, to 
facilitate the shift toward sustainable fishing. Further, the reduction of fishing effort 
without proper training to help fishers find alternative livelihoods may create 
significant social problems (Cheung and Sumaila 2007). 
However, strategies and initiatives to promote alternative livelihoods are often 
difficult to implement, particularly among fishers. This is because fishing fulfills non-
economic satisfactions that make fishers reluctant to leave the industry, even if 
catches and income decline (Cinner and Pollnac 2004). Therefore, to succeed, 
alternative livelihood or income strategies should fulfill some of the same job 
satisfactions as fishing (Cinner and Pollnac 2004). Pomeroy et al. (2006) similarly 
state that alternative livelihoods for fishers should have some of the same 
characteristics that are considered desirable in fishing such as being self employed or 
just the pleasure of being at sea. In addition, fishers show an interest in activities that 
do not remove them entirely from the fishery and that utilise their current skills-set. 
Alternative income generation should be tailored to the understandings and needs of 
specific segments of the community, as this will maximise the benefits of social 
changes and promote sustainable resource use (Cinner and Pollnac 2004). It is vital to 
be aware of the constraints faced in other countries when trying to implement 
alternative livelihood options in coastal communities. Conventional interventions in 
the fisheries sector have focused on the introduction of new technologies, provision of 
credit, fish stock enhancement programmes and strengthening of government 
monitoring and enforcement (Allison and Horemans 2006). Instead, interventions 
identified through the sustainable livelihoods approach, are usually targeted at 
overcoming institutional barriers to the effective development of existing 
technologies, financial service provision and marketing arrangements (Allison and 










users to become involved in fisheries management and tend to address the social 
needs of fishing communities (Allison and Horemans 2006). 
One of the most frequently proposed alternative activities for coastal communities is 
aquaculture. However, aquaculture initiatives are not without problems and should not 
be seen as a blanket solution to resource overexploitation in fisheries. For example, 
the introduction of aquaculture in Central Vietnam as a livelihood opportunity had 
negative repercussions that left farmers in debt and polluted natural resources (Van 
Hue and Scott 2007). Those with management skills, capital and the right political 
connections, gained priority access to resources. However, the 'better-off farmers 
who invested more ended up most indebted. In addition, crises such as disease 
outbreaks have devastated aquaculture initiatives and these are exacerbated by low 
levels of education and lack of experience amongst fishers as well as poor technical 
support and lack of access to capital (Van Hue and Scott 2007). A range of socio-
economic problems are associated with the development of aquaculture e.g. equity 
issues relating to distribution of benefits, conversion of common property to private 
property, land-use conflicts, and the production of an export food instead of food for 
the poor (Defeo and Castilla 2005; Van Hue and Scott 2007). Van Hue and Scott 
(2007) stress the importance of attention to local contexts and histories when 
considering alternative livelihoods as this can contribute to a more thorough 
understanding of the cause and consequences of environment-poverty interfaces. 
Another problem associated with the introduction of alternative livelihoods, or coastal 
development in general, is that successful ventures tend to attract outsiders (Raakjaer 
Nielsen et al. 2004; Sievanen et al. 2005). Unless alternative livelihood projects are 
coupled with controls to prevent increased fishing effort and new entrants, and a 
change from fish as the main protein source, fishing in unlikely to decrease (Sievanen 
et al. 2005). 
The promotion of alternative livelihoods is often based on a number of assumptions 
regarding fishing and fishing communities. Firstly, it is assumed that small-scale 
fishers are poor and that this is linked to resource overexploitation. Secondly, it is 
assumed that fishers are willing to stop fishing and engage in more lucrative 










reduce pressure on the resources (Sievanen et af. 2005). However, recent research has 
shown that these assumptions may be incorrect (Sievanen et af. 2005). For example, 
Sievanen et af. (2005) found from a review of literature and empirical research that 
researchers are now questioning whether fishers are in fact amongst the poorest of the 
poor. Furthermore, there are questions regarding the direct link between poverty and 
overexploitation and that job satisfaction results in a resistance to change to 
alternative occupations (Sievanen et af. 2005). 
Examples of international and regional interventions to identify and develop 
alternative livelihoods include the Sustainable Fisheries Livelihood Programme 
(SFLP) based in West Africa, and the Integrated Coastal Resource Management 
Project (ICRMP) based in the Philippines. The SFLP achieves its objectives by 
providing three types of support: institutional capacity and policy development; small-
scale poverty-focused community projects; and pilot-projects that address regional 
issues related to livelihood security (Allison and Horemans 2006). However, 
interventions such as the SFLP are targeted at overcoming the institutional barriers 
and creating conditions that facilitate the involvement of resource users in monitoring, 
surveillance and enforcement of fisheries management (Allison and Horemans 2006). 
Interventions should not focus only on fishery management related activities, but 
should also be involved in social issues such as HIV / AIDS prevalence or gender 
inequalities (Allison and Horemans 2006). 
The Integrated Coastal Resource Management Project (lCRMP) was initiated in 2005 
and will run until 2009. It is supported by the Asian Development Bank loan and a 
Global Environmental Faculty (GEF) grant and implemented by the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The aim is to improve the state of 
coastal and marine resources, thereby reducing poverty. The project will strengthen 
institutional development and coordination between agencies, as well as help to 
develop a national CRM policy. Enterprise development and poverty reduction 
interventions will aim to develop sustainable enterprises and livelihoods for local 
communities. Further, infrastructure and social services will be provided, to improve 
the quality of life for coastal residents and facilitate ICM (White et af. 2005). Both 
these projects recognise the importance of institutional arrangements as an issue that 










As is clear from the above, a review of the literature has highlighted a number of 
constraints with regards to the implementation of alternative livelihood options. 
Pomeroy et af. (2006) list four key criteria for assessing livelihood options that could 
playa role in facilitating their success: 
(i) Social feasibility i.e. livelihood options need to be well-suited to "the 
needs and aspirations, existing work ethic and livelihood strategies, 
organization, economic and social structure, gender differences, and 
culture of the affected community and households . .. Because households 
are not homogenous, and preferences differ, a variety of options need to be 
made available. Livelihoods that evolve in response to local skills and 
available resources are more likely to be sustainable; 
(ii) Technical feasibility i.e. livelihoods are preferable if they reqUIre low 
levels of capitalization, are low risk and are at a level that can be managed 
by the people; 
(iii) Institutional sustainability i.e. livelihoods must be sustainable even after 
external organizations (with funding and resources) phase out. Decision-
making must be participatory and people must be provided with the skills 
and ability to adapt to change; 
(iv) Supporting infrastructure and policy environment i.e. the sustainability of a 
livelihood option "will depend on the availability of supporting 
infrastructure and the enabling environment, including credit, inputs, 
markets and technical assistance. " 
Although the concept of alternative livelihoods is being promoted in various countries 
through numerous projects, there is still a pressing need to reduce the absolute 
pressure on resources (White et al. 2005). Alternative livelihoods, whilst necessary, 
do not employ people to the extent required to reduce absolute dependence on coastal 
resources. Research by White et af. (2005) found that as people migrate to the coast, 
there are an increasing number of people dependent on fisheries for food and 
livelihoods. White et af. (2005) recommend that the need to balance human 
population growth with resource use and management should be incorporated into 










Subsistence fisheries in South Africa are characterised by poverty, a large number of 
users and easy access to resources (van Sittert et af. 2006). Co-management and the 
development of alternative livelihoods are crucial to fulfill the need for co-operation 
from fishers and to alleviate pressure on resources (van Sittert et af. 2006). "Failure to 
generate alternative livelihoods and create employment will heighten poverty, 
intensify reliance on natural resources and increase illegal catches until slocks 
collapse. "(van Sittert et af. 2006). In addition, small-scale fisheries are often 
neglected in rural development or poverty alleviation initiatives (F AO 2005). This is 
because fishers are often seen to be 'employed' as they already have a means of 
livelihood (pers. comm. Sowman 2008). 
In situations were people with historic involvement in small-scale fisheries are 
excluded from accessing marine resources, this cannot be done without first 
identifying and developing viable alternative livelihood opportunities for them. It is 
government's responsibility to explore other livelihood opportunities with such 
communities (Sowman and Cardoso 2008). Further, exploring alternatives an inter-
sectoral approach is needed, taking into account that fishers often use a range of 
livelihood strategies (Sowman and Cardoso). There are a number of national polices 
that may be of relevance to identifying alternative livelihoods. These include poverty 
alleviation, decentralization, finance and credit, migration, health and education (F AO 
2005). Furthermore, the SADC Protocol on Fisheries holds the State responsible to 
seek alternative economic opportunities for persons in cases where their activities 
threaten the survival of a species. 
In 1999, Hauck and Sweijd predicted that there would be severe economIC 
repercussions should the abalone resource collapse, resulting in a need to seek 
alternative forms of income. Not only would rights holders be affected; but also those 
who indirectly depend on the fishery for their livelihood (Hauck and Sweijd 1999). It 
would appear that limited research and feasibility studies were undertaken on 
appropriate livelihood opportunities for those dependent on small-scale fisheries 










2.2 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) (see Figure 1) was developed as a tool 
to help gain a better understanding and aid analysis of the livelihoods of the poor, and 
to allow thinking about livelihoods that orders the complexity of the various factors 
(DFID 1999; Allison and Ellis 2001). The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach is not 
only a research or conceptual framework, but can also be used to design and 
implement policies that seek to improve livelihoods and reduce poverty (Allison and 
Horemans 2006). If management or other forms of intervention are based on an 
incomplete understanding of livelihoods, it can result in recommendations that are 
incompatible with resource conservation as well as the social and economic goals of 
management (Allison and Ellis 2001). A key aim of the SLF is to avoid 
preoccupation with a particular component of a livelihood strategy, and to ensure a 
holistic approach in which other components, that make demands on the resources of 
the household, are considered (Allison and Ellis 2001). 
The Framework organises the various factors that influence people's livelihoods and 
the relationships between them, as well as trying to determine how people convert 
assets into livelihood outcomes (DFID 1999; Allison and Horemans 2006; Isaacs 
2006). The Framework seeks to understand the factors that influence a particular 
choice of livelihood strategy (DFID 1999), but also recognises multiple strategies, 
actors and livelihood outcomes (Isaacs 2006). The unit of analysis is typically the 
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Figmc 1: The Sustainable Livelihoods Flamework (adapted from lsam,s 2(06) 
l\ livelihood is made up oI'thc assets and the activities, and th~ m'c~ss to lhc,:c, lhat 
co lkctivcly determine the living aclll~ve<l by lh~ individual or hOll,>cho ld (All ison and 
Elli~ 20( 1). L;"eb 11 0005 ur" susla; nabk when lbey arc r~-, i lienl [0 ~hocb atlJ Strc,SC5. 
arc 1101 reliant on exlernal _,upporL maintain the long term productivity of natural 
rc~ourccs and do not un(krmin~ '" GOmpromi,>c the livtiihmx], or others (DFID 1999: 
Isaacs 20()6; Alli,on and Horcman~ 2(){)6). The sustainable usc of the resoUlw IS a 
pl'el'equisite for ,;u';tainab Ie live] iboodo: ill coasta l communi tics (Isaacs 2(06). 
The framework views people as operating in a context of vu lnerability, within whidl 
they have access to certain assets or poverty l'educing factors (DFID 1999). The 
'vulnerability context' refers to external factors which al'e l>eyond the househo ld'~ 
control thm call affect livelihood ;:ustainabil ity, such as shocks4, ll'en<lsl an<l se,,-sonal 
shifts, which can destroy or create assets (UHU 1999; Allison and Ellis 2001; Alli'ilm 
and Horemans 20(6), Poor ~oplc'slivclihoods are innately Ij-ugik, whi~h make~ it 
dil'ficult i'OT thenl to co~ "'1th stresses or to reduce those stresses, and as a result the;' 
l>ec.ome m~rca-,ing l y more vulnerable (DFID 1999) Pasl mana~ement practices to 
cmb resource deplclion bave been lOp <lown and mnsequent ly nol responSlve to 
trends und shocks, as they lack adaptability (Allison and Lllis 2001). 
' E· H ,to,", damago, toxic alg,1 blao:n. or fu. 1 pr;';. in". , ,", (Alli;on end Ilorem,,, , 2006). 











To ensure that interventions reach the poor in a particular community, and build the 
necessary resilience, it is essential to understand the underlying causes of poverty and 
vulnerability (Allison and Horemans 2006; Pomeroy et al. 2006). Underlying causes 
of poverty can include: "social and economic power imbalances, lack of participation 
in decision-making, limited asset ownership, resource dependence, and laws and 
regulations that influence people's ability to use assets" (Pomeroy et al. 2006). 
Building resilience means "reducing reliance upon natural resources for livelihoods, 
strengthening community institutions, organizations and infrastructure, and 
diversifying livelihoods" (Pomeroy et al. 2006). Research suggests that laws and 
policies are not encouraging the building of resilience, in fact they are resulting in the 
opposite (Pomeroy et al. 2006) 
Further, we need to understand how people sustain their livelihoods (or not) despite 
shocks and trends, as this will help design policies that are based on existing coping 
strategies and that can enhance their effectiveness (Allison and Horemans 2006). 
Policies or interventions can include improving access to education, reforming local 
tax systems, providing financial services or promoting livelihood diversification 
(Allison and Horemans 2006). 
Livelihood or capital assets or the' asset pentagon', lies at the core of the framework, 
within the vulnerability context, and consist of the natural6, human7, social8, financial9 
and physical lo capital that that is owned, controlled or somehow accessed by the 
household (OFIO 1999; Allison and Ellis 2001; Allison and Horemans 2006). These 
assets gain their value through the social, institutional, policy and organizational 
environment in which they operate (i.e. 'policies institutions and processes' II) (OFIO 
1999; Allison and Horemans 2006): 
6 E.g. Fish stocks, areas accessed by license, land owned (Allison and Horemans 2006). 
7 E.g. People's capabilities in terms of their knowledge, skills, health and education (Allison and 
Horemans 2006). 
8 E.g. Organizations, networks and associations that people can use during times of difficulty (Allison 
and Horemans 2006). 
9 E.g. Savings, credit, insurance (Allison and Horemans 2006). 
10 E.g. Boat and house (at the household level); infrastructure and schools (community level) (Allison 
and Horemans 2006). 











"ft is policies and institutions that determine access to assets, set the vulnerability 
context and determine peoples' livelihood options, reactions and strategies, and 
ultimately, the outcomes of those strategies in terms of their ability to make a 
living and willingness to invest in helping to conserve the natural resource base. 
Addressing governance therefore remains the key challenge for both poverty 
reduction and responsible fisheries. " (Allison and Horemans 2006). 
These 'policies, institutions and processes' hinder or enable access to capital or 
livelihood strategies (i.e. access rights and regimes), determine the terms of exchange 
between different types of capital and the returns experienced from livelihood 
strategies (DFID 1999; Allison and Ellis 2001; Allison and Horemans 2006). This 
policy and institutional environment in turn also influences the livelihood strategies 
(i.e. ways of combining and using assets) that are available to people in order to 
achieve livelihood outcomes l2 that meet their livelihood objectives (DFID 1999). 
Many livelihood strategies are employed by the poor in order to make the best use of 
the assets available in their environment (Glavovic et al. 2002). These strategies can 
vary spatially and temporally, can be used together or sequentially and do not 
necessarily complement each other (Glavovic et al. 2002). These may include: 
employment, pensions and grants, resource harvesting, trading and investment in 
social networks and services, amongst others (Glavovic et al. 2002). 
Allison and Horemans (2006) list interventions that can strengthen the 'asset 
platform' and include the following: human - training, education, improved access to 
health facilities; natural - rehabilitation of degraded environments; assisting 
communities to use their resources more sustainably; financial - improve access to 
credit; savings mechanisms; physical - improve access to infrastructure; and social -
strengthen community organization skills; building trust; inclusion of marginalised 
groups. 
It is important that development initiatives focus on existing capital - the key to 
successful fisheries development is to focus on what fishers have, rather that what 
they do not (Allison and Ellis 2001). Therefore attention should be focused on 










knowledge, skills, social capital, income generating-strategies and resource 
management, to aid fishers to build on existing capital and make their own way out of 
poverty (Allison and Ellis 2001). The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework is a 
holistic approach that puts people at the centre of development interventions, since 
sustainable poverty reduction will not be possible unless it takes into consideration 
current livelihood strategies, social circumstances and the people's ability to adapt 
(DFID 1999). It recognises that fishers' livelihoods depend on a range of assets and 
that building social and human capital can decrease poverty and vulnerability by 
supporting existing attempts to do so, whilst also addressing the institutional and 
policy factors that prevent them from protecting their fisheries resources (Allison and 
Horemans 2006). 
Diversity vs. Specialization 
Diversified livelihoods can be beneficial to resource protection (Allison and Ellis 
2001) and should be encouraged over specialization. Policies should encourage part-
time fishing, instead of trying to professionalise small-scale fishers and ban part-
timers (Allison and Ellis 2001). The promotion of specialization by investing in 
capital-intensive technologies or assets will result in part-time fishers becoming full-
time fishers, as they have loans to repay and need a return on their investment 
(Allison and Ellis 2001). As a result, fishers become more reliant on fishing, and 
during times of resource scarcity they will be less likely to revert to non-fisheries 
based livelihoods - this can have a negative impact on the resource as they will 
continue to harvest (Allison and Ellis 2001). In fact, Allison and Ellis (2001) suggest 
that a lack of livelihood diversity may be due to inappropriate interventions and 
management. 
"Rather than being specialized, and therefore vulnerable to a sudden change, 
many households in coastal communities are well situated to adapt to changing 
circumstances. The net result of this occupational diversity is that many coastal 
communities are best understood as dependent not on a single resource but on a 










Diverse sources of income can potentially buffer people in the event of one activity 
failing (Sievanen et af. 2005). If a wide range of assets are drawn upon, it can 
minimise susceptibility to shocks and minimise poverty (Glavovic et af. 2002). 
However, a lack of specialization on one or two assets can lead to greater poverty 
(Glavovic et af. 2002). Poor people often do not have access to a full suite of assets 
or they do not know how to access them (Glavovic et af. 2002). 
"Solving the problem of a lack of livelihood diversity is by no means simple. If it 
were, fishery-based economies would already have become diversified by now, 
in response to past fishery downturns" (Charles 2001 in Allison and Ellis 2001). 
Most fishers in low-income countries pursue a diversity of livelihood strategies as 
fishing is prone to unpredictable seasonal fluctuations in stock size and location, and 
because diversification reduces risk and vulnerability (Allison and Ellis 2001; FAO 
2005; Sowman 2006). Sectoral policies do not adequately address this shift between 
various livelihood strategies and make it difficult for fishers to do so (Allison and 
Ellis 2001; Walmsley et af. 2006). Therefore, whilst specialization can be encouraged 
in more industrialised countries, it is not feasible in countries where fishers have 
traditionally adjusted their behaviour and turned to alternative forms of income when 
resources declined (Allison and Ellis 2001). In South Africa, the rights allocation 
system fails to recognise the array of livelihood strategies that are employed by fishers 
(Sowman 2006). 
Thus whilst encouraging fishers to engage in livelihoods outside of the fishery sector; 
choosing appropriate alternatives is not simple and requires "very careful assessment 
of existing livelihoods strategies, the assets of the poor, specific vulnerabilities and 
sources of risk, attitudes, and coping mechanisms" (F AO 2005). 
Perceptions about "Community" 
A stumbling block to the successful implementation of sustainable livelihood 
initiatives is the common perception of fishing communities as homogenous, 
geographically isolated groups (Allison and Ellis 2001; Isaacs 2006). However, 










necessary to distinguish between "new entrants" and traditional resource user groups 
(Allison and Ellis 2001). Further, within communities, households usually differ in 
terms of assets, incomes and religion (Allison and Ellis 2001). Because of the 
differences in wealth and status, people often do not have shared goals or interests 
(Allison and Ellis 2001). Similarly, 'coastal communities' often consist of multiple, 
often competing interest groups (Sunde 2003). Another concern is that better 
informed, politically connected and wealthier members of the fishing communities 
tend to be the main beneficiaries of quotas and access at the expense of poorer 
members of the community (Isaacs 2006; Sowman 2006). 
The SLA does not make assumptions about 'community' - instead it supports 
Agrawal and Gibson's (1999) call to "abandon the notion of the 'mythic community' 
in favour of a focus on institutions, conceptualized as sets of rules describing and 
prescribing human actions" (Allison and Ellis 2001). An institutional approach 
focuses on the ability of actors to make and enforce rules that are a product of social 
negotiation or compromise between stakeholders, and implies support of existing 
institutions (Allison and Ellis 2001). This approach is favoured over the creation of a 
perceived homogenous community (Allison and Ellis 2001). Isaacs (2006) cautions 
that in South Africa, government (MCM) often tries to implement a sustainable 
livelihoods approach usmg the term 'community' to imply a homogenous, 
geographically isolated group. 
A weakness of the livelihoods approach is that it suggests the poor are capable of 
escaping poverty, through the possession of assets to create a sustainable livelihood 
(Isaacs 2006). However, most coastal communities are asset-poor and cash-
dependant, with very little or no formal education (Isaacs 2006). Further, assets and 
the relationships between them change over time, and thus require some form of 
management to prevent depletion or degradation (Glavovic et al. 2002). The poor 
struggle to take a long term view of these assets, as they need to meet their immediate 
short-term needs (Glavovic et al. 2002). 
Many coastal communities in South Africa are involved in a range of income earning 
opportunities, such as fisheries, agriculture, handicrafts and services on a seasonal or 










universally effective in providing sustainable livelihoods for the coastal poor, because 
the complexity of the coastal environment requires that multiple strategies are 
employed to address the diverse needs of coastal communities (DEAT 2008a). Many 
alternative livelihood initiatives that have been implemented have failed or proved 
unsustainable without continued funding (EEU 2008b). This is often due to a lack of 
understanding of the social and cultural dimensions as well as a lack of research and 
poor planning (EEU 2008b). Opportunities and constraints associated with 
sustainable alternative livelihood programmes have not been adequately assessed and 
is thus in itself a major limitation to the successful implementation of alternative 
livelihood opportunities for coastal communities (EEU 2008b). 
The poor face many constraints and obstacles in achieving sustainable coastal 
livelihoods in South Africa (Glavovic et al. 2002). Obstacles relate mainly to: "the 
lack of access to and ownership of coastal resources, limitations of the living natural 
resource base, institutional inadequacies, and a lack of skills and capacity/ awareness 
to develop opportunities". Even though MCMs focal point is managing marine 
resources, they also need to align their activities with national poverty alleviation and 
food security priorities (Sowman 2006). Thus government should facilitate the 
exploration of alternative livelihood opportunities with other relevant agencies 
(Sowman 2006). 
In South Africa, many institutions and organizations have a role to play in developing 
sustainable coastal livelihood opportunities, including government agencies, NGOs, 
CBOs, research institutions and private sector institutions (Glavovic et al. 2002). 
Their roles, responsibilities and mandates are generally poorly defined and therefore 
the poor do not know who has jurisdiction over assets or who can provide them with 
support (Glavovic et al. 2002). Polices, laws and their related procedures and 
implementation practices are often overlapping, inconsistent and conflicting 
(Glavovic et al. 2002). Coastal Management Plans, for example, aim to provide co-
ordinated management for a number of sensitive coastal areas. In effect, these should 
include proposals to identify opportunities for sustainable alternative livelihoods 
within their management area. Integrated Development Plans, which are developed at 
a local government level, may also contain proposals to identify and implement SCLs, 










Furthermore, many institutions are unaware of each others' role in the realm of 
coastal livelihoods, resulting in a lack of cooperation and coordination of activities. 
Provincial and Local government responsibility over coastal resources has increased, 
with little provision of additional resources to cope with new responsibilities. This is 
coupled with a lack of understanding of coastal management issues. 
The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework organises all the factors that contribute to the 
livelihood strategy employed by individuals and allows thinking about livelihoods 
that orders the complexity of the various factors. The SLF promotes a holistic 
approach to livelihoods and it encourages one not to only look at abalone harvesting, 
but to also look at other activities fishers are involved in that contribute to their 
livelihood. This assisted in the development of the questionnaire which looked 
broadly at assets and livelihood strategies employed by fishers and asked fishers to 
identify what they considered to be opportunities and constraints associated with 
alternative livelihoods. Further, it helped to guide key questions asked of various 
stakeholders. The SLF assists in connecting all aspects of the enquiry, thus the policy, 
legal and institutional framework is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
2.3 Co-management 
Despite groundbreaking concepts such as 'Common Property Theory' and the 
'Tragedy of the Commons', as well as advances in natural resource management, the 
degradation of natural resources is continuing (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990; Hara 
2003). Resource managers are still struggling to remove the incentive for destructive 
competition due to the common property nature of natural resources (Hara 2003). 
Centralised state management has long been identified as one of the problems; and is 
becoming too costly for the state (Hara 2003). Similarly, sole management at the local 
level may also prove ineffective (Hara 2003). 
Common property resources are those for which "exclusion is difficult and joint use 
involves subtractability" (Hara 2003). Thus, control of access to users is problematic 
or costly and each user's exploitation results in less of the resource being available to 
other users (Hara 2003). Thus there are two management issues: the need to regulate 










authorised users (Hara 2003). If a management regime is to be effective, it must deal 
with both these issues (Hara 2003). Property rights are also an important consideration 
in a situation involving common property resources (Hara 2003). Property rights 
consist of a bundle of characteristics, i.e. exclusivity, transferability, inheritability, 
alienability and enforcement mechanisms, and define the legitimate uses which are 
exclusive and who has these exclusive rights (Hara 2003). 
In addition, the call for greater public participation and resource user involvement in 
natural resource management has been incorporated into various international and 
regional conventions (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Pedersen and Sunde 2007). Various 
management approaches exist, and a variety of possible collaborative management 
approaches can be put in place to facilitate decentralised and patiicipative resource 
management allowing resource users to be involved in management and decision-
making (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Excluding the very 
people you are trying to manage (resource users) from being involved in management 
decisions, will almost guarantee that the measures put in place will not be successful 
(Hara 2003). By engaging resource users in management, the hope is that users would 
act more responsibly towards the long term goal of sustainability (Hara 2003). A 
system that is collaborative, transparent, participatory and inclusionary is the most 
effective way to approach the management of small-scale fisheries. However, each 
management initiative should take stock of the context within which it is operating to 
ensure that measures put in place are realistic (Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen 1996). 
Co-management is joint management through delegation and power sharing; where 
resource-users and government share decision making and management powers (Sen 
and Raakjaer Nielsen 1996; Symes and Phillipson 1999; Hara 2003; Hauck and 
Sowman 2003; McConney et al. 2003; Raakjaer Nielsen et al. 2004; Beem 2007; 
Suarez de Viviero et al. 2008). The general functions of co-management are "the 
encouragement of partnerships, provision of local incentives for sustainable use of 
resources, and the sharing of power and responsibility for conservation" (Hara 
2003). According to Pomeroy et al. (2001) co-management is a compromise between 
government concerns for efficient resource utilisation and protection on the one hand 
and resource users' concern for equal opportunities, self-determination and self-










responsibility to be delegated and shared based on the capabilities of resource users 
and government. The extent to which government devolves decision-making powers 
to resource users is dependant on a number of factors: the extent of political support 
for user involvement; the existing legislative provisions; and the capacity, skills and 
resources of the different stakeholders (Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen 1996; Symes and 
Phillipson 1999; Hara 2003; Hauck and Sowman 2003; Raakjaer Nielsen et al. 2004; 
Suarez de Vivero et al. 2008). Ideally however, co-management gives user groups real 
influence in that their input makes a difference in the decision-making process (Hara 
2003). Support for co-management results from the view that concerned interests 
should be heard; information from resource users would result in improved 
management decisions; and that it could improve legitimacy of the management 
system since no management arrangement will work unless it has the support of those 
whose behaviour it intends to influence (Hara 2003). 
The continuum or spectrum of co-management arrangements is classified according to 
the roles that government and users play (See Figure 2). 'Instructive': minimal 
exchange of information between users and government (government informs users 
on the decisions they plan to make); 'consultative': all decisions are taken by 
government, but mechanisms exist for consultation; 'cooperative': government and 
users are equal partners- in decision-making; 'advisory': the users advise government 
of decisions to be taken; and' informative': powers to make decisions are delegated to 
user groups. For many, 'cooperative' co-management is the definition of co-
management (adapted from Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen 1996). See also: Symes and 
Phillipson 1999; Hara 2003; Raakjaer Nielsen et al. 2004; Suarez de Vivero et al. 
(2008). Co-management is usually considered to lie somewhere in the middle, so that 
fishers or resource users are not merely providing information, as is so often the case 
in government/stakeholder relations (Beem 2007). Co-management must be based on 
mutual respect and trust and it is important that "the autonomy of both the state and 
resource users, in their respective areas of responsibility, is fully recognised and 















Figure 2. The continuum of co-management arrangements. Adapted from Sen and 
Raakjaer-Nielsen 1996. 
Institutions are the formal and informal sets of rules and types of interactions that 
people develop in order to function effectively (McConney et al. 2003). Co-
management institutions that are based on the democratic representation of the fishers 
have more staying power than those that are not (Mahon and Wilson 2003). Effective 
management is adaptive and responds well to social and biological information 
(Mahon and Wilson 2003). Thus, the smaller the scale an institution is operating on 
the better able it is able to understand and respond to information (Mahon and Wilson 
2003). Mahon and Wilson (2003) state that communities which need government help 
in resolving conflicts are the most ripe for the creation of effective, self motivated, co-
management institutions. 
Co-management is often implemented in situations where problems related to 
overexploitation of resources, increases in illegal harvesting, and tensions between 
local communities and authorities exist (Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen 1996; Hauck and 
Sowman 2001; Hara 2003). Therefore it is often implemented in response to a 
particular crisis (Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen 1996; Hauck and Sowman 2001; Kaplan 
and McCay 2004). Limited capacity in governments to enforce regulations and 










of management responsibilities. Also, in the South African context, the policy and 
legislative framework requires that government devolve power and embrace 
sustainable development principles (Hauck and Sowman 2001). Factors that impact 
on the success of the co-management of common pool resources include the attributes 
of the community (i.e. they are relatively homogenous; rule changes will affect them 
equally and the costs of transformation are relatively low), the resource (i.e. difficulty 
of exclusion and subtractability), the nature of the rules governing use, and the 
relationship of the groups to external forces (Beem 2007). 
There is a growmg awareness of the benefits of including local user groups in 
management and decision-making and that this can lead to better management (Beem 
2007). These include: better information about the resource, including local 
knowledge suited to the context and broadening the amount of knowledge that would 
influence decisions; improved compliance with management protocols due to support 
and greater perceived procedural legitimacy from users as a result of their 
involvement and in turn, buy-in from the people they are trying to regulate decreases 
transaction costsl 3 (Hauck and Sowman 2001; Hara 2003; van Sittert 2003; Defeo and 
Castilla 2005; Beem 2007; BerghOfer et al. 2008). 
Enhancing the capacity of user groups to undertake co-management responsibilities is 
a challenge that requires time, effort and finances (Frangoudes et al. 2008). Further, a 
lack of capacity is seen as a major stumbling block to successful implementation of 
co-management (Hauck and Sowman 2001). The formation of local level institutions 
or management structures within the community l4 will require support and capacity 
building in order to 'get off the ground' (Hauck and Sowman 2001; Raakjaer Nielsen 
et al. 2004). It is vital that resource users understand why co-management is being 
implemented i.e. that they understand sustainable resource practices (Hauck and 
Sowman 2001). Building capacity of local management structures and individuals, 
will lead to empowerment of resource users (Hauck and Sowman 2001). It can be 
argued that empowerment and skills development will give users confidence to 
explore other forms of work. Establishing relationships between stakeholders is vital 
as mutual respect and trust are the foundations of co-management (Symes and 
13 i.e. the time, money and manpower that is usually spent on enforcement, control, monitoring and 
surveillance 











Phillipson 1999). There is no one model of co-management that can be applied 
because what type and how much responsibility to devolve is dependant on the 
political and local context, the capabilities of resource users, and how much power 
government is willing to devolve (Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen 1996; Hauck and 
Sowman 2001; Hara 2003; Sowman 2006). 
Ideally, co-management arrangements need to be in place before resource conditions 
decline to a state of scarcity (Hara 2003). Often co-management is introduced once 
the resource is already declining, and objective becomes the recovery of the resource 
which requires reduced exploitation (Hara 2003). In this situation, co-management 
alone cannot solve the problem of over-exploitation, and alternative sources of 
livelihood become closely linked to resource recovery and the success of the 
management strategy (Hara 2003). Co-management also cannot be expected to 
overcome problems related to rapid popUlation growth, corruption or open access 
property regimes, which may be the main causes of resource degradation (Hara 2003). 
Further, the introduction of a co-management arrangement is time and money 
consuming (Hara 2003). 
There are numerous challenges facing the effective implementation of co-
management in South Africa. Firstly, with political transformation and new policies 
and legislation, there is often a lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities 
within government. Coupled with the inefficiency and lack of capacity of people 
within government, there is a sense that government is not committed to co-
management practices (Hauck and Sowman 2001; Masifundise 2007). In addition 
many members of the scientific community are sceptical about co-management and 
whether resource users are capable of management responsibilities (Hauck and 
Sowman 2001). This creates a dilemma in terms of implementation, because while 
there is a growing awareness that top down centralised methods do not work (Symes 
and Phillipson 1999; Raakjaer Nielsen et at. 2004) a lack of support for new methods 
does not encourage confidence, trust and participation on the part of resource users. 
Ultimately, resource users decide whether or not a management system will work, and 










Hara (2003) points out that co-management in coastal environments is particularly 
difficult due to the large number of user groups and stakeholders. Thus coastal areas 
are characterised by "the heterogeneity of users with uneven powers, conflicting 
interests, unequal bargaining powers and different stakeholder values and 
rationalities" (Hara 2003). This in turn makes deliberation and participant democracy 
more difficult to achieve and consensus rare (Hara 2003). 
Key conditions for successful co-management arrangements include suitable local and 
governmental institutions, trust between the actors (particularly due to the deep-rooted 
culture of distrust that characterises the relationship between state and local resource 
users), legal protection of local rights and economic incentives for local communities 
to conserve the resource (Hara 2003). Further, it is vital that case studies of co-
management be used to ascertain which factors led to the success or failure of similar 
initiatives. These conditions need to be understood and investigated. 
Further, whilst much research examines the efficacy of co-management institutions 
once they have been established; there is little attention to the processes through 
which alternative forms of management and decision-making are considered and 
changed (Beem 2007). It is vital that we examine the process of developing co-
management institutions and which factors facilitate or hamper the support of user 
groups to co-management (Beem 2007). The process of developing co-management 
institutions is time consuming and resource users do not always embrace changes to 
the status quo (Beem 2007). Factors which facilitate the development of co-
management institutions include government support, the characteristics of resource 
users and the resource, the nature of distributional conflict l5 and the affiliation of 
policy entrepreneurs l6 (Beem 2007). 
Similar to the decision to close the abalone fishery in South Africa, the Chilean loco 
fishery was closed between 1989 and 1992 due to overexploitation as a result of the 
open-access state of benthic resource fishing and the newly opened export markets 
(Castilla et al. 2005; Defeo and Castilla 2005). In 1991, TURFs were allocated to 
15 These conflicts are primarily concerned with the distribution or resources of access. These conflicts 
could provided the impetus for new rules to emerge as stakeholders, recognizing benefits of rule 
change, are willing to invest time and resources into the process to develop these new rules (Beem 
2007). 
16 Facilitating a new type of institutional arrangement may require an individual with time and 










artisanal fishers in what were known as "Management and Exploitation Areas for 
Benthic Resources" (MEABRs) (Castilla et al. 2005; Defeo and Castilla 2005). 
Coastal benthic shellfisheries, due to their sedentary or sessile nature are amenable to 
spatially-explicit management tools such as TURFs (Defeo and Castilla 2005). In 
benthic shellfisheries, where the community is geographically well-defined and 
matches the scales of distribution of the stocks, management sub-units can be clearly 
established and co-management arrangements tend to be meaningful (Defeo and 
Castilla 2005). 
MEABRs are a management alternative under which government and fishers shared 
responsibility for benthic resource sustainability (Castilla et al. 2005) However, the 
regulations were only published in 1997 and up until then, those fisher syndicates (or 
associations) who wished to engage in the MEABR policy did so informally with the 
support of university researchers (Castilla et al. 2005). In 1997, TURFs were legalised 
and given to artisanal fisher syndicates in the form of MEABRs. By 2000, the 
MEABRs were being harvested. 
The co-management arrangements behind the MEABR Policy required fisher 
syndicates to co-finance a baseline study for their MEABR from which quotas and 
management plans were created (Castilla et al. 2005). In addition, fishers must pay for 
annual follow up assessments by certified consultants to determine any changes in 
TACs or adjustments to the management plan (Castilla et al. 2005; Defeo and Castilla 
2005). Initially, the government co-financed the implementation of MEABRs as they 
were the basis for managing the loco fishery (Castilla et al. 2005). The aim was to 
increase the sense of exclusive use and thus ownership among fishers (Castilla et al. 
2005; Defeo and Castilla 2005). Further, the government put a ban on loco extraction 
apart from MEABRs with approved management plans (Castilla et al. 2005). 
Fisher communities self-organised into syndicates and applied for MEABRs creating 
partnerships with government, consultants and universities. Further, monitoring, 
control and surveillance procedures were put in place by fishers themselves to stop 
poaching within MEABRs (Castilla et al. 2005; Defeo and Castilla 2005). Also, 
participatory and regulatory rules were developed within communities (Castilla et al. 










was created by the policy which assigned fishing grounds to well-defined groups of 
fishers, recognizing the role of small-scale communities in conservation and 
management (Castilla et al. 2005). Castilla et al. (2005) also state that community 
quotas as opposed to individual quotas gave the right incentives for cooperation 
between fishers. 
Self-organisation and empowerment has led to a change in the attitudes of fishers 
towards the management and conservation of resources; with many agreeing that 
fishers have a duty to conserve marine resources for the next generation (Castilla et al. 
2005). This perception of their role in the conservation of marine species was 
generated through co-management. Thus in Chile, the implementation of co-
management strategies in addition to the allocation of property rights has been 
necessary for the management of benthic invertebrates (Castilla et al. 2005). 
However, despite the success of the MEABRs, no studies have examined the social 
consequences of the policy (Castilla et al. 2005). Those open-access areas that have 
not been declared as MEABRs are becoming scarce and overexploited. Some fishers 
(divers) complain that MEABRs are being indiscriminately extended, leaving many 
divers with nowhere to go. The lack of historical open-access diving grounds is 
leading to conflict between divers and illegal poaching within the MEABRs (Castilla 
et al. 2005). These fishers feel it is their right to do so as they claim that the syndicates 
who applied for MEABRs extracted resources from the open access sites in order to 
re-populate their MEABRs (Castilla et al. 2005). 
Hauck and Sweijd (1999) highlight that the establishment of co-management 
arrangements is more complex in the abalone fishery because it includes an organised 
criminal element, yet they stress that the notion should not be abandoned. Hauck and 
Sweijd (1999) identify the need to involve the community in crime prevention, 
enforcement, awareness, resource ownership, resource management and local 
governance, and to establish partnerships between initiatives. Whilst law enforcement 
does have a role to play, particularly in intelligence and policing, confrontational 
crime-control methods on the ground will not be the most effective in addressing 










3. Legal and Institutional Framework governing abalone management in South 
Africa 
There are a number of international, regional and national policies and protocols that 
are relevant to small-scale fisheries. South Africa has signed a number of international 
agreements and these have played a part in guiding the law reform process. Laws and 
policies in South Africa encourage participative, collaborative and holistic approaches 
to resource management, and aim to address the inequalities of the past. This chapter 
will outline the main laws, policies and protocols that are of general relevance to 
small-scale fisheries and more specifically to the abalone fishery in South Africa. It 
will also provide an overview of the key institutional arrangements relevant to the 
management of the Abalone fishery. 
3.1 International Instruments 
UNCLOS 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a key 
international agreement that has significant influence over domestic fisheries policy 
(Witbooi 2006). It establishes a legal regime for the ocean and marine resources, 
therein recognizing the autonomous right that coastal states have over their territorial 
waters and to natural resources within a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) (Glazewski 2005; Witbooi 2006). States specifically have to determine TACs 
of marine living resources within their EEZs and must ensure "proper" conservation 
and management to avoid overexploitation (Witbooi 2006). UNCLOS also states that 
a country must prioritise its national interests and local livelihoods before giving 
access to its fisheries resources to other countries (Sowman and Cardoso 2008). South 
Africa has incorporated provisions of the UNCLOS into its legal regime, via the 
Maritime Zones Act 15 of 1994 and the MLRA (Witbooi 2006). 
Article 61 states that "the coastal State, taking into account the best scientific 
evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and management 
measures that the maintenance oj the living resources in the exclusive economic zone 










designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can 
produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and 
economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities ... " 
UN FAO Code of COil duct of Responsible Fisheries 
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries "provides a framework of principles and standards for efforts 
to promote responsible fishing worldwide through the effective conservation, 
management and development of marine resources" (Witbooi 2006). Specifically, it 
emphasises the need to promote the goal of sustainable development in fisheries 
(Witbooi 2006). This policy document is influential, despite the fact that it is 
voluntary and does not impose legal obligation on parties (Witbooi 2006). The 
overarching goals of the F AO Code of Conduct are reflected in the principles and 
objectives underpinning the MLRA (Witbooi 2006). 
One of the objectives of the Code is to "promote the contribution of fisheries to food 
security and food quality, giving priority to the nutritional needs of local 
communities". The Code recommends that States should protect the rights of fishers 
and fish workers (particularly subsistence, small-scale and artisanal) to a secure 
livelihood and provide them with preferential access to fishing grounds and 
resources 17 . Further, "when deciding on the use, conservation and management of 
fisheries resources, due recognition should be given, as appropriate, in accordance 
with national laws and regulations, to the traditional practices, needs and interests of 
indigenous people and local fishing communities which are highly dependent on 
fishery resources for their livelihood's". 
As with the UNCLOS, the UN F AO Code, states that "conservation and management 
decisions for fisheries should be based on the best scientific evidence available, also 
taking into account traditional knowledge of the resources and their habitat, as well 
as relevant environmental, economic and social factors". 
17 Principle 6.18 










In terms of policy measures, the Code encourages States to promote participation in 
management processes by those affected 19; to take into account economic, social and 
cultural factors in order to assist decision-making on the allocation and use of coastal 
resources
20 
and; that States should promote multidisciplinary research in support of 
coastal area management. 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) promotes the conservation, 
sustainable use as well as equitable sharing of the benefits derived from the use of 
biological diversity (Witbooi 2006). Included is marine biodiversity and the 
implementations of the Conventions' provisions are expressly required to be 
consistent with UNCLOS (Witbooi 2006). 
The CBDs Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity promotes the 
"conservation and long-term sustainable use of marine and coastal living resources 
in a manner that re5pects both societal interests and the integrity of ecosystems" 
(Witbooi 2006). The White Paper for the Conservation and Sustainable use of South 
Africa's Biological Diversity (1997) and consequently the NEM: Biodiversity Act 10 
of 2004 incorporates provisions of the CBD into domestic law (Witbooi 2006). The 
Act does not make specific reference to marine and coastal resource management, but 
contains a broad definition of "biodiversity" and is thus applicable (Witbooi 2006). 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora 
(CITES) 
CITES was negotiated in 1973 when it was realised that international trade in wildlife 
and wildlife products could lead to the overexploitation of certain species, thus 
threatening them with extinction (CITES 2008b). CITES came into force in South 
Africa on 13 October 1975 (CITES 2008b). CITES works by requiring that 
international trade in specimens of selected species adhere to certain controls (DEAT 
2006). Thus importing and exporting of species covered by the Convention must be 
authorised through a licensing system (DEAT 2006). 
19 Principle 10.2.1 










In an attempt to halt the illegal trade in abalone, the listing of South African abalone, 
Haliotis midae, on CITES Appendix III came into effect on 3 May 2007 (Science in 
Africa 2007). CITES Appendix III lists species that are not necessarily threatened 
with extinction; but that may become so unless trade is closely controlled (CITES 
2008). All trade consignments of abalone now have to be accompanied by CITES 
documentation (Science in Africa 2007). Further, by listing H midae on Appendix III 
it automatically enlists the assistance of consumer states in monitoring and regulating 
the trade in abalone (Science in Africa 2007). Thus any consignment of abalone that is 
not accompanied by the relevant documentation is illegal. 
3.2 Regional Instruments 
SADe Protocol on Fisheries 
A regional convention of relevance to fisheries management in South Africa is the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Fisheries, which 
was signed in 2001 and came into force in August 2003 (Glazewski 2005; Witbooi 
2006). Although South Africa is party to the Protocol, it has yet to be approved by 
cabinet (Glazewski 2005; Witbooi 2006). The purpose of the Protocol is to promote 
food security, alleviate poverty, generate economic and livelihood opportunities for 
fishing communities and ensure the sustainable use of marine resources (Glazewski 
2005; Witbooi 2006). 
A specific objective is to "safeguard the livelihood of fishing communities"; and one 
of the principles is that state parties must "regulate the use of living aquatic resources 
and protect the resources against over-exploitation, whilst creating an enabling 
environment and building capacity for the sustainable utilisation of the resources". 
Further, it requires that states ensure the participation of all stakeholders in promoting 
the objectives of the protocol (Daniels et at. 2006). 
Article 12 of the Protocol refers specifically to artisanal, subsistence and small-scale 
commercial fisheries. State parties are required to seek a "rational and equitable 
balance between social and economic objectives" through the provision of legal, 










grounds of artisanal and subsistence fishers (Cullinan et af. 2005 p4 in Sowman and 
Cardoso 2008). Where an aquatic species is endangered, State Parties are required to 
"seek alternative economic activities for those persons whose activities threaten the 
survival of the endangered species" (Article 14: 4 d). 
Although South Africa is a party to the SADC Protocol on Fisheries and has indicated 
support for the FAa Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, neither of these 
agreements has been adequately implemented and the extent to which the interests of 
poor fishers are being met has been questioned (Sowman 2006). 
3.3 South African National Policy and Legal Framework relevant to fisheries 
management 
Policies and laws of the colonial and apartheid periods largely denied "black,,21 South 
Africans access to marine resources (Hauck and Sowman 2003). Most laws dealing 
with access to marine resources were focused on the control of commercial activities, 
and in later years, recreational fishing (Hauck and Sowman 2003). Other laws 
prevented sectors of the population from gaining access to the seashore as most of it 
was under private or state ownership (Hauck and Sowman 2003). Pre-1994, 
subsistence fishers had no legal rights to access marine resources and were not 
recognised as a legitimate sector in the fisheries management legislation (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). This, despite the fact that evidence suggests subsistence fishers have 
been harvesting coastal and marine resources for thousands of years (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). 
Prior to the publication of the White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development 
(2000) there was no coherent and integrated policy framework for the sustainable use, 
development and management of coastal areas and resources (Hauck and Sowman 
2003). In the 1980s, the importance of an integrated approach to coastal management 
was recognised, and a number of guideline documents were published (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). Despite these initiatives, coastal management was regarded as the 
responsibility of the coastal management office within the national Department of 
21 "Black" is a generic term in South Africa for those ethnic groups identified by apartheid policy as 










Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DE A T), and sectoral departments continued to 
execute their functions in coastal areas without embracing existing coastal 
management principles and guidelines (Hauck and Sowman 2003, p46). 
The transition to democracy in South Africa has resulted in a plethora of new laws 
and policies being promulgated, a number of which are applicable to natural resource 
management (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Sowman and Brown 2006). "Principles of 
decentralisation, public participation, equity, social and environmental justice, co-
operation and integration are now firmly on the government's agenda" (Sowman and 
Brown 2006). The extent to which these policies and laws have been successfully 
institutionalised and implemented is limited (Hauck and Sowman 2003). Obstacles to 
adopting a more integrated approach to coastal management in South Africa include: 
a lack of coordination between government departments that are responsible for 
coastal management; insufficient financial resources; inadequate mechanisms for 
implementation; lack of institutional capacity, specifically staff and skills; and a lack 
of knowledge regarding the value of the coast and its role in sustainable development 
(Hauck and Sowman 2003). 
The Constitution 
The Constitution of South Africa aims to redress past injustices and promote equality 
and is guided by the rights laid out in the Bill of Rights (Witbooi 2006). All 
government actions must be guided and measured against these rights and thus the 
Bill of Rights played a vital role in fisheries law reform, as well as providing the 
statutory framework within which fisheries management decisions must be made 
(Witbooi 2006). 
"Equitable access to resources, sustainable use of natural resources, access to 
information and involvement of the public in decisions and management are key 
principles embraced in the 1996 Constitution" (Hauck and Sowman 2003, p47). 
Accordingly, these principles are embedded in many of the new policies and 










The Environmental Right guarantees that everyone has the right to an environment 
that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and that the state, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures, will protect the environment and prevent ecological 
degradation (Witbooi 2006). The property right is relevant to fisheries, as access 
rights are considered property22, thus in addition to protecting property rights; 
redistribution is specifically condoned (Witbooi 2006). The Just Administrative 
Action Clause, read together with Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (2000) 
(PAJA) is relevant, as decisions taken by authorities, for example the determination of 
T ACs and allocation of fishing rights, must comply with these provisions (Witbooi 
2006). The Right of Access to Information Clause and the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act (PAIA) are relevant as they are useful for determining how decisions 
were reached, for instance how the T AC was determined and portions allocated 
(Witbooi 2006). Further, both the NEMA and MLRA contain sections that relate to 
the right to access to information and transparency, respectively (Witbooi 2006). 
The Constitution also makes provision for socio-economic rights, including the right 
to sufficient food and water and the right to choose an occupation. The State may not 
act in a way that infringes upon these socio-economic rights directly (Daniels et al. 
2006). However, these rights must be balanced against the environmental rights and 
obligations to promote sustainable development (Daniels et al. 2006). Similarly, the 
MLRA requires that socio-economic rights to food be balanced against the 
conservation of marine living resources and the sustainable development of the 
resource (Daniels et al. 2006). 
Following the enactment of the Constitution, the government embarked on a law 
reform process to align the domestic legislation with the new constitutional 
framework (Witbooi 2006). Numerous policies and statutes were developed ranging 
from general to sector-specific natural resource management (Witbooi 2006). There 
was however a tendency to regulate natural resources in a sectoral manner; thus 
creating artificial divisions and hampering integrated environmental management 
because different laws are within the domain of different government departments 
(Witbooi 2006). 
22 According to Daniels et at. (2006), the granting ofrights and permission to harvest abalone does not 
confer a real right in the private law sense, but rather a statutory entitlement to take part in activities 










Policies and Laws of relevance to marine and coastal management include: the White 
Paper on Marine Fisheries Policy for South Africa (1997), the White Paper for the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of South Africa's Biological Diversity (1997), the 
Marine Living Resources Act (1998), the National Environmental Management Act 
(1998), and the White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa 
(2000). All these documents stress the importance of local community involvement in 
resource management as well as the development of partnerships between the relevant 
local conservation authorities, resource users and other stakeholders (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). The Coastal Policy Green Paper (September 1998), which preceded 
the White Paper, provides an interesting insight into the thinking that laid the 
foundation of the new Act. However, many of the ideas and intentions of the Green 
Paper were not can-ied through to the final Act. 
Natiollal Environmental Management Act 
The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) No 107 of 1998 is South 
Africa's over-arching piece of environmental legislation and provides the framework 
for environmental governance (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Witbooi 2008). It is 
underpinned by a set of environmental management principles that promote 
sustainable development (Witbooi 2006). Features of the act include: cooperative 
governance and partnerships; the participation and inclusion of civil society in 
environmental governance; conflict resolution mechanisms; the duty of care provision 
- which makes it the responsibility of all citizens to prevent environmental damage; 
and improved decision making through the application and integration of a set of 
principles by all organs of state (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Witbooi 2006). Through 
Environmental Management Cooperation Agreements, NEMA puts emphasis on and 
provides the 'legal vehicle' for the formation of partnerships between resource users, 
government and other stakeholders (Hauck and Sowman 2003). 
The NEMA sets out a number of principles to which ALL organs of state are bound, 
including: equitable access to natural resources - with particular emphasis on 
previously disadvantaged persons; equitable participation of interested and affected 
parties (lAPs) in environmental governance; decisions must be open and transparent 










needs and interests of all lAPs (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Witbooi 2006). According 
to Hauck and Sowman (2003) the NEMA principles have in general been 
incorporated into the new fisheries and coastal policies. 
Specific Principles of the NEMA, which are of relevance to the decision to close the 
abalone fishery, include: 
(i) Environmental management must place people and their needs at the forefi'ont of 
its concern, and serve their physical, psychological, developmental, cultural and 
social interests equitably; 
(ii) That the development, use and exploitation of renewable resources and the 
ecosystems of which they are part do not exceed the level beyond which their integrity 
is jeopardised; 
(iii) That a risk-averse and cautious approach is applied, which takes into account the 
limits of current knowledge about the consequences of decisions and actions; 
(iv) The social, economic and environmental impacts of activities, including 
disadvantages and benefits must be considered, assessed and evaluated, and decisions 
must be appropriate in the light of such consideration and assessment 
(v) Decisions must be taken in an open and transparent manner, and access to 
information must be provided in accordance with the law. 
The principles of public participation are entrenched in environmental decision-
making (Daniels et al. 2006). Principles that apply to all organs of state and that must 
guide the implementation of any law concerned with the protection of the 
environment include: 
(i) The participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental 
governance must be promoted, and all people must have the opportunity to develop 
the understanding, skills and capacity necessary for achieving equitable and effective 
participation, and participation by vulnerable and disadvantaged persons must be 
ensured. 
(it) Decisions must take into account the interests, needs and values of all interested 
and affected parties, and this includes recognizing all forms of knowledge, including 










The White Paper on Marine Fisheries Policy for South Africa and the Marine 
Living Resources Act 
The new government promised' the upliftment of impoverished coastal communities 
through improved access to marine resources' (ANC 1994, pi 04 in Hauck and 
Sowman 2003, p49). A special Committee (the Access Rights Technical Committee) 
was appointed to investigate access rights options for fishers during the policy 
formulation process (Hauck and Sowman 2003). The Committee found that there 
were expectations that access rights should be broadened to include those who were 
previously denied rights for political reasons (ARTC 1996, p5 in Hauck and Sowman 
2003). The White Paper on Marine Fisheries Policy for South Africa (1997) therefore 
put emphasis on addressing inequity and broadening access to marine resources 
(Hauck and Sowman 2003). At the same time, it warns that "open or liberal" access to 
marine resources will result in depletion or even extinction of resources (Witbooi 
2006). A few of the same principles underpinning the Marine Fisheries White Paper 
were later carried through to the MLRA (1998) and provided the three pillars on 
which the Act is based namely: sustainability, equity and stability (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003; Witbooi 2006). 
The MLRA aims to ensure the sustainable use of marine living resources and the 
promotion of equitable access to resources, whilst at the same time redressing 
historical imbalances, transforming the fishing industry and encouraging socio-
economic benefits for coastal communities (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Witbooi 
2006). The MLRA gives attention to inshore and coastal resources, whereas 
previously laws and policies were concerned with offshore fishing industries (Hauck 
and Sowman 2003). Transformation within the fishing industry has been seen as a 
"foundational" principle of the act and refers particularly to granting access to new 
entrants from historically disadvantaged sectors of society (Witbooi 2006). However, 
transformation and ecological sustainability are potentially competing goals and the 
MLRA does not address how these are to be put into practice (Witbooi 2006). As a 
result, this responsibility falls on decision-makers and consequently a number of 










The MLRA makes use of both output (TACs, quotas and size restrictions) and input 
(type of gear, methods of fishing, numbers and type of fishing vessels) controls for 
managing fisheries (Witbooi 2006). Further, gear and species restrictions and closed 
seasons are imposed by regulations (Witbooi 2006). This combination of management 
methods can contribute towards sustainable fisheries. However in the absence of 
sufficient and effective control, they can result in adverse effects on sustainability 
(Witbooi 2006). Quotas, in particular, have led to numerous administrative difficulties 
(Witbooi 2006). 
Both the White Paper and the MLRA recognise, for the first time, subsistence fishers 
as a legitimate category within the fishing sector (Hauck et al. 2002; Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). Prior to this, small-scale fishers were considered 'illegal' or operated 
under regulations for recreational fishers (Sowman 2006; Hauck 2008). Subsistence 
fishers can apply for legal rights to undertake fishing activities as laid out in the 
MRLA (Hauck and Sowman 2003). Allocation of rights has been mainly through the 
allocation of subsistence fishing rights and 'limited commercial' rights, which are a 
small-scale quota allocation (Hauck 2008). 
In 1999, the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) was appointed to advise the 
government on the management of the subsistence fisheries sector (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). According to Hauck and Sowman (2003), the SFTG developed a 
comprehensive set of recommendations; yet MCM has been slow in putting in place 
the necessary institutional structures and administrative procedures to implement 
these. 
Further, "broad and accountable participation" of resource users and relevant 
stakeholders in fisheries management has been stressed in the fisheries White Paper 
and the MLRA (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Witbooi 2006). However, even though 
major progress has been made with the laws and policies governing marine living 
resources, their implementation has been fraught with problems particularly relating 
to the lack of institutional capacity and skills within MCM to implement the 










Principles in the MLRA, which are of relevance to the closure ofthefishery 
The MLRA has a number of principles, which are of direct relevance to the closure of 
the abalone fishery, These are as follows: 
(i) The need to achieve optimum utilisation and ecologically sustainable development 
of marine living resources; 
(ii) The need to conserve marine living resources for both present and future 
generations; 
(iii) The need to apply precautionary approaches in respect of the management and 
development of marine living resources; 
(iv) The need to utilise marine living resources to achieve economic growth, human 
resource development, capacity building within fisheries and mariculture branches, 
employment creation and a sound ecological balance consistent with the development 
objectives of the national government; 
(v) The need to preserve marine biodiversity; 
(vi) The need to achieve to the extent practicable a broad and accountable 
participation in the decision-making processes provided for in this Act; 
In terms of the MLRA, the Minister is responsible for determining the T AC23 and may 
determine that the TAC shall be nil24, Further, if an emergency occurs that endangers 
or may endanger stocks of any species of aquatic life in any fishery, the Minister may 
suspend all fishing in that fisherls, Particulars of any emergency measures shall be 
made known by notice in the Gazette or in any other appropriate manner26, 
All rights granted to person in terms of Section 18 of the MLRA are valid for a period 
determined by the Minister, after which the right is terminated and the state may 
reallocate that right27, However, if the Minister is of the opinion that it is in the 
interests of the promotion, protection or utilisation on a sustainable basis of a 
particular marine living resource, he may "at any time by written notice to the holder 
of a right, licence or permit, revoke, suspend, cancel or reduce that right, licence or 
23 S14 (1) 
24 S14 (5) (a) 
25 S16 (1) (a) 
26 S16 (2) 










permipg". The Minister is also allowed to declare any area to be a "priority fishing 
area" (PF A) to promote authorised fishing within the area in question. This power 
may be of assistance in implementing closure; in that all activities may be prohibited, 
except for the harvesting of abalone by legal permit holders in the "PFA". This could 
assist policing in that only legal permit holders would be allowed to enter the "PF A". 
In this manner, authorised harvesting is not prejudiced by poaching activities in the 
area (Daniels et al. 2006). 
The Minister is also entitled to declare an emergency in the fishery and suspend all or 
any fishing in the fishery if "an emergency occurs that endangers or may endanger 
stocks of fish or aquatic life". The Minister must provide notification of this decision 
in the Government Gazette or in any other "appropriate manner". The definition of 
'emergency' is not given in the MLRA; but the Oxford English Dictionary defines an 
emergency as "a serious, unexpected, and potentially dangerous situation requiring 
immediate action". Similarly, the definition of 'emergency incident' in NEMA is "an 
unexpected sudden occurrence". Thus it seems that the Minister would have to show 
that the situation is unexpected in addition to demonstrating that it endangers stocks in 
a fishery (Daniels et al. 2006). However, Daniels et al. (2006) state that an emergency 
in the context of S 16 of the MLRA should not be restricted to unexpected or 
unforeseen circumstances. Instead, it refers to "a serious situation that requires 
immediate action due to the endangerment or potential endangerment of ... aquatic 
life ... in a fishery ... " (Daniels et al. 2006). 
Tlte White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development (WPSCD) 
In 2000, the White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa was 
published, which outlines a policy for "sustainable and integrated coastal 
development in South Africa" (DEA T 2000). This paper emphasises the importance of 
the value of the coast and in maintaining productive and diverse coastal ecosystems 
(Hauck and Sowman 2003). In turn, intact coastal ecosystems provide the basis for 
social and economic development (Hauck and Sowman 2003). 










Further, the White Paper promotes a people-centred approach and a management style 
that involves integration and cooperation across disciplines, sectors and interests thus 
transcending legislative boundaries (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Witbooi 2006). 
Further key aspects of the White Paper include: recognizing the value of the coast; the 
promotion of access to marine resources; support for community involvement in the 
management of local resources; the promotion of partnerships between the state, 
private sector and civil society to encourage co-responsibility; adoption of 
participatory and cooperative management approaches; devolution of responsibility 
from higher to lower spheres of government; and the need for capacity building to 
ensure participation of all stakeholders in planning and management (DEAT 2000a; 
Hauck and Sowman 2003; Witbooi 2006). The White Paper specifically identifies as 
one of its Principles, the need to recognise the "interrelationships between coastal 
users and ecosystems" (DEA T 2000a). 
One of the goals 0 f the White Paper is to "alleviate coastal poverty through proactive 
coastal development initiatives that generate sustainable livelihood options". Specific 
objectives to fulfil this goal are the proactive identification and development of 
opportunities that seek to eliminate coastal poverty and that coastal planning and 
management efforts shall promote meaningful and sustainable livelihood options 
(DEA T 2000). 
The White Paper goes on to state that "attention will need to be given to diversifYing 
economic opportunities for poor coastal communities, with a particular focus on 
reducing reliance on consumptive use of natural resources. Special attention will 
need to be given to retaining the benefits from coastal development in poor local 
coastal communities, for example, through beneficiation of natural resources. Coastal 
planning and management efforts will need to maintain the health, diversity and 
productivity of coastal ecosystems in order to alleviate coastal poverty" (DEA T 
2000). The White Paper also lists a number of priority issues that need to be addressed 
by MCM, in consultation with other departments; and further, that programmes need 
to be developed to address these priority issues. Some priority issues include: 
diversifying coastal economies and optimizing benefits for local coastal communities; 
exploring opportunities for development of ports and harbours; and identifying 










The White Paper also holds that those responsible for degradation or damage will 
need to bear the full cost of rehabilitation and will need to be held accountable for 
compensating coastal users whose livelihoods are adversely affected or whose 
benefits are reduced as a result of damaged coastal ecosystems. 
NEM: Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) Bill 
This Bill recognises that the State is the public trustee of coastal public property, 
which includes coastal waters. The State must ensure that "coastal public property is 
used, managed, protected, conserved and enhanced in the interests of the whole 
communit/9 and must take whatever reasonable legislative and other measures it 
considers necessary to conserve and protect coastal public property for the benefit of 
present andfuture generations30 ". Before exercising any power, the person exercising 
that power must "consult with interested and affected parties by means of a fair 
consultative process that enables them to participate effectively in the decision-
k· 31" rna zng process . 
Small-scale Fisheries Policy 
Although the abalone fishery is still managed as a commercial fishery due to its 
lucrative nature, it effectively functions as a small-scale fishery. South African small-
scale fisheries have been managed in a 'piecemeal' manner, and many fishers still do 
not have legal access to the sea (Masifundise 2007). The development of a new small-
scale fisheries policy is currently underway (Masifundise 2007). 
During 2007, government released a draft policy on small-scale fisheries for 
comment. However, the "Draft Policies for the Allocation and Management of 
Medium-term Subsistence Fishing Rights and Small-scale Commercial Fishing 
Rights" was rejected out of hand by subsistence and small-scale fishers because of the 
lack of consultation in the formulation process. At a National Summit on Subsistence 
and Small-scale fisheries in November 2007, a number of principles to guide a new 
small-scale fisheries policy was agreed upon by Government and other stakeholders 
29 S 12 (a) 
30 S12 (b) 










(for example researchers, NGOs, scientists, and representative from fishing 
communities). Principles included: the need for equity in the fishing industry; 
recognition of the principle of adjacency in respect of the sea; respect for the 
livelihood and indigenous knowledge of the fishers; a participatory co-management 
approach; an integrated framework which supports and ensures alleviation of poverty, 
food security and Local Economic Development; and an approach to empowerment 
which builds capacity (Masifundise 2007b). In addition, there was recognition of the 
relationship between small-scale fishers and sustainable livelihoods, as well as the 
need for effective institutional arrangements to promote an integrated approach 
(Masifundise 2007b). The formulation of the small-scale fisheries policy is currently 
underway. 
Policy for the Allocation of Commercial Fishing Rights ill the Abalone Fishery 
The Policy for the Allocation of Commercial Fishing Rights in the Abalone Fishery 
(The Abalone Policy (DEAT 2003)) intended to introduce a "new system of co-
management" and to "effectively address the threat of the illegal harvesting and over 
catching of abalone". The purpose of the policy was to adopt a management regime 
that would "result in the substantial reduction in the rate of illegal harvesting". 
Specific objectives were to instill a culture of ownership among rights holders and 
members of coastal communities, encourage rights holders and members of the 
community to co-manage the resource together with the Department32, to ensure the 
long term viability of the fishery and to sustain the level of employment in the fishery. 
It was anticipated that ownership would result in some form of local policing and a 
substantial reduction in poaching was predicted (Maharaj et al. 2006). 
Three management options were considered in the Abalone Policy: (i) maintaining the 
status quo; (ii) closing the commercial and recreational abalone fisheries; and (iii) co-
management of the commercial abalone resource. Option (ii) recognised the right that 
the Minister had to close the commercial fishery in terms of Section 16 of the MLRA 
by declaring an emergency. The rationale given was that closure would facilitate 
compliance and enforcement. However, "militating against (closure) would be the 
adverse socio-economic consequences such as substantial job losses, potential 










increases in ordinmy as well as organised crime and the loss 0/ important markets/or 
South A.frican abalone" (DEA T 2003). 
The option of co-management required that the Department share the responsibility of 
management of the resource with rights holders. It also recognised that rights holders 
"depend on the resource Jor their livelihoods"; and that in addition, coastal 
communities also depend on the industry for their income and prosperity. The Policy 
recommended splitting the existing zones into smaller units; to facilitate compliance, 
monitoring and "ownership". Essentially, a TURF system was introduced, which 
shifted fisheries management from open access rights to more exclusive access rights 
allowing harvesting in delineated areas or TURFs (Maharaj et al. 2006). Rights 
holders would effectively have 'ownership' over the secondary zone and the 
community adjacent would play an oversight role, ensuring that only "their" rights 
holders dive in that zone. Good management would be rewarded with an increased 
T AC for the zone; however reductions in abalone numbers could result in a decrease 
or even a zero TAC being declared. 
Option (iii) was selected by the Department, and divers and legal entities were 
allocated 10-year rights. Abalone processing factories were allocated 3-year rights and 
recreational fishing was suspended (Maharaj et al. 2006). The intention of 3-year 
rights for abalone processing factories was to allow them time to look at the 
processing of other fish stocks and to prevent unemployment and instability. The 
Departments intention was "to allocate commercial rights to as many divers and legal 
entities as reasonably possible". 
To be considered for long term rights, divers had to show historical involvement in 
the harvesting of abalone and that they were reliant on the resource for 75% or more 
of their annual income. Every applicant had to demonstrate ownership or a right of 
access to a suitable vessel and the appropriate equipment and gear in order to harvest 
abalone. 
A number of measures were required to strengthen compliance: vessels had to be 
fitted with a vessel monitoring system (VMS); and there were limits on the number of 










vehicle restrictions. Apart from a non-refundable application fee of R6700, the 
Department also stated that they would put in place a compliance related levy for 
funding of monitoring and enforcement initiatives, which the rights holders would be 
required to pay for (OEAT 2003). 
Integrated Development Plan 
Since 1996, local government has been given an expanded mandate and as the 
government sphere closest to the people, has become the focus for addressing the 
social and economic needs of local communities (Sowman and Brown 2006). This is 
achieved through the Integrated Development Plan (lOP). An Integrated Development 
Plan (lOP) is as a five year strategic development plan for a municipality and serves 
as the principal planning tool that guides development within its area of jurisdiction. 
The central aim of an lOP is to provide "a holistic, integrated and multisectoral, 
strategic plan to guide the work of the municipality" (Sowman and Brown 2006). The 
IDP is legislated by the Municipal Systems Act 2000 (MSA) and supersedes all other 
plans that guide development at a local level. Thus, as the closest government sphere 
to the people, the local municipality and its lOP play an important role in the 
livelihoods of fishers. 
The Overstrand Local Municipalities' lOP for the 2008-2009 period recogmses 
tourism as a major driver for the local economy; and particularly for Kleinmond. 
Further, the Overstrand is a leader in the field of commercial abalone farming; and the 
lOP recognises the potential to expand aquaculture developments along the coast. The 
lOP recognises that "the rapid decline in conventional fishing places emphasis on this 
(aquaculture) alternative for the traditional fishing community". 
3.4 Institutional Overview 
In South Africa, a number of different government departments have jurisdiction over 
the coast and its inhabitants, and most national and provincial departments have a role 
to play (Glavovic et al. 2002). However, this range of governance actors has led to 










2002). This often results in poor management of resources and has negative 
implications for the poor (Glavovic et al. 2002). 
Institutional arrangements for coastal and fisheries resources are complex and unclear; 
which often leads to ineffective administration on the ground (Hauck and Sowman 
2003). Firstly, the Constitution recognises marine resources as being of 'exclusive 
national competence'; and environment, tourism and nature conservation (excluding 
marine resources) as 'concurrent national and provincial competence' (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). 
The Chief Directorate of MCM, within the National DEA T IS the government 
authority primarily responsible for the management of marine resources in South 
Africa. National DEA T has considerable power over marine resource management 
and its responsibilities include the setting of resource control measures such as TACs, 
determining access rights and promulgating regulations in terms of certain resources 
(Hauck and Sowman 2003). 
The institutional structure of MCM incorporates the following Chief Directorates, 
Directorates and sub-directorates (those not included are those related to financial and 
administrative support): which all have a role to play in small-scale fisheries 
management 
1. Chief Directorate: Research, Antarctica and Islands: Directorate Research 
Support, Directorate Antarctica and Islands, Directorate Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Research; Directorate Resources Research; Directorate Ecosystem 
Utilisation and Conservation 
i. This Deputy Directorate is responsible for monitoring the resource and 
determining the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the 
commercial abalone fishery. They do this by means of catch 
return/statistics forms, sampling of commercial catch, fishery 
independent abalone surveys33 (FIAS) and monitoring of illegal catch. 
33 Fishery independent surveys consist ofsurveying33 and sampling the various Zones (Zones A-D; 










2. Chief Directorate Monitoring Control and Surveillance: Directorate 
Compliance, Directorate Environmental Protection Vessels, Directorate 
Surveillance Investigative Unit 
3. Chief Directorate Marine and Coastal Resource Management: Directorate 
of Offshore Management and Directorate of Inshore Management (Sub-
directorate Subsistence and Small Scale Fisheries) 
4. Chief Directorate Integrated Coastal Management: Directorate Socio-
Economic Development (Sub-directorates: Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods); 
Directorate Integrated Coastal Management (EEU 2008) 
1. The Directorate of Resource Management is responsible for the 
management of the wild harvesting of marine resources. Resource 
Management makes recommendations on quota allocations to the 
Minister on the basis of the TAC recommended by 'Research' I.e. 
Resource Management decides how to divide up the T AC amongst 
rights holders in a particular industry and then once approved, they 
implement and issue permits 
Other aspects of coastal management are handled by a number of different national 
and provincial departments; whilst local government and traditional authorities also 
have a role to play in coastal and resource management (Hauck and Sowman 2003). 
Provincial Planning and Development Acts govern development of coastal land; but 
decisions about land development are usually made at the local level (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). Developments on the seaward side of the high water mark, e.g. 
harbours, are the responsibility of departments such as Transport and Public Works 
(Hauck and Sowman 2003). Furthermore, management of fisheries resources and 
other economic activity affecting the coast are handled separately (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). Within MCM there is little communication between and within the 
divisions responsible for coastal and marine resource management (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003). This was evident during interviews with MCM officials; as they had 
little knowledge about the responsibilities of other directorates within MCM. 
Whilst MCM is based in Cape Town, resource users are situated at various locations 
along the coast. Fishery Control Officers are present in many coastal towns, but are 










needs to have satellite stations in key areas and a "flat" structure that will allow MCM 
to reach resource users. Each province ideally needs their own sub-directorate; with a 
sub-directorate in Cape Town that links those based in the provinces (Resource 
Management Official pers comm. 2008). According to van Sittert et af. (2006), "lack 
of integration across the directorates within MCM and other sectoral government 
departments charged with coastal management and economic development represents 
one of the greatest challenges to effective fisheries governance in South Afhca". 
Since 1994, many responsibilities have been devolved to local government; including 
broader environmental responsibilities - such as environmental stewardship and the 
promotion of social and economic development (Hauck and Sowman 2003). FUliher, 
in terms of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) local authorities must produce an 
Integrated Development Plan (lOP). However, the integration of coastal issues into 
the lOPs "presents both a significant opportunity and challenge to the implementation 
of the Coastal White Paper" (Hauck and Sowman 2003, p53). Hauck and Sowman 
(2003) state that capacity building and skills development in the field of Integrated 
Coastal Management are required at government level to ensure that the policies in 
the Coastal White Paper are implemented. 
4. Overview of the Abalone Fishery and Case Study 
4.1 History of abalone harvesting and management in South Africa 
The abalone fishery in South Africa began in Gansbaai in 1949 and the commercial 
industry is based on the species Haliotis midae (Hauck 1999; Hauck and Sweijd 
1999). Abalone is most abundant along the 580km of coastline between Cape 
Columbine and Quoin Point and occurs mostly in waters less than 5 meters deep 
(Envirofish Africa 2000; DEA T 2006; Maharaj et aZ. 2006). H. midae is slow-growing 
and takes about 7 years to attain sexual maturity, and 8-9 years to reach minimum 
legal size for harvesting34 (Tarr 1995 in Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008; Maharaj et 
af. 2006). 










Th~ induslry is focused on the south west coast, octween Rohbcn Island and Quoin 
Point (Sec f'ig\ll'c 3) (Hauck I ~')~), Due to (ile occurrence of lhi.~ species in shallow 
"<lter and its sedentary nature, it is relatively easy to access and exploit (J lauck 1')')9: 
II,llXk and Swcijd 1999; Branch and Clark 2006). further, althol1f\h the abalone 
!ishery is among the smallest in South Africa, it is the most lucrative in terms of unit 





Zone A . 
. , , 
!lr.~.,,,,,,,. ! 
Figure _l: The ahalonc fishery is focused hd\>'~cll Rohben Island ,mri Quoin I'oint 
The figur~ also shows ahalone fishing /.onc.~ A to G including TURF suh-zones 
Licenses to harvest abalone commercially became freely aVili Jablc in 1954, and hy 
)964 the numher 01' hcel1_,ed divers had lncreased 10 104 (I::nvirofish Africa 21XXl). 
Due LO strider ~nf'lrcerncnt of licen~ conditions applicablc to diver_'_ number., were 
reduced to 6~ by I nO and to 47 by l'i89 (Enviro fi sh Afl-kil20(0)_ Prior to 197 0_ no 
harvcsting limit for ab"lone was in place and there were reI'.' management controls 










1965, harvesting reached a peak annual take of 2 800 tonnes (Plaganyi and 
Butterworth 2008). Due to declining catches, the first production quota was set in 
1968 at 386 tonnes of meat mass, with reductions during the next 15 years due to 
continued concerns relating to declining catch rates (Tarr 1992 in Plaganyi and 
Butterworth 2008; Envirofish Africa 2000). However, annual landings continued to 
decrease until they stabilised in the 1980s at around 600 tonnes per annum (Envirofish 
Africa 2000; DEAT 2006; Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). 
In 1986 an overall annual TAC was formally implemented as the sum of individual 
Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for each of the seven zones (A-G) (Plaganyi and 
Butterworth 2008). Kleinmond falls within Zone D. 
Up until 1998, the fishery consisted of two components - 50 licensed divers who 
'owned' the right to harvest and deliver a fixed percentage of the TAC to a processing 
company and six quota holders who owned the processing and marketing rights to a 
percentage of the T AC (Envirofish Africa 2000). The commercial fishery was 
regulated by the determination of an annual T AC, with the historically most exploited 
zones being A, B, C and D (See Figure 3) (Hauck and Sweijd 1999). In addition there 
was a recreational fishery, which was regulated by means of a permit, a closed season 
and a bag limit per day, but this fishery was suspended in 2003 (Hauck 1999; Maharaj 
et al. 2006; ASWG 2007). 
The MLRA initiated major changes in the abalone fishery. Whereas previously the 
TAC was only allocated to the commercial sector, the subsistence and recreational 
sectors were also now included (Envirofish Africa 2000). Subsistence fishers were 
recognised for the first time in the MLRA, and the first subsistence abalone permits 
were allocated in March 1998 for 3 years (Hauck 1999; EEU 2008). In terms of the 
subsistence permit, fishers could dive abalone for personal consumption and sell their 
excess catch (Hauck 1999). This newly created category was also referred to as the 
"small-scale commercial fishery" (Envirofish Africa 2000). In the 199811999 season, 
236 permits were allocated to fish a quota of 160 tonnes (Envirofish Africa 2000). In 
1999/2000, 53 applicants were granted permits to fish 45 tonnes of abalone on a 
small-scale commercial basis (Envirofish Africa 2000). Interestingly, more than half 
of the successful applicants for subsistence permits were employed in the commercial 










or owned boats that held abalone fishing permits (Envirofish Africa 2000). This 
subsistence fishery eventually transformed into the small-scale commercial fishery. 
In addition to the commercial, subsistence and recreational sectors, there was also an 
illegal sector, which harvested abalone without permits in violation of the Sea 
Fisheries Act of 1988 and later in contravention of the MLRA of 1998 (Hauck 1999; 
Hauck and Sweijd 1999). However, this group was largely composed of individuals 
who felt they had a right to harvest the resource, yet were unfairly excluded by the 
rights allocation process. Thus, "protest fishing" in opposition to the inequitable 
allocation of rights soon developed into large-scale criminal operations, driven by the 
market in the Far East (van Sittert et al. 2006). 
Heavy poaching started in the early 1990s, which subsequently led to a reduction in 
the TAC for the commercial fishery (Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). For the 
199611997 season, only 550 tonnes was allocated - indicating that there was a 
problem (Hauck 1999; Hauck and Sweijd 1999). According to Hauck (1999) the 
cause for this reduction was due to "over-exploitation, biological uncertainty and 
political pressure" (Hauck and Sweijd 1999). Some areas (Zone C) suffered up to 
90% reductions in their T AC (Hauck and Sweijd 1999). 
The Directorate of Resource Management is responsible for the management of the 
wild harvesting of marine resources. Resource Management makes recommendations 
on quota allocations to the Minister on the basis of the T AC recommended by 
'Research' i.e. Resource Management decides how to divide up the TAC amongst 
rights holders in a particular industry and then once approved, they implement and 
issue permits. Lack of capacity within Resource Management is a major obstacle as it 
prevents officials from getting "on the ground" and interacting with resource users 
(Resource Management Official pers comm. 2008). Management measures that were 
historically applied and enforced until the recent closure were based on effort-
limitation and included minimum legal size restriction35 , closed season, gear 
restrictions, slipway controls, zonal partitioning, T ACs and marine protected areas 
(Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). Decision rules, which 
acted as guidelines for the management of the abalone resource, were developed in 










the mid 1990s (Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). Decision Rules include the 
following: (i) each zonal T AC may not be increased or decreased for 2 years from the 
last change, unless a major change of resource status becomes apparent; (ii) TACs 
may not be increased or decreased by more then 10% unless special circumstances 
arise e.g. boundary shifts; and (iii) if (i) applies, an increase or decrease of a zonal 
T AC may only occur if no indicators (cpue, % catch in first 5mm and mean size) are 
in conflict (ASWG 2007). 
The Abalone Scientific Working Group (ASWG) is responsible for compiling a 
document recommending a global TAC for the resource for a prescribed season on a 
zone-by-zone basis. The ASWG consists of scientists employed by the department, 
UCT researchers and observers. The ASWG has a number of meetings throughout thc 
year and the Chairman signs off the T AC recommendation. This recommendation is 
then made to the Chief Director: Research, Antarctica and Islands. The Chief Director 
then considers the recommendation and in turn makes recommendations to the Chief 
Director: Resource Management. The recommendations of the CD: Research, 
Antarctica and Islands do not have to concur with that of the ASWG. The CD: 
Resource Management then makes his recommendation to the Deputy Director-
General of MCM. The Deputy D-G then takes account of the recommendation of the 
two CDs and then makes his recommendation to the D-G of the Department, who then 
considers the recommendations and makes a recommendation to the Minister, who is 
the final decision maker. At each stage of the decision making process, each person 
has access to all the relevant documentation and recommendations and consults 
widely. None of the recommendation made in the chain are binding. 
From 1998 - 2003 the industry was "characterized by a lack of security attached to 
successful quota applications such that long-term interests were forfeited in favor of 
lucrative short-term gains" (Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). As a result, few quota 
holders "invested" in the resource and conflict emerged between stakeholders 
(Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). Further T AC reductions continued over the years. 
Table 1 indicates changes to the TAC over the period 1996 through 2008. Reductions 
in T AC are usually phased in over a 2-3 year period in order to maintain industry 










Table 1: The TAC (in tonnes) for the abalone fishery from 1996 - 2008 (Zones 
A-G) 
199611997 550 1 
199711998 5301 
199811999 515 1 
1999/2000 5002 







2007/2008 Zerol fishery closed 
I EnvirofishAfrica (2000); 2 Plaganyi and Butterworth (2008); 3 Plaganyi and 
Mackenzie 2005; 4 Hauck (2006), Maharaj et al. 2006; 5 ASWG (2007). 
Medium-term commercial abalone rights were in place during the 2001-2003 abalone 
fishing seasons. In 2003, a new abalone policy was implemented that outlined a co-
management approach for the abalone fishery, which encouraged resource users to 
participate in management activities. Long-term rights were allocated to abalone 
divers for a period of 10 years and a TURF system was introduced as this system has 
shown some success in other countries (Castilla and Defeo 2001). TURF systems give 
rights to a specific group (of fishers) to engage in fishing within a specific 
geographical location; and consequently limit the rights of others (Hauck 2006; Sunde 
2003). The concept of the system is to create 'ownership' over the resource, thus 
increasing compliance and enhancing management (DEAT 2003; Hauck 2006; 
ASWG 2007; Research Officials pers comm. 2008). The expectation was that the 
TURF system would result in rights holders taking greater responsibility for resource 
management and informing compliance agencies of poaching activities within their 
TURF (ASWG 2007). Zones A-G were subdivided into 2-3 subzones or TURFs and 
where possible, fishers were allocated fishing rights within or adjacent to the sub-zone 










In addition to the implementation of a TURF based system, the Abalone Policy 
encouraged fishers to invest in the industry, by requiring that applicants invest in 
"suitable vessels, gear and other applicable equipment" in order to qualify. Abalone 
processing factories were phased out of the industry over a period of three years 
(2004-2007) and are no longer allocated a quota for abalone, but instead rights holders 
could sell their abalone to the abalone processing factory of their choice. Further, 
abalone rights holders could be involved in marketing in conjunction with the factory 
i.e. they could have a say in what form most of their catch would be exported (e.g. 
30% live and 70% canned). In this way they had more control (i.e. increased 
ownership and input) over the final product (Research Officials pers comm. 2008). 
The allocation of long term rights to abalone fishers was in line with international 
thinking that the most successful management strategies are likely to be those that 
involve the allocation of long-term rights (Stephenson and Lane 1995 in Plaganyi and 
Butterworth 2008). The introduction of a co-management approach was also seen as a 
mechanism for instilling a sense of custodianship over the resource. The 
overexploitation of many Latin American shellfish stocks has been attributed to a lack 
of co-management practices (Castilla and Defeo 2001). 
Prior to the closure of the fishery, the TAC for the abalone fishery was allocated to 
262 divers and 40 diver entities and it is estimated that approximately 792 crew 
members were employed by these rights holders (Hauck 2006; Bozalek 2008). In 
addition to divers and crew, other stakeholders include: abalone buyers, processors, 
the broader community, the management authority, local government and illegal 
fishers (Hauck 2006). 
The rationale for closure offlshery and the diving ban 
The 'official' rationale quoted in press releases was that the stock had declined to 
such an extent that closure of the fishery was necessary to allow stocks to recover. 
According to Research officials at MCM the rationale for the closure of the fishery 
was twofold. First, it was a management approach to deal with poaching, as the 
closure would facilitate compliance initiatives and second to allow for resource 
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The rationale for the selection of areas was based on "key areas where stock was 
likely to recover" (ICM Official pers comm. 2008). Thus the diving ban does not 
apply to those areas where recruitment of abalone is failing due to poaching activities 
or WCRL predation (ICM Official pers comm. 2008). These areas are considered to 
have little or no guarantee of recovery as the ecosystems have potentially changed as 
a result of the influx of WCRL and therefore a decrease in harvesting alone will not 
guarantee an increase in wild stock (ICM Official pers comm. 2008). Thus the dive 
ban has been focused on those areas where the abalone is expected to recover, 
presumably as a result of an expected decrease in harvesting. 
In addition, areas covered by the diving ban have been prioritised for concerted 
enforcement efforts and focus areas are Zone A and B where the stock is likely to 
recover if the poaching can be stopped (MCS Official pers comm. 2008). Thus any 
reports of poaching activity in this area will be a priority for enforcement officials. 
This could explain why resource users in Kleinmond rarely see any response to their 
reports of poaching activities in Zone D. 
The diving ban also makes it considerably easier for enforcement officials to protect 
the resource, as they can now apprehend persons in possession of diving equipment in 
prohibited areas, and thus do not have to catch the poacher in possession of the 
abalone. Further, Augustyn in Bozalek (2008) states that the practical difficulties in 
distinguishing between "out and out poaching" and illegal harvesting by rights holders 
are eliminated due to the suspension of harvesting. Thus it will have positive 
implications for compliance and enforcement. 
A UCT Researcher (pers comm. 2008) however states that the only defensible 
argument for the closure of the fishery is the inability of MCM to effectively control 
poaching, and thus the need to prevent people from entering the water. The researcher 
believes the argument about the status of the resource is invalid (UCT Researcher pers 
comm. 2008). The Researcher further states that immediate closure versus closure 
over a phasing out period of 5 years would have made a negligible difference to the 
resource. The above implies that there is little agreement amongst government 
scientists, managers and other researchers, with regards to the rationale that was given 










4.2 Current management challenges 
The struggle to sustainably manage the abalone fishery is not unique to South Africa 
(Hauck 2006). The illegal trade in abalone has affected other abalone fisheries around 
the world including Australia, Canada, California, Mexico and Chile (Hauck 2006). 
Management of the abalone fishery is faced with two main challenges. First concerns 
the extent of illegal fishing (or poaching) and second, the ecosystem changes because 
of the southward migration of the WCRL (Hauck and Sweijd 1999; ASWG 2007; 
Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008; Research Officials 2 pers comm. 2008). 
The demand for abalone in oriental countries has led to the development of highly 
organised Chinese Mafia syndicates in South Africa who purchase poached abalone 
and smuggle it out of the country (Hauck 1999b). The demand is driven by a belief 
that abalone increases fertility, delays senility, has aphrodisiac properties. In addition 
it is used in various ceremonial events (Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Plaganyi and 
Butterworth 2008). 
The combined Zone A-D model-predicted37 poaching for 2003 was estimated at 933 
tonnes, which is more than 7 times the commercial T AC for these zones (Plaganyi and 
Butterworth 2008). Further, it is assumed that only 36% of all poached abalone is 
confiscated (Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). In addition, the demand and increased 
price for abalone have been fueled by drastic declines in abalone popUlations 
elsewhere, such as the black abalone Haliotis cracherodii fishery off California 
(Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). Also in California, over exploitation has resulted in 
the possible extinction of the species Haliotis sorenseni (Hauck and Sweijd 1999). 
Due to its large size and high quality flesh, the South African abalone is one of the 
most sought after species (Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). 
The second threat to the abalone resource is the southward migration of the west coast 
rock lobster (WCRL), Jasus lalandii, into Zones C and D (DEAT 2006; Plaganyi and 
37 A spatial- and age-structured production model has provided the basis for management advice for 
the abalone resource over recent years by projecting abundance trends under alternative future catch 
levels. The model estimates the reduction in juvenile abalone survival due to the ecosystem change and 
estimates the illegal take using a novel fisheries index - confiscations per unit of policing effort 










Butterworth 2008; Research Officials pers comm. 2008). Biological interactions 
between WCRL, juvenile abalone and sea urchins have resulted in a decrease in 
abalone recruitment (Tarr et al. 1996 in Hauck and Hector 2003; DEAT 2006; 
Maharaj et al. 2006). WCRL prey on and significantly reduce sea urchin populations 
(Parechinus angulosus) on which juvenile abalone depend for shelter (Plaganyi and 
Butterworth 2008; Branch and Clark 2006). The reasons for this ecosystem change are 
poorly understood, and it may be linked to regional changes in sea temperature or be 
part of long-term cyclical change (Maharaj et al. 2006). 
To address illegal resource exploitation, South Africa has historically relied on law 
enforcement and crime control (Hauck and Sweijd 1999). This still seems to be the 
case today and challenges to management include the de-legitimization of regulations 
as many feel resource allocation has not been fair, mistrust and the alleged corruption 
of authorities (e.g. turning a blind eye or receiving financial payments), conflict 
between resource users, the lucrative nature of the resource which encourages short 
term financial gain over long-term interests, and the involvement of syndicates 
(shifting the problem from resource management to organised crime). 
Despite the challenges mentioned above, there are concerns that some scientists have 
been 'crying wolf' for many years with regard to the status of the resource (Plaganyi 
and Butterworth 2008). The model used to assess the abalone stock (and determine 
the T AC) is rigorous and "integrates all available information in an objective 
manner" (Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). A UCT Researcher (pers comm. 2008) 
states that despite the apparent robustness of the model some scientists have criticised 
it because it does not indicate that the resource is "sufficiently depleted". The model 
has suggested for many years now that the resource is not as threatened as many 
claim, even though their assertions are often subjective and not supported by any 
concrete evidence (UCT Researcher pers comm. 2008). By looking retrospectively at 
the observed CPUE data, it indicates that the resource could not have been more 
depleted than indicated by the model (Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). 
Thus despite challenges faced 'on the ground', it seems that researchers and scientists 
are also in conflict with regards to the perceived or actual status of the resource. 










approach in making management decisions, they also highlight the need for caution in 
'crying wolf' regarding the state of the abalone resource. "Crying wolf' in this case 
may result in scientific credibility being questioned due to unsubstantiated claims by 
scientists, as well as resulting in concerned fishers putting added pressure on the 
resource "while they still can" (Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). They caution that 
"where there is cause for concern, it is sometimes better not to overstate the case" as 
it creates a similar setting to the "tragedy of the commons" - where there is a rush to 
take as much as possible before closure or there is nothing left (Plaganyi and 
Butterworth 2008). 
In addition to the TURF system, the new management strategy included Coastal Co-
Management Meetings with rights holders from each secondary zone or TURF 
(DEAT 2006). TURF Representatives38 met with the Department to address issues in 
the Resource Management Working Groups and attended the Abalone Scientific 
Working Group Meetings, where the annual TAC recommendations are made (DEAT 
2006). Issues discussed at the Co-Management Working Group included forms of 
punishment for rights holders that exceeded their allocation, agreeing on times for 
diving, as well as general house-rules and day to day management issues. In addition, 
when the TAC was being determined, a meeting would be held with the 'TURF Reps' 
and MCM would respond to queries or complaints. In general, Co-Management 
working group meetings were held 2-3 times a year for the first 2 or 3 years of the 
Abalone Policy. However, Management Working groups were infrequent and TURF 
Representatives usually tried to raise management issues at Scientific Working Group 
meetings because they had no other medium (UCT Researcher pers. comm. 2008). 
Consequently, these issues were often not addressed, as researchers and scientists 
generally tend not to handle issues related to management (UCT Researcher pers. 
comm. 2008). 
4.2.1 Failure of the TURF System 
The TURF system which was implemented with the advent of the Abalone Policy, 
failed to increase a sense of ownership over the resource. Failure of the TURF system 
38 Each of the zones has a 'TURF Representative' which would represent the interests of rights holders 










can be attributed to four main factors. Firstly, the high value of abalone is an incentive 
to harvest illegally as "it is worth the risk" and outweighs the possible sanctions 
(OEAT 2006; Maharaj et at. 2006). Secondly, the declining nature of the resource and 
the possibility that long-term rights may be withdrawn eliminate the incentive to co-
manage and protect the resource (OEAT 2006; Maharaj et at. 2006). Third, some 
zones were shared amongst rights holders due to the uneven distribution of the 
resource and this non-exclusivity has led to conflict and removed the sense of 
ownership (DEAT 2006; Hauck 2006; Maharaj et at. 2006). Lastly, many divers were 
excluded from the new management system and many have persisted or resorted to 
poaching (DEA T 2006; Maharaj et at. 2006). 
In addition, Hauck (2006) maintains that the ineffective implementation of the 
Abalone Policy cannot only be attributed to the declining resource, but also to the 
absence of a jointly agreed strategy to implement the TURF system and a lack of 
budget and capacity within MCM to establish co-management (Hauck 2006). One 
MCM official admitted, that due to lack of communication between MCM and 
fishers, there was little capacity building or follow up in relation to the TURF system. 
Further, there was not a shared definition of what "co-management" entailed. For 
government, it means consultation with fishers and the consideration of what they 
consider 'useful inputs'. For fishers, it means being integrally involved in 
management and decision-making. However, government is reluctant to give resource 
users this kind of responsibility. Ideally, government would need to decide in 
consultation with fishers what allocation system to implement and the amount that can 
be harvested; as well as clarification of responsibilities (Research Official pers comm. 
2008). 
4.3 Enforcement Initiatives 
Numerous enforcement initiatives aimed at curbing the poaching of abalone have 
been implemented in the past, particularly in the Overberg area. This section briefly 
discusses Operation Neptune, MARINES and SeaWatch for the purposes of providing 
a broader understanding of what has been attempted in the past to address illegal 











Operation Neptune originated from an SAPS initiative that aimed to address 
community unrest in Hawston. When it became clear that many of the issues were as 
a result of the abalone resource, a cooperative policing venture was entered into 
between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and MCM (Hauck and Hector 
2000; Plaganyi and Butterworth 2008). At the outset, this venture had the support of 
coastal communities and local organizations (Hauck and Hector 2000). Operation 
Neptune was short-lived, and lasted only about 8 months (February - October 1999) 
(Hauck and Hector 2000). 
The main objective was to curtail poaching along the southwest coast, from Quoin 
Point to Cape Hangklip (Hauck and Hector 2000) (See Figures 3 and 4). Additional 
assistance was provided by the army, navy and locally based organizations, such as 
SeaWatch and municipal law enforcement officials (Hauck and Hector 2000). 
MCM provided personnel and equipment, and initially funded costs such as cell 
phones and accommodation, but officers were not paid a salary by MCM and the main 
operating expenses were covered by the SAPS (Hauck and Hector 2000). The SAPS 
would then send groups of officers to the coast for a few weeks at a time to assist with 
monitoring and enforcement. This system of rotation was implemented to prevent 
officers from being known by poachers and thus being open to bribery and corruption 
(Hauck and Hector 2000). 
However, Operation Neptune came to an end when the SAPS withdrew as marine 
resource protection was no longer a priority and they were of the opinion that MCM 
should rather make use of local police stations to assist with enforcement. However, 
local police stations lacked human capacity and resources and marine resource 
protection was not a top priority. Hauck and Hector (2000) state the reason for 
termination was due to a lack of funding. Operation Neptune also lost the public's 
confidence and support due to rumours of corruption (Russell 2007). Russell (2007) 
further states that Operation Neptune was "incorrectly staffed with ... policemen on 










supposed to be protecting and considered themselves to be on an extended holiday at 
the coast" (Russell 2007 p46-47). 
Operation Neptune had a number of positive impacts, such as increased coordination 
between policing agents, an increased feeling of security in local communities and its 
role as a deterrent to poaching (Hauck and Hector 2000). However, it was too short 
lived and resulted in an increased black market price for abalone and the movement of 
poaching activities to new areas (Hauck and Hector 2000; Plag{myi and Butterworth 
2008). MCM officials have mixed opinion's regarding the extent to which Operation 
Neptune was successful in curbing poaching. Additional problems identified include 
the bribery of police officers by poachers, a lack of expertise and training on the side 
of police officers to catch poachers and a lack of funding (Hauck and Hector 2000). 
Management Action for Resources of Inshore and Nearshore Environments 
(MARINES) 
With the disbandment of Operation Neptune, another initiative started in the Overberg 
area known as the MARINES. The MARINES was initiated by the Overstrand 
Municipality who approached MCM to fund a compliance and enforcement body in 
its area (Hauck and Kroese 2006). In 2003, 8 people were appointed to undertake 
patrols from Pringle Bay to Botriver, and a budget of R900 000 was made available 
(Hauck and Kroese 2006). The MARINES are considered to have been highly 
successful in curbing poaching and it was proposed to expand the group to 45 
individuals in 2005, with a budget of R4.5 million (Hauck and Kroese 2006). With 
this, their area of jurisdiction also increased to Buffeljags. Funding was initially 
provided by MCM and the Overstrand Municipality. 
The MARINES had a number of duties, including compliance, patrols, rapid response, 
slip way control, awareness-raising and coordination with other organisations, such as 
Sea Watch and the SAPS (Hauck and Kroese 2006). 
Despite their perceived success, reasons for the disbandment of the MARINES were 
threefold. Firstly, they became autonomous and were considered to be "taking over" 










statements that criticised MCM. Secondly, there were problems regarding the 
corruption of officials. Lastly, a new Chief Director in the Monitoring, Compliance 
and Surveillance Directorate (MCS) as well as a new Chief Financial Officer were 
appointed who decided that MCM could do the job better and cheaper themselves 
(MCS Official pers comm. 2008). 
MCM then took over the MARINES and incorporated their staff as officials on 
contract and about 46 officials were absorbed into MCM (Augustyn 20008b). They 
are no longer called MARINES but are now known as Fishery Control Officers 
(FCOs) and are appointed under the MLRA. This contract was renewed on the 1 st of 
January 2008 for a period of 2 years (albeit only 40 contracts) and MCM are currently 
in the process of appointing another 30 FCOs on a one-year contract to ensure full 
time coverage in focus areas and "keep the pressure on". 
Sea Watch 
SeaWatch is a non governmental organisation which operates on a similar premise to 
'neighbourhood watch'. Sea Watch consists of local community members who are 
concerned about the state of marine resources in the area. They patrol the coast for 
any poaching activity and work together with local law enforcement to apprehend 
poachers. They assist in the gathering of intelligence and supply additional capacity to 
the Fishery Control Officers in the area. 
Green Court 
The Green Court or Environmental Court was established in February 2003 in 
Hermanus and was a collaboration between MCM and the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) and was created mainly to try abalone-related offences (Hauck and 
Kroese 2006). The court was justified on the grounds that abalone cases had a low 
priority in the justice system and that sentences were lenient and the conviction rate 
low (Hauck and Kroese 2006). The Court had a conviction rate of 75% (compared to 










According to Research Officials (pers comm. 2008) the Green Court did not manage 
to significantly reduce poaching activities; despite the high conviction rate, increased 
fines and jail sentences. The Green Court was closed down by the Department of 
Justice in March 2006 (Augustyn 2008b) on the basis that any prosecutor should be 
able to try any case and thus did away with the need for specialised courts. Instead, 
the Department has appointed specialist environmental prosecutors in the MCS Chief 
Directorate, specialising in and dedicated to MLRA prosecutions, which is seconded 
to the NPA (DEA T 2006; Augustyn 2008b). 
4.4 Challenges to enforcement 
As a result of the increase in the number of access rights to fisheries, more people are 
operating along the South Africa coast and thus more people need to be managed and 
monitored (Hauck 2008). Because of this increase in formal resource users, and the 
need to minimise over-exploitation of stocks, MCM has felt it necessary to promote 
fisheries compliance through an increased investment in law enforcement (Hauck and 
Kroese 2006; Hauck 2008). 
However, many traditional fishers are still excluded from legally harvesting resources, 
yet they continue to fish "because they believe it is their right to do so" (Hauck and 
Kroese 2006; Hauck 2008). Informal (or illegal as it is referred to in this report) 
fishing or 'poaching' will continue as many traditional fishers do not consider the 
management and rights allocation system to be legitimate (Hauck 2008). 
Within MCM, the Chief Directorate Monitoring, Control and Surveillance are 
responsible for enforcement and compliance within the abalone fishery. Their abalone 
protection strategy is to keep abalone in the sea and thus alive. However, in order to 
achieve this they need to be proactive, have a full time presence, and require the 
necessary resources to gather intelligence on poaching syndicates (MCS Official pers 
comm. 2008). 
MCM officials identified numerous challenges that hamper the effectiveness of 
enforcement initiatives during the interview process. Firstly, a lack of human capacity 










enforcement activities. Further, there are 21 other commercial fisheries, which also 
need MCSs attention, and in the "greater scheme" the economic value of abalone is 
relatively low. Nearly all linefish species are threatened and thus monitoring of this 
industry is vitally important. 
Secondly, some MCM officials are of the opinion that MCS is not in a position to 
tackle organised crime and their role is ideally to "monitor compliance" and that the 
illegal fishery or poaching falls under 'crime', which is the responsibility of the 
SAPS. MCM compliance officers are trained to deal with "normal" illegal activities 
within the legal fishery such as landings, size, and fishing areas. Others feel that 
partnerships with the South African Police Force (SAPS) and South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) are essential in curbing poaching. Past enforcement 
initiatives came to an end because abalone poaching was not a high priority for other 
government departments. Further, the illegal harvesting of abalone is listed as a 
schedule B offence in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (DEA T 2006). 
MCS officials suggest that it should be reclassified as a schedule 'A' offence, so as to 
ensure appropriate priority of this offence (DEA T 2006). In addition, the Scorpions 
had a unit dedicated to abalone cases and their disbandment has further impacted on 
fighting organised crime. 
Third, a lack of trust between MCS and fishers has resulted in MCS questioning the 
intentions of fishers who are willing to assist - as the poachers themselves often feed 
through false information. There are also problems relating to the corruption of FCOs, 
which hampers MCSs ability to do their job and results in further mistrust. 
Fourthly, with the continuing decline in the TAC over the past few years in addition 
to rumours of a closure, "uncertainty" in the industry has resulted in legal and illegal 
fishers trying to secure a share of the resource before harvesting becomes unviable or 
the fishery is closed (Research Official pers comm. 2008). Further, there is a tendency 
for people to harvest illegally because others are doing so and they do not want to 
"lose out" and that getting caught is "bad luck" as opposed to a socially unacceptable 










Fifthly, informants were initially paid per kilogram of abalone confiscated, and this 
proved to be a very successful system. However, it is felt that payment for 
information leading to confiscations or arrests are too small and there is little 
incentive to report poaching (Fishery Control Officer pers comm. 2008). 
Lastly, practical constraints to enforcement include that the poacher must be caught in 
possession of the abalone and when pursued usually throws the abalone overboard 
(MCS Official pers comm. 2008) and the area that needs to be patrolled is vast and 
many roads are not easily accessible. 
Currently, 40 Fishery Control Officers (ex-MARINES) are appointed in the Overberg 
area on contract for 2 years and 30 more will be appointed in the near future on one 
year contracts. However, due to a lack of manpower there is not a full time presence 
in Kleinmond. In terms of securing community involvement in law enforcement, a 
station manager is based in Kleinmond and it is his responsibility to set in place 
mechanisms for cooperation. The rationale is that different approaches will work in 
different communities and this allows for the station manager to adapt to the local 
context. However, it is not known whether Kleinmond currently has a Station 
Manager. MCM also works together with other bodies such as the National Parks, 
Scorpions, SANDF, CapeNature and the SAPS. Recent developments related to 
enforcement include: the potential involvement of SARS - to improve control at 
airports, ports and borders and collaboration with SADEC countries to create 
awareness of the problem. 
A SeaWatch member (pers comm. 2008) was of the opinion that law enforcement 
officials need to be "conservation minded" as this will make them less vulnerable to 
corruption and bribery. Further constraints identified by him include the lack of 
human capacity, lack of equipment and boats and suspected corruption of the 
inspectors in Hermanus. 
Constraints to enforcement highlighted by a local fisherman include that law 
enforcement has decreased and there are only 3 or 4 Fishery Control Officers. Due to 
this lack of manpower, poachers collect abalone when the inspectors are at the 










communication between law enforcement officials, which hampers effective 
enforcement and a lack of control in the harbour results in fishers taking more WCRL 
than they should. 
Factual plans to deal with enforcement problems post ball 
According to Research Officials (pers comm. 2008) no additional policing has been 
employed to the Kleinmond area since the ban. Instead, there has been a diversion of 
resources and additional staff have been employed to Zone A and Zone B; thus 
negating the need for officials from Zone 0 to be transferred or called away to police 
other zones. Policing efforts have been focused on those areas that are affected by the 
diving ban; where the resource is still abundant. 
It is not clear whether additional resources have been allocated for enforcement; as 
contradictory statements were recorded. However, Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance (MCS) do have the following long-term strategies in mind: 
(1) To make use of technology to develop and implement a full time observation 
network. This is out on tender and MCS will appoint service providers to 
monitor the coast; 
(2) To register all slip-buoys. Slip buoys are the responsibility of Provincial 
Government and the Local Municipality. Overstrand Municipality have not 
registered their slip buoy yet. The idea is that the 'authority' who registers the 
slip buoy must also take responsibility for enforcement and compliance on 
MCMs behalf; 
(3) To engage with SAPS and National Defence Force in order to make poaching 
of a "higher" importance. 
Further developments since the closure include a higher commitment from SAPS and 
National Defence Force. However, lacking is full community buy-in as some 
communities are regarded as hostile, which hampers enforcement efforts. MCS also 
makes use of partner organisations, such as Sea Watch and also recruit "observers" 
from the community who stay close to the sea and act as "informal informants". 











There is conflicting information regarding the budget for enforcement initiatives. An 
MCS Official (pers comm. 2008) stated that to his knowledge, there had not been an 
increased budget, however a Resource Management Official (pers comm. 2008), 
stated that R 20 million had been allocated and that SAPS had committed themselves 
to the protection of the resource. In addition, the closure of the fishery has resulted in 
a budget increase for Research from R 500 000 to R 1 million. MCM is currently 
working on a comprehensive research plan; which includes the setting of targets and 
monitoring of resource recovery (Research Official pers comm. 2008). 
It is clear that there are numerous constraints to the management and enforcement of 
the abalone fishery. Given the concerns regarding the sustainability of the abalone 
resource, and the various challenges facing government and communities in terms of 
compliance, government took the decision to close the abalone fishery. This has had a 
significant impact on the livelihoods of rights holders. The manner in which the 
decision was taken and a lack of alternative income opportunities available, has 
resulted in further animosity towards MCM. This study will examine the impact of the 
ban on the Kleinmond community. 
4.5 Overview of Case Study 
Kleinmond is a fishing community located approximately 120km south east of Cape 
Town (Figure 2). Fishing activity in Kleinmond dates back to 1915, when a small 
fishing community established themselves at Jogensklip, which is today the small 
fishing harbour in Kleinmond (Hauck and Hector 2003; Hangklip-Kleinmond 
Tourism Bureau). The community was a largely Afrikaans-speaking 'coloured,39 
community, whose livelihood was based on harvesting marine resources (Hauck and 
Hector 2003). 
39 This term refers to a diverse group of people descended largely from slaves, indigenous Khoisan 
peoples, and other black people and partly rrom European settlers. Coloured's are distinct from the 
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In 1948, these fishers were moved inland and in 1954, the harbour area where the 
fishers' homes were located was declared an Industrial Zone (Hangklip-Kleinmond 
Tourism Bureau 2008). Their homes were located on the area that serves as the 
parking lot today (Hofmeyr 1985). This relocation was based on the Group Areas Act 
41 of 1950 and has led to the development of the 'Coloured' community of 
Proteadorp where many of the fishers live today (Hofmeyr 1985). Traditional fishers 
in Kleinmond have a long history of harvesting linefish and abalone and following the 
promulgation of the MLRA, many were allocated formal rights to these resources, and 
WCRL, through subsistence, limited commercial and commercial rights (EEU 2008). 
Prior to the promulgation of the MLRA and the reallocation of fishing rights, no 
traditional fishers in the Kleinmond community had commercial quotas to harvest 
abalone or WCRL resources (Hauck and Hector 2003). 
The Kleinmond area has a population of 9305 permanent residents (Hangklip-
Kleinmond Statistics 2007), with many holidaymakers and tourists frequenting the 
area (Hauck and Hector 2003). Table 2 shows the population distribution as per the 











Table 2: Population: Kleinmond, Proteadorp, Overhills and Hangklip (Census 
2001) 
Black African 2001 
Coloured 2582 
White 2306 
Indian! Asian 7 
TOTAL 6896 
Although most fishers in Kleinmond reside in Proteadorp, in more recent times, an 
informal settlement known as Overhills was established in 1990, and consists of 486 
households (Mthimkhulu 2006). The Overhills settlement, adjacent to Proteadorp is a 
largely black settlement, with most residents having migrated to Kleinmond from the 
Eastern Cape. Some members of the Overhills settlement are involved in harvesting 
marine resources - a few received interim relief permits and one or two have WCRL 
quotas; whilst others try their hand at harvesting without permits (Fishery Control 
Officer pers comm. 2008). Some work as crew members, although exact numbers 
involved in fishing activities are not known. 
Statistics for the Overstrand Local Municipal area indicate that fishers in Kleinmond 
reside in a comparatively well developed area (Statistics SA 2007). The Overstrand 
Municipality consists of 21 953 households, or 74 547 people. 85.3% of households 
live in formal dwellings and 65, 9 % of households own their own houses - 51 % of 
which are fully paid off. Access to basic services is good, with 96, 5% of households 
having access to electricity for lighting; 89, 7% for cooking; and 77, 3% for heating 
purposes. More than 98% of the households have access to flush toilets and 98, 1 % of 
households have refuse removal. 
Poverty in the Overstrand municipal area is "highly racialised and geographically 
concentrated" (Overstrand IDP 2008). Economic forces, such as the decline in fishing 
and the seasonality of tourism, impacts negatively on the unskilled and semi-skilled 
workforce in Over strand. Further, in-migration of poor and unskilled people is 
associated with rising rates of poverty and inequality (Overstrand IDP 2008). People 
depend mostly on grants, informal construction work and illegal livelihoods such as 










Resource lIsers ill the case study area 
The fishers in Kleinmond, most of who reside in Proteadorp, are mostly small-scale 
fishers with limited (small-scale) commercial rights. However, 24 interim relief 
permits have also been allocated in this area, and many fishers buy recreational 
permits from the Post Office as a means of gaining legal access to the resource. The 
community consists of both traditional! historical fishers as well as new entrants into 
the industry who do not have a long history of fishing. The fishers interviewed for this 
study largely had a history of fishing, with most reporting that their fathers and 
grandfathers had been fishers. Years spent harvesting marine resources ranged from 
10-68; with and average school leaving age of 14. Fishers in Kleinmond tend to be 
involved in fishing activities throughout the year, and the frequency and duration of 
harvesting is mainly influenced by the weather conditions. 
This study focused on abalone rights holders who depend on fishing for their 
livelihood and who received more than half, and sometimes all of their income, from 
fishing activities. These fishers are not subsistence or recreational fishers, but sell 
their catch in order to generate a cash income (Hauck and Hector 2003). These fishers 
are mostly in possession of limited commercial WCRL, linefish and or abalone 
permits and predominantly own their own boats (8 of the 9 abalone rights holders 
interviewed owned their own boats and 6 rented their boats out for extra income). 
Hauck and Hector (2003) classified these boat owners as "small-scale commercial" 
fishers. Predominantly these fishers are from the 'coloured' community. As stated in 
Hauck and Hector (2003), these small-scale commercial fishers are considered leaders 
in the community and have earned the respect of the fishing community. 
There are also those fishers in the community who continue to harvest resources 
without formal access rights (EEU 2008). They are considered 'poachers' by 
government (EEU 2008) but tend to be considered as two distinct groups by the 
fishers. The first group is those fishers who were denied access to a fishery through 
what was considered an unjust rights allocation process; in which historical fishers did 
not gain access to resources, which they had been harvesting prior to the MLRA 
(Hauck and Hector 2003). This would include what Hauck and Hector (2003) term ad 









resources for food without a permit. Thus, whilst many fishers do not condone 
poaching, they sympathise with those that do so in order to provide basic needs for 
their families. 
The other group includes those persons involved in large-scale illegal fishing (mostly 
of lucrative abalone), who are also linked to other criminal activity such as drugs, 
particularly "tik" (EEU 2008; Russell 2007). Fishers in Kleinmond regard the large-
scale illegal fishers as the 'real' poachers and thus there are different scales of 
illegally fishing which is perceived differently by the broader fishing community 
(Hauck and Nursey-Bray 2002). 
Prior to the MLRA of 1998, small-scale fishers were considered illegal by the state or 
operated under regulations for recreational fishing (Hauck 2008). However, since 
1998 fishers have been given the opportunity to apply for legal access to marine 
resources through the allocation of subsistence and 'limited commercial' rights 
(Hauck 2008). Although many more people now have legal access to marine 
resources, many traditional fishers have been excluded and are therefore not legally 
recognised as fishers (Isaacs 2006; Sowman 2006; Hauck 2008). This is due to 
inequitable policy implementation and the hijacking of opportunities by the local elite 
(Isaacs 2006; Hauck 2008). As a result, the management system has little legitimacy 
and has led to 'protest fishing' - where those fishers who do not have a legal permit 
continue to fish because they believe it is their right to do so (Hauck 2008). Although 
technically 'illegal', some authors refer to these fishers as 'informal', because the 
legitimacy of the laws themselves is called into question. However, in this 
dissertation, fishers who harvest without a permit will be referred to as 'illegal', whilst 
those with legal access to a fishery will be referred to as 'rights holders'. 
Marine resources harvested 
Fishers in Kleinmond mainly harvest WCRL, abalone and vanous species of 
linefish4o. Abalone and WCRL are both harvested commercially by means of the 
allocation of 10-year (long-term) rights and quotas that are determined on a yearly 
40 Including: Cape Snoek (Thyrsites atun), Hottnetot (Pachymetopon blochii), Carpenter! Silverfish 











basis. Some fishers in the area have recreational WCRL permits purchased from the 
post office, allowing the permit holder 4 crayfish per day during the open season 
(November through April) but this catch cannot be sold. 
Abalone harvesting takes place between November and April, with most effort during 
November, February and March (01 November - 31 July); whilst WCRL is harvested 
mostly during March (the season is open from 15 November to 30 June). One fisher 
pointed out that the abalone industry is strongly influenced by the market, and they 
take into consideration the price that the market is offering. For example, the Chinese 
New Year falls during January and February and this creates a large demand and 
consequently higher prices. Whilst WCRL is harvested in the Kleinmond area, 
abalone rights holders have mainly been harvesting their allocation at Robben Island 
for the past 2 years. This is due to the decline in abalone in Zone D (mostly due to the 
increase in WCRL) and thus the decision by MCM to allow rights holders to harvest 
in Zones where the resource is still viable. Fishers harvest anywhere between 100 -
800 kg in one day (8am-3pm) and most harvest their allocation in 1-3 days. 
Linefish and WCRL are harvested with commercial, interim relief or recreational 
permits. Interim relief permits were allocated in mid-2007 to small-scale traditional 
fishers along the west and south coasts as a relief measure while the small-scale 
fisheries policy is being developed (EEU 2008). Many of the fishers consider these 
interim relief permits as 'subsistence' permits, probably because they are limited by 
bag limits (EEU 2008). Fishers are limited by bag limits as follows: 20 WCRL per 
week, as well as 10 snoek, 10 yellowtail, 10 hottentot, 10 silverfish and 30 white 
mussels (for bait) per day. However, a cumulative total of no more than 30 of any 
combination of the linefish may be caught per day, except when snoek or yellowtail 
are running, in which case the permit holder may catch 30 of either, but no other 
species (DEA T 2007). These permits emanated from an out of court settlement 
between the Minister of DEAT and artisanallsmall-scale fishers and there are 
currently 24 interim relief permits in the Kleinmond area (EEU 2008). Some linefish 
species are seasonal and others are available throughout the year (Hauck and Hector 
2003). There is evidence of illegal harvesting of line fish for household consumption 










Historically, marine resources were accessible to all fishers through an open access 
system before regulations and management measures were put in place by the 
government (for abalone, in the 1970s) (EEU 2008). Prior to the MLRA, none of the 
fishers in Kleinmond had commercial quotas to harvest WCRL or abalone (Hauck and 
Hector 2003). Fishers first gained legal access to abalone through subsistence 
permits41 , which were allocated in 1998 for three years (EEU 2008). In 2000, a pilot 
co-management initiative was undertaken in Kleinmond, which resulted in the 
allocation of 3 small-scale abalone quotas, as well as an experimental commercial 
WCRL quota (Hauck and Hector 2003). In 2001, subsistence abalone permits gave 
way to limited-commercial quotas (DEAT 2002b). In 2001 fishers could apply for 
limited commercial abalone quotas and in 2003 long-term rights (10 years) were 
allocated (EEU 2008). Prior to the closure of the abalone fishery, there were 15 
individual rights holders and 3 companies who had abalone rights in Kleinmond. The 
commercial WCRL fishery was also introduced in 2003 and by 2008 there were 147 
commercial rights holders in the Kleinmond area (EEU 2008). It is important to bear 
in mind, that the allocation of rights to access marine resources in the Kleinmond area 
has been a matter of contention and attempts have been made by various stakeholders 
to secure commercial quotas (Hauck and Hector 2003). The recreational abalone 
fishery has been closed since 2003 (DEAT 2003). 
Before the closure of the fishery, abalone was only allowed to be harvested by those 
in possession of long term rights, of which there are 302 rights holders42 in South 
Africa (South Africa.info 2007). Commercial abalone and WCRL are sold to 
processing factories. The processing factories are organised buyers and are mostly 
located outside of Kleinmond in Hermanus and Hout Bay, although a few rights 
holders sell their catch to Ocean Star, a local processing factory. Recreational WCRL 
and linefish are primarily consumed or shared with neighbours and crew members, 
although some fishers sell their catch to holiday makers. 
Abalone harvesting requires a relatively large investment in equipment. Apart from a 
vehicle and boat, which costs approximately R80 000, including a VMS, quota 
holders require a compressor (which can cost in the region of R15 000 - 20 000), a 
50-60 meter hose (supplying oxygen), a full diving kit, nets with balloons, measuring 
41 Subsistence permits were formalised for the first time in the MLRA (EEU 2008) 










rings, approximately 100 litres of fuel, a stainless steel lifter tool, a 'panga' to chop 
away seaweed and a "unit"- which is a weight belt or jacket which helps you to 
maintain your balance under the water. Harvesting abalone requires a crew and most 
boat owners 3 crew members who help them harvest their quota. Thus the fishers are 
required to invest a relatively large amount of capital in equipment. In fact, the 
Abalone Policy (DEAT 2003) required that applicants indicate a certain level of 
investment in the industry, generally requiring that applicants have access to a boat. 
DEAT (2006) determined through a telephonic survey that the average investment per 
diver is R259 000, broken down as follows: Vesse143 (R80 000), Vehicle44 (R170 
000), diving gear (R3 000) and Compressor (R6 000). 
Current state of resources 
Most linefish are in a critical condition and have been depleted to 5-10% of pristine 
levels by overfishing (Branch and Clark 2006). According to van Sittert et al. (2006), 
the decline of linefish was not due to "malicious or intentional flouting of 
regulations", but rather due to progressively greater fishing effort over the last century 
- the effects of which have only recently been detected. Linefish stocks in the 
Kleinmond area have declined extensively over the years mainly due to overfishing 
(Attwood et al. 1997). Fishers interviewed blame the declines in local fish stocks on 
commercial fishing trawlers coming in too close to shore and claiming species such as 
snoek, as by-catch. It was agreed by all fishers that linefish stocks were not as 
abundant as they had once been. 
In initial interviews, when fishers were asked what species they consider to be the 
most abundant in the area, the overwhelming response was that WCRL is the most 
abundant, followed closely by abalone. This response was surprising given that the 
WCRL TAC has been decreasing by 10% per year for the past three years45. Follow 
up interviews with fishers indicated that there is currently concern about the WCRL 
resource and that fishers are struggling to harvest their allocation before the season 
closes. Fishers were not the only ones to highlight this problem; abalone processing 
factories, who now also process WCRL, indicated that they were concerned that the 
43 Replacement value 
44 Replacement value 











T AC would not be filled this season; and that 100 tonnes had to be landed in the last 
month. Possible reasons for this decline were attributed to poaching, the movement of 
WCRL back up the west coast and "lice" which occur as a result of poachers only 
taking the tail section and throwing the heads back into the water - it is believed that 
the lice "chase away" the living WCRL (whether this is fact or a myth has not been 
determined). Maharaj et al. (2007) state that they are unsure whether the 
encroachment of WCRL is permanent or part of a long-term cyclical change. 
Abalone abundance has also decreased due to poaching and biological interactions 
between WCRL, juvenile abalone and sea urchins (Tarr et al. 1996 in Hauck and 
Hector 2003). The TAC for the abalone fishery has been decreasing annually, and 
culminated in the closure of the fishery in February 2008. Poaching is harmful to the 
resource, because abalone much smaller than the legal minimum size46 is harvested, 
reducing the number of individuals that would reach legal size (Hauck and Hector 
2003). Further, poaching results in a much larger amount than is sustainable being 
removed from the sea, with detrimental impacts on the species in the long term. 
Recent confiscations of abalone are of a much larger size class, and are believed to be 
from the Betty's Bay Marine Reserve (Hauck and Hector 2003). 
All abalone rights holders see a future abalone fishery as a viable option, with a 
functioning co-management arrangement in place (EEU 2008). Further, they feel that 
they are owed the remainder of their long-term right and that as such MCM has a 
responsibility to them - whether financially (by paying out the remaining years on the 
long term right) or by providing support for alternative livelihoods (EEU 2008). 
Fishers claim that MCM has closed the fishery without undertaking a surveyor 
conducting research in the Kleinmond Area. Due to constraints47 , 'Research' has had 
to prioritise zones according to the state of the resource. Thus for the past few years, 
Zone B, Robben Island and Zone A (in order of importance) have been a priority in 
terms of surveying and sampling due to the relatively "better" state of the resource in 
these areas (Research Officials pers comm. 2008). Consequently, Zones C and D48 
have not been surveyed because recruitment is failing in these areas (i.e. recruitment 
46 Possibly to supply the market with cocktail abalone or because full size individuals are hard to come 
by. 
47E.g. number of perfect sea days; lack of capacity, staff and resources 










is currently less than 5%) due to the movement of WCRL into the area49 (Research 
Officials pers comm. 2008). Therefore the resource in these zones is going to collapse 
regardless of whether or not fishing effort is reduced (Research Officials pers comm. 
2008). 
According to a UCT Researcher (pers comm. 2008) the state of the resource in Zone 
C and 0 is poor; yet zones A and B can still support a viable commercial fishery. The 
state of the resource in A and B is "where you want it to be" and if you could cut back 
poaching (even by only half) then you could have a viable fishery (UCT Researcher 
pers comm. 2008). The legal industry is having little effect on the resource as they are 
taking about 10% of the total abalone harvest (incl. legal poaching) every year. It's 
the other 90% that is the concern. For the 2006/2007 season, the total amount poached 
from Zones A-D was approximately 12 times greater than the annual TAC for these 
zones (ASWG 2007). 
The role of marine resources in the livelihood strategies of fishers 
In Kleinmond, there are 15 individual rights holders and 3 entities that have been 
allocated long terms rights to harvest abalone. Each rights holder employs on average 
3 crew members. Apart from the legal rights holders, there are also a number of 
people in the community who harvest abalone and other marine resources without 
permits. This study focused specifically on legal fishers or rights holders in 
Kleinmond. 
Marine resources play an important role in the livelihood strategies of abalone rights 
holders in Kleinmond. Whilst some are involved in non-marine related activities; 
abalone still provides the majority of their monthly household income. Abalone is the 
most lucrative fishery in Kleinmond, and fishers earn between R 125 - 250 per 
kilogram in the shell 50. WCRL earned fishers in the range of R 60 - 113 per kilogram 
whole in the shell. Linefish, such as snoek, sells for R15-20 per fish whilst a mixed 
bunch of 3 linefish sells for R3 5. 
~9 Since 199411995 
50 An article in the Mail & Guardian ("Kortbroek's ban hits heavy flak" 03111/2007) values the 










According to rights holders, monthly income differs from year to year, as it depends 
on the allocation received (kilograms) as well as the price offered by the factory5l. 
Fishers who only had an abalone quota, and had their own boat earned between R 
3500 and R 8000 per month. One abalone quota holder who had to pay for the use of a 
boat earned R2500 per month. Fishers who had both an abalone and WCRL quota 
earned between R5000 and RIO 000 per month. One fisher, who had only a WCRL 
quota earned R 4500 per month. Table 3 below indicates the WCRL and Abalone 
allocations per fisher for the 2006! 2007 season, as well as the price per kilogram 
received and their monthly income. The total monthly income in rand includes the 
income received from abalone and WCRL harvesting, renting out of boats and any 
additional income earned from working as crew on boats. Thus the "Monthly Income 
in Rand" is the income received from all marine-related activities (including renting 
out of boats). 
Table 3: Monthly income received from Abalone and WCRL 




Income in Rand kg's 
Fisher 11 428 190 500 70 10000 
Fisher 81 242 200 750 108 10000 
Fisher 71 320 230 500 100 9000 
Fisher 6* 240 240 8000 
Fisher 9 600 200 7000 
Fisher 101 150 180 750 90 5000 
Fisher 51 150 250 500 110 5000 
Fisher 4** 750 113 4500 
Fisher 21 395 125 3500 
Fisher 3 230 165 2500 
Where incomes or price per kg were given over a range, the average value was 
taken for the table 
* sells WCRL caught on recreational permit 
* * additional income earned as a crew member on the boats 
I Receives an income from renting out boat 










The majority of income is spent of food and clothing, with school fees, equipment 
purchases and petrol being other major expenses. 
Before the abalone fishery was closed, rights holders who had abalone and WCRL 
quotas considered abalone to be their most important form of income, with WCRL 
second and the renting of their boats third. For all fishers, abalone brought in more 
than half of their income. Currently, these fishers consider WCRL and the renting of 
their boats as their most important forms of income. Yet, those fishers who only had 
abalone quotas now have no formal income at all52 . Of the 9 abalone rights holders 
interviewed, 8 had their own boat and 6 of them rent the boat out for extra income53 . 
Boats are rented to those rights holders who do not own a boat, with the owner of the 
boat usually acting as skipper. Boat owners charge in the region of R 15 000, inclusive 
of petrol and crew, to harvest another rights holders quota. Some boat owners are still 
receiving an income from harvesting of WCRL quotas. 
Most fishers believe that fishing activities provide them with a secure form of income 
when resources are managed correctly. However, there is great uncertainty with 
regards to future access to resources; which has been exacerbated by the closure of the 
abalone fishery and the decrease in the T AC for WCRL (EEU 2008). The closure of 
the abalone fishery in February 2008 has significantly impacted on the household 
income of abalone fishers, as they are all regarded as the household head and bring in 
the majority (if not all) of the income. Additionally, at the time of allocating long-
term rights, rights holders were encouraged to invest in suitable vessels, gear and 
other applicable equipment, which has resulted in many fishers sitting with debts 
incurred as a result of these investments. 
Those who also have WCRL are being affected by the T AC reductions, resulting in 
unviable quota allocations (EEU 2008). Many fishers indicate that with the rise in fuel 
prices, it is becoming less and less viable to harvest WCRL considering the current 
quota allocations of 500 or 750 kilograms. 
52 One fisher does own a shop/ bottle store from which he can derive an income. Another fisher is a 
volunteer fire fighter, but this is an erratic form of income. 
53 The owner of the boat acts as skipper, and the rights holder pays him a certain amount for the use of 










There is consensus amongst fishers that too many people are involved in the abalone 
fishery. In particular, there are many new entrants in the industry that have little or no 
history of involvement in fishing, yet have been allocated permits. Further, poor 
management and control over the resource due to a lack of capacity in enforcement 
has impacted negatively on the resource. 
Procurement of long-term rights in 2003 has had a positive impact on the SOCiO-
economic circumstances of fishers in Kleinmond. Fisher's lifestyles improved and 
they were able to invest in their children's education and purchase equipment for 
fishing. One fisher has sent his daughter to be educated at a tertiary institution, which 
he says he would not have been able to do without the income from abalone fishing. 
What most fishers do point out is that many managed their money poorly and thus 
have very little money saved or invested. One fisher indicated that he knew "it 
wouldn't last", referring to the long-term rights, and as such got involved in buying 
and selling property. 
Additional and complementary livelihood and income generating activities 
Historically, additional sources of income have been used by fishers to sustain their 
livelihoods. They argue that this has been necessary because of rough sea conditions 
during the winter months and because of annual decreases in the T AC of abalone and 
WCRL over the past three years. 
Fishing communities such as Kleinmond tend to have a long history of being involved 
in the construction trade, because when the sea is too rough (usually in the winter 
months) or fishing is not viable, fishers would get involved in building work during 
the 'off-season'. This includes bricklaying, tiling, plastering, painting and wood work, 
and most fishers (even those who have been fishing since their early teens) have skills 
in some of these vocations. Even though fishers in Kleinmond were historically 
involved in the building trade, only 4 fishers indicated that they did ad hoc building 
work54 when they were not involved in fishing activities. They were quick to add that 
this was "hand to mouth" work, which did not add substantially to their monthly 
54 This includes bricklaying, plastering, painting and carpentry - and most fishers have skills in some of 
these vocations. It is interesting to note that most fishers built their own homes; adding on year by year 










household income. Other fishers are involved in formal and informal business 
ventures including owning a bottle store, buying and re-selling of fish, buying and 
selling property, and one fisher receives a pension. 
Some of the fishers indicated that they have been "investigating" alternative income 
earning opportunities since the abalone closure. One fisher is hoping to formalise the 
buying and selling of fish and is in the process of constructing a processing and 
packing room. Another fisher is buying WCRL in large quantities from the West 
Coast and transporting it to Kleinmond where it is processed and exported. 
Crew members55 (also known as "bakkie-boys") earn an income by assisting on the 
boats also catch fish with a hand line. This provides a contribution to the household 
food and some will also supplement their income with ad hoc construction, painting, 
tiling or gardening work when it is available. Some are still employed on the WCRL 
boats, but the season closes at the end of July. These jobs become available on an ad 
hoc basis and are not a reliable form of income and as a result crew members can be 
unemployed for long periods of time. 
Rights holders feel responsible for their crew, and usually kept them busy outside of 
the abalone season with jobs such as boat maintenance and repair, or even as 
"handymen" around their homes. At the time of this research, some rights holder were 
still employing their crew in this capacity; although others have encouraged their crew 
to look for other work because they cannot afford to pay them. Many crew members 
have turned to illegal fishing to supplement the ad hoc income received from 
construction work. 
5. Findings 
The findings presented in this section are based on an analysis of the available 
literature and court proceedings, interviews, questionnaire surveys and focus group 
discussions. Nine abalone rights holders were interviewed by means of a 
55 Crew members jobs include: lifting the bags of abalone out of the water and onto the boat; 
measuring and cleaning the abalone; packing abalone in crates and transferring it onto the truck that 










questionnaire, which was used to guide the interviews, and two focus group meetings 
were held with abalone and WCRL rights holders. In addition, a few linefish and 
WCRL fishers were interviewed. Ten Marine and Coastal Management officials were 
interviewed, as well as social and natural scientists based at the University of Cape 
Town. Further, boat based whale watching operators, local business people, local and 
provincial government officials and abalone processing factory managers were 
interviewed. 
5.1 Decision making process 
5.1.1 Announcement of the decision 
On 26 October 2007, the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism published a 
notice in the Government Gazette (GG) stating that "an emergency had occurred that 
endangers the stocks of wild abalone" and that "wild abalone stocks (are) at such a 
low level that a complete suspension of all fishing is required in order to promote the 
recovery and rebuilding of the abalone resource". The suspension came into 
operation effective immediately and the Minister acted in terms of Section 16 of the 
MLRA: 
(l) If an emergency occurs that endangers or may endanger stocks of fish or 
aquatic life, or any 5pecies or class offish or aquatic life in any fishelY or part 
of a fishery, the Minister may -
(a) suspend all or any of the fishing in that fishery or any specified part of it; 
(b) restrict the number of fishing vessels fishing in that fishery; or 
(c) restrict the mass of fish which may be taken from that fishery. 
(2) The particulars of any measures taken in terms of this section shall be 
made known by notice in the Gazette and in any other appropriate manner 
On 25 October 2007, the Minister made a press release announcing his decision to 
close the fishery. He stated that "the commercial harvesting of wild abalone can no 
longer be justified because the stock has declined to such an extent that the resource 
is threatened with commercial extinction". He went on to say that the main causes for 










He continued by saying that ':(01' the past few years the recommendation of (his) 
department's managers and researchers has been that the fishery is in crisis and that 
closure could not be avoided'. Further, to ensure that the suspension of harvesting 
was observed he stated that monitoring and control on the part of the department 
would be up-scaled and that abalone population dynamics will be monitored through 
regular research surveys. 
The Minister also announced that "(they) have ... consulted with the Department of 
Labour and jointly developed a Social Plan to mitigate impacts of suspending Wild 
Abalone Commercial Fishing. This plan includes our department's commitment to 
developing a sustainable aquaculture industry and the issuing of additional permits 
for whale watching and shark cage diving" (SAGI 2007). 
5.1.2 The process leading up to the decision 
As early as 2003, the Abalone Policy indicated that the Minister was faced with 3 
decisions. These were to continue with the status quo, implement co-management of 
the abalone resource or close the fishery (OEA T 2003). The Abalone Policy also 
'warned' that if stocks declined in secondary zones the Minister would be forced to 
declare a zero TAC. In addition, the Betty's Bay Marine Protected Area (MPA) was 
no longer considered sufficient to protect the resource and Dyer Island also had to be 
closed (DEAT 2003; ASWG 2007). At the time, the adverse socio-economic 
consequences weighed against closure, and the co-management option was chosen 
(Augustyn 2008a). The management system adopted became known as the TURF 
system (Augustyn 2008a). 
However, the TURF system did not have the desired effect of increased ownership 
and decreased poaching, and stock assessment models showed a continuing decline in 
resource strength and TAC from year to year (Augustyn 2008a). Then in 2004, when 
the Minister announced the T AC for abalone he stated that unless there was a drastic 
decline in poaching, that he would have to consider a complete ban in order to allow 
for resource recovery (Augustyn 2008a). Again in 2007, the Minister warned in his 










significantly reversed by November 2007, he would be forced to close the legal 
commercial abalone fishery (BUrgener and Hauck 2007). 
In 2006, the Minister requested advice on options around the possible phased closure 
of the abalone fishery over a 3-year period (Maharaj et al. 2006). Within MCM, each 
directorate (Resource Management, Integrated Coastal Management, Research, 
Antarctica and Islands and Monitoring, Control and Surveillance) had to provide 
comment on the implications of closure of the abalone fishery, in the form of an 
opinion or motivation for immediate closure or closure over a period of 3 years (pers. 
comm. Research Official 2008). In 2006 the Chief Director: Research, Antarctica and 
Islands commissioned a departmental report on the status of the abalone resource 
from scientists in the Inshore Resource Research Deputy Directorate in response to 
this request. 
This departmental report, titled "Status of the Abalone (H. midae) Resource", 
recommended immediate rather than delayed closure of the abalone fishery (Maharaj 
et al. 2006). The report emphasised the negative effects of poaching on the resource, 
explained why the TURF system failed and stated that the "complete collapse and 
closure of the fishery seems inevitable given the status quo" (Maharaj et al. 2006; 
Augustyn 2008a; Bozalek 2008). The option of immediate closure was favoured for 
two reasons. Firstly, there was a fear that abalone population density might decline to 
such a point where the remaining adult population is too sparsely distributed for them 
to reproduce effectively, this is also known as the Allee Effect (DEAT 2006; Maharaj 
et al. 2006). Secondly, there was a perception that a phased closure would result in 
rights holders rebelling and joining illegal harvesters, resulting in the poaching of the 
last remaining abalone (DEAT 2006; Maharaj et al. 2006; Research Officials pers 
comm. 2008; Augustyn 2008). The report mentioned the need to consider the socio-
economic impact of the closure, and that initiatives to implement alternative 
livelihoods should be launched on the coast (Maharaj et al. 2006). The findings of this 
study were not shared with stakeholders as this report was a confidential internal 
report. 
An outside consultancy was also commissioned in 2006 to prepare a report that 










assessment of alternative livelihoods and socio-economic considerations and other 
factors that needed to be considered in the event of closure and recommendations 
(DEA T 2006; Augustyn 2008a). The report, titled "Final Report: evaluation of the 
current status of the abalone fishery" recommended partial closure and reduced T ACs 
in open zones (DEAT 2006). The partial closure, it was argued, would provide time to 
"explore alternative solutions to the socio-economic factors whilst ensuring that the 
resource can recover substantially in the medium to long-term" (DEA T 2006). The 
report also recommended that each Directorate (Resource Management, Integrated 
Coastal Management, Research, Antarctica and Islands and Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance) develop a strategy to implement the partial closure recommendation 
(DEAT 2006). A further recommendation was that an inter-departmental initiative be 
established to ensure co-ordination of joint projects and to assign roles and 
responsibilities to various departments in terms of the management, protection and 
rebuilding of the abalone resource (DEA T 2006). 
On the basis of these two reports and the department's own assessment of the 
situation, the fishery was closed in three zones (A, C and D) for the 2006/07 season 
(Maharaj et al. 2007; Augustyn 2008a). Three TAC options were proposed for the 
2006/2007 season namely, 195, 125 or 68 tonnes and the Minister selected the 
recommended T AC of 125 tonnes. 
Despite the partial closure decision taken in 2006, the pressure on the resource was 
still perceived to be severe, and thus the reports produced in 2006 were updated and 
resubmitted in 2007. In the interim CITES was implemented which further indicated 
commitment from government to the protection of the abalone resource. Specifically, 
the 2006 report by Maharaj et al. (2007) was updated. The reports were considered 
and discussed by top management and resulted in a recommendation being made by 
the Director-General to the Minister on 22 August 2007 for the suspension of wild 
abalone harvesting as an emergency measure (Augustyn 2008a). The process that led 
to this initial recommendation (to close the fishery) had input from biological and 
fisheries scientists, applied mathematicians, social scientists, lawyers and members of 










decided to act and approached Cabinet56. The issue was submitted to Cabinet, but 
approval was not granted until a Social Plan was submitted as well, addressing the 
socio-economic impact of the suspension (Augustyn 2008a). A Resource 
Management Official (pers. comm. 2008) stated that the reason the Minister 
approached Cabinet was to illicit support from other government departments. 
However, this support was not forthcoming and on 25 October 2007 Cabinet declared 
that the abalone fishery would be closed indefinitely. On 26 October 2007, the 
Minister published a Notice in the Government Gazette announcing the suspension of 
all fishing in the wild abalone sector until further notice (Augustyn 2008a). 
5.1.3 Revised decision 
The announcement of the ban led to outrage and a quick response from abalone rights 
holders. However, after an application was brought against the Minister in the High 
Court to reverse the decision the Minister issued another press statement on 31 
October 200757. In this statement, he announced the suspension of his earlier decision 
until 01 February 2008 and declared a TAC of 75 Tonnes for a 3 month period (01 
November 2007 - 31 January 2008). He remained of the view that the resource was 
endangered; but due to pressure from communities he requested that the Department 
see if there was any scientific basis to delay the implementation of the decision. On 
the basis of a report received from the Department on the morning of the 31 st October 
and after considering the socio-economic implications of the decision; the Minister 
decided to delay the decision until the 1 st February 2008. The Report that the Minister 
received on 31 October was a TAC Recommendation from the Director General. 
The decision to close the abalone fishery did not follow the usual decision making 
process as laid out in section 4.1 above. Instead, the ASWG was working on their 
T AC recommendation for the 2007/2008 season, whilst the decision-making process 
to close the fishery was taking place within MCM. These two separate processes were 
conducted simultaneously. The ASWG Report, dated August 2007, recommended a 
global T AC of 50 or 125 tonnes. Specifically, the Zone B recommendation of zero or 
56 One MCM official claims that the reason the Minister had to approach Cabinet, was because he had 
consulted with other departments and spheres; and thus the decision was not only on MCM. 
57 In the matter between: Oscar Delmore Fisher (First Applicant), The South African Abalone Industry 
Association (Second Applicant) and The President of the Republic of South Africa (First Respondent) 










75 tonnes indicated a difference of opinion amongst members of the ASWG. The 
ASWG were aware that the Minister was considering closure. The ASWG were seen 
to have overstepped their mandate as they were a research and scientific body when 
the following view was expressed in their TAC recommendation: "closure of the 
commercialfishery, in the absence of a revised compliance approach and community 
buy-in, cannot result in resource recovery and could worsen poaching". However this 
view was considered to fall outside of the ASWGs terms of reference (Augustyn in 
Bozalek 2008). 
So although the suspension recommendation was made in August 2007, based on the 
internal research reports, work in relation to a TAC recommendation (by the ASWG) 
had to continue because of the possibility that the Minister might not accept the 
recommendation. After the Minister accepted the closure recommendation on 22 
August 2007, the T AC process continued because the Minister still had to go before 
Cabinet (Augustyn 2008b). Therefore the ASWG continued to work on its 
recommendations (Augustyn 2008b). 
The Chief Director: Research, Antarctica and Islands considered the ASWG 
recommendation and worked on it during September, but did not complete his 
recommendation at this stage, because the Minister had supported the closure 
recommendation. The request from the Minister to see if there were any scientific 
grounds for postponing the implementation of the closure was referred to the Chief 
Director. He only then completed work on the ASWG TAC recommendation in 
October 2007 and signed off on it on 30 October 2007 after the request from the 
Minister. The CD s recommendation was closure of the abalone fishery, but in the 
event that the fishery should not be closed, he recommended a global T AC of 125 
tonnes (one of the ASWGs recommendations). This recommendation made its way up 
the decision-making chain to the D-G in the Department, who on 31 Oct 2007 made 
two alternative recommendations: (i) immediate closure until further notice or (ii) 
suspension to take place on a date announced by the Minister with a T AC of 75 
tonnes for the intervening period. The Minister accepted the second recommendation 










Thus two separate processes were simultaneously in progress with different 
recommendations. The reports compiled by MCM (specifically Maharaj et af. 2006) 
recommended closure; whereas the ASWG document recommended a TAC for the 
2007/2008 season. However, the Minister (and Cabinet) made their decision to close 
the fishery based on the recommendation of MCMs top management prior to the 
completion of the ASWG recommendation. 
A UCT Researcher (pers. comm. 2008), insists that the report compiled by MCM and 
used to support the decision was not balanced and only drew on information that 
could support closure of the fishery. Further, this report was not reviewed by the 
ASWG and contained a number of errors and contradicted the ASWGs 
recommendations. This decision "was based on fraud science and not on the best 
available science" (UCT Researcher pers. comm. 2008). Further, the Researcher 
(pers. comm. 2008) disagreed with a statement made by the Minister in his initial 
press release, where he referred to "scientific studies" which indicated that the 
resource was depleted. According to the Researcher there were no other scientific 
studies that justified the conclusions and reasons the Minister gave for the closure. In 
fact, this researcher was of the opinion that scientific work conducted to inform this 
process had been misquoted. Thus while the researcher believes that one could justify 
the closure of the fishery; the reasons for closure that were given in the press 
statement were not valid. 
Although MCM does have a right to change the ASWG recommendation, the ASWG 
was not notified about the changes to the T AC, and were informed like everyone else 
via the press. If the process was as consultative as some MCM officials claim, the 
ASWG members should have been informed. Further, there had been a good history 
of the AS WG advice being taken - why was it different this time around? In addition, 
it seems there were also documents that did not support closure of the fishery. 
However, these were not mentioned by any MCM officials interviewed, and were also 
not available in the court proceedings. Thus if these reports do exist, they are not 
public documents and therefore could not be reviewed. 
Although MCM officials claim no one person or directorate was pushing for the ban, 










pushing for the closure over the past few years. The Minister's press statement to the 
effect that his managers and researchers have recommended closure for the past few 
years supports this. A Research Official (pers. comm. 2008) also indicated that 
departmental scientists were more "pro-closure" than the ASWG itself. 
5.1.4 Legal action against the decision 
The Applicants58 remained dissatisfied with the Minister's decision and they pursued 
their Court application. Their main grounds for the case was whether or not the 
Minister was correct in deciding that there was an 'emergency' in the fishery which 
justified invoking the provisions of Section 16 of the MLRA. Instead, they argued that 
all that existed was a "crisis" that needed to be "managed". 
They maintained that there was a contradiction between the advice of the ASWG 
(which recommended a TAC) and that of the Chief Director (who recommended 
closure); as described above. Further, they argued that the CDs advice was self-
contradictory, since on the one hand he recommended closure and then later a TAC of 
125 tonnes for 2007/2008. 
The Applicants argued further that Cabinet's decision endorsing the Ministers initial 
decision to suspend the fishery was taken on 25 October 2007, yet the CDs 
recommendation to this effect was only made on 30 October 2007. Therefore the 
Minister could not have made the decision based on scientific advice from his 
officials as the sequence of decision-making shows. 
The court upheld the decision to close the fishery as the decision met the test of 
reasonableness. Further, it is not the courts function to second guess decisions taken 
by decision makers "if these are reasonable both on their own terms and in relation to 
the reasons given for them if the decision will reasonably result in its ultimate goal of 
saving and rebuilding the resource". This despite doubts that the court may have as to 
the viability of the suspension without a stringent and sustained anti-poaching drive. 











Section 16 of the MLRA does not specify the duration of suspension and given the 
wide terms of the Ministers powers in Section 16, it can be argued that the Ministers 
powers of suspension in a fishery are not limited as to time (Bozalek 2008). Section 
14 (2) implies that having established a commercial abalone fishery and allocated 
rights that the Minister is required to determine a T AC on an annual basis and by 
implication was precluded from suspending the fishery indefinitely. However, Section 
14 (5) states that the Minister shall not be prohibited from determining that the T AC 
shall be nil (Bozalek 2008). 
5.1.5 Development of a Social Plan 
The vision of the Draft Strategic Plan for Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods, within the 
Sub-directorate: Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods is to provide sustainable alternative 
livelihood opportunities to poor fishing dependent communities by utilising marine 
and coastal resources and opportunities in a sustainable manner (EEU 2008; DEAT 
2008b). Despite their mandate, the need to identify and develop alternatives 
specifically for fishers impacted by the ban was not discussed with the sub-directorate 
Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods (SCL) prior to or in the run up to the ban. Only once 
the decision had been made, was sub-directorate approached to develop potential 
alternative opportunities for rights holders. Further, only "once the decision had been 
made, (did) we have to come up with the impacts and the suite of measures to give 
effect to the ban" (ICM Official pers comm. 2008). Thus they started work on a 
Social Plan once the decision to close the fishery had been taken. 
The reports documenting the decision to close the fishery (Maharaj et al. 2006, 
Maharaj et al. 2007, DEAT 2006) all mentioned the need to consider the socio-
economic impacts and develop alternative livelihoods for rights holders affected by 
the closure. Maharaj et al. (2007) specifically states that alternative livelihoods should 
be identified "in consultation with key stakeholders including commercial right(s) 
holders, coastal communities, .fisher organisations, researchers and scientific, 
management and compliance working groups". Maharaj et al. (2007) also recognises 
the need for consultation and community buy-in during the process of rebuilding the 










to the closure decision but only that fishers should be involved in rebuilding the 
resource (Maharaj et al. 2006; Maharaj et al. 2006). 
Further, a Report commissioned by DEA T in 2006 (Final Report: evaluation of the 
current status of the abalone fishery) included an assessment of alternative 
livelihoods. The report acknowledged socio-economic impacts associated with a 
possible closure and that alternative livelihoods would need to be identified to support 
rights holders (Daniels et at. 2006). The report identified short, medium and long-term 
interventions. Short-term interventions included the absorption of affected individuals 
into "law enforcement or monitoring activities", the "Working for the Coast" 
program, the marine aquaculture industry and the utilisation of individuals and their 
equipment in boat based whale watching and shark cage diving. The consideration of 
boat based whale watching and shark cage diving would however require training and 
guidance. Medium-term interventions included a "livelihood assessment" to 
understand the impact of a possible closure on affected individuals, development of 
new abalone farms and inter-departmental collaboration to identify viable options and 
the creation of a task team to implement these. Long-term interventions included 
marine aquaculture and sea ranching, but these needed to be preceded by the 
development of a national aquaculture development policy, the development of a 
marine aquaculture sector development plan and the establishment of an inter-
departmental co-operation forum. Both the national development policy and the 
development plan were presented to Cabinet in early 2007, after having been made 
available for comment in July 2006. 
When the Minister announced the closure the fishery in October 2007, he also 
indicated that politicians had approved a Social Plan, which was to provide alternative 
employment opportunities for legal abalone fishers (South Africa.info 2007). To date 
however, no implementation of alternatives or even a 'Social Plan' has been 
forthcoming. This despite the documents produced prior to the closure. 
Discussions with ICM officials revealed that a Social Plan or 'detailed framework 
document' was developed by the Directorate of Integrated Coastal Management (of 
which SCL is a sub-directorate), which described opportunities and constraints 










which are within the mandate of the Department, will be taken forward; no Social 
Plan would be released by the Department (rCM Official pers comm. 2008). Portions 
of the Social Plan to be taken ahead include the development of an aqua-culture 
industry and the issuing of permits for whale watching and shark-cage diving (South 
Africa.info 2007; rCM Official pers comm. 2008). A Social Plan is usually put in 
place by an employer to safeguard the well being of employees. However, after 
several weeks of deliberations between the Ministers of DEAT and Labour, it was 
decided that the Social Plan was not suitable in this case and as it did not constitute a 
formal employer-employee relationship, and the Department of Labour pulled out. 
Further, the development of a Social Plan is not seen to be MCMs competence or 
expertise and is not considered relevant in this situation. 
Despite rCM Officials saying that a Social Plan will not be released, a version of the 
Social Plan, which consists of 8 pages, was made public during the Court Case. A 
Social Plan applies "in the event of threatening large-scale retrenchments as such 
retrenchment could have an impact on sector, regional or national interests" (DEA T 
2007b). Potential opportunities that were highlighted in the Social Plan in the short 
term included: boat based whale watching, shark cage diving and the sardine and 
anchovy fisheries, inclusion in the Working for Water and Coast Programmes, 
inclusion in existing marine aquaculture ventures and law enforcement activities, 
agricultural enterprises and compensation (DEA T 2007b). Medium to long-term 
opportunities included marine aquaculture, hiking trails, heritage tourism and 
agricultural opportunities (DEA T 2007b). The Social Plan seems to be based largely 
on the report mentioned above "Final Report: evaluation of the current status of the 
abalone fishery". In addition to the identification of alternatives, the Social Plan lists 
potential stakeholders, including national, provincial and local government. Missing 
from the Social Plan is how MCM plans to implement the Social Plan and how they 
propose to engage with stakeholders. The sub-directorate SCL have liased with 
Tourism and various eco-tourism projects are proposed (lCM Official pers comm. 
2008). This Social Plan document was incomplete and did not provide much 
information on how MCM was planning on putting in place alternatives for fishers. 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No 3 of 2000 requIres public 










administrator may depart from this requirement where it is reasonable and justifiable 
(Maharaj et al. 2007). A Social Plan was developed in consultation with the 
Department of Labour but it was decided that a consultative process should not be 
followed with rights holders because of the fear that once plans to close the fishery 
became known, that illegal harvesting would escalate in order to "beat the deadline" 
(Augustyn 2008a). Also, consultation would have delayed the closure, which would 
have impacted negatively on the resource, and immediate closure, without 
consultation was necessary to protect the resource (Resource Management Official 
pers comm. 2008). 
An ICM Official (pers comm. 2008) states that because of the perceived negative 
outcome of the decision; certain stakeholders (i.e. fishers) are saying a non-
consultative approach was followed; even though "a lot more process was in place 
than the closure is given credit for". According to a Resource Management Official 
(pers comm. 2008) the possibility of closure was discussed with the TURF 
representatives at Co-Management Working Group meetings with mixed responses. 
She claims that many did not want to accept the trend of resource decline; and further 
claims that MCM tried to engage with them regarding alternatives; but that they 
responded by overemphasizing their reliance on the resource and did not show much 
interest. 
5.2 The Impacts and Implications of the closure of the fishery 
5.2.1 Stakeholders affected by the ban 
Fishers and their crew 
The fishers in Kleinmond are mostly small-scale fishers with limited commercial 
rights. The fishers interviewed for this study largely had a history of fishing, with 
most reporting that their fathers and grandfathers had been fishers. This study focused 
on abalone rights holders who depend on fishing for their livelihood and who received 
more than half, and sometimes all of their income, from fishing activities. Fishers in 
Kleinmond tend to be involved in fishing activities throughout the year, and the 










The abalone industry is one which requires a large investment in equipment, and with 
the advent of the abalone policy many fishers incurred debts in order to purchase the 
necessary equipment. However, the investment in equipment is small given the return 
on the investment and therefore the fishery is relatively easy to enter. In addition, the 
vessels can also be used for other forms of fishing, i.e. linefishing or WCRL and thus 
vessels are often rented out. This is in contrast to other fishers, where the capital 
required is much greater, whilst the return on capital is much smaller. Section 4.5 
above discusses the rights holders in more detail. 
In addition to rights holders, another key stakeholder group that need to be considered 
are crew members, who will also be heavily impacted by the closure. Similar to rights 
holders, crew members are also traditionally associated with the fishing industry and 
"it is the only thing they know" and many spend their days catching fish with a hand 
line. One fisher indicated that his crew member had a WCRL quota of his own, but 
other crew members access marine resources mainly through recreational linefish and 
WCRL quotas. 
Abalone Processing Factories 
Abalone Processing Factories (APF) used to receive abalone quotas, but were phased 
out over a period of 3 years (as of the 2006/2007 season) with the implementation of 
the Abalone Policy (DEA T 2003) - thus whilst they still hold processing, marketing 
and exporting rights, they are no longer allocated an abalone quota. Consequently, 
divers (i.e. rights holders) were allocated a quota and deliver the abalone to the APF. 
There are 5 main Processing Factories in the area are: Tuna Marine; Walker Bay; 
OCAD; SPP Canning; and Combined Abalone (BlueStar Holdings). 
Previously, Combined Abalone processed exclusively wild abalone, yet as a result of 
cuts in the T AC over the past few years (from 70 tonnes initially, to 9 tonnes in the 
final year) and a concern that the industry was going to be closed; they shifted their 
focus to WCRL. They expect to process in the region of 150 tonnes of WCRL this 
year. Infrastructure such as holding tanks and refrigeration used for abalone are easy 










Similarly, Walker Bay Canners Ltd was phased out of the abalone industry59 in 
2006/2007 and has also changed their focus to WCRL, as well as farmed abalone. 
They claim WCRL is not a viable option, as all the processors are now targeting this 
product and until recently there has only been 180T available in the area60 and the 
TAC has been decreasing over the past 3 years. Further, there is not enough farmed 
abalone to supply all the factories. However, if the poaching can be decreased then 
WCRL could be a viable option in the future. In addition, many abalone farms are 
putting up their own processing and canning plants effectively decreasing the need for 
APFs. Currently, Walker Bay is doing research into alternative fish-related products. 
Walker Bay still processes confiscated abalone on behalf of MCM; yet state that less 
has been available since the closure. 
SPP Canning has managed to shift their processing from wild to farmed abalone over 
the past 4 years, and now exclusively process farmed product. Since the processing of 
farmed abalone started, they have increased their staff, as it is more labour intensive. 
This is because the abalones are smaller and they have more abalone coming through 
the system, it takes more time to shuck the product. However, Groenewald (pers 
comm. 2008) maintains that small farms trying to get into the industry now will 
struggle although as long as the Chinese economy is doing well; there will be a 
market for abalone. 
Boat shops 
Rights holders from Kleinmond predominantly bought and serviced their equipment 
at Magson Marine in the Strand. Magson Marine sells and services commercial 
fishing boats and equipment. Since the closure, they have had a number of rights 
holders trying to sell their boats and equipment. Magson Marine has had few or no 
rights holders wanting to buy equipment, spares or bringing boats in for a service and 
have lost a lot of regular business due to the closure. 
59 Went from 140T to 35T. 










5.2.2 Perceptions of stakeholders to the abalone ban 
Rights holders 
Rationale for closure 
Interviews with rights holders indicate that they are of the opinion that the closure of 
abalone fishery is as result of MCMs inability to control poaching activities. Further 
they stated that when MCM allocated the lO-year rights, they should have had 
adequate enforcement and monitoring capacity in place (cf. 'enforcement 
developments'). 
Transfer of pressure to other resources 
Rights holders believe that the diving ban will merely transfer pressure to those areas 
that are still open whilst others are of the opinion that a diving ban makes no 
difference to a poacher because enforcement officials cannot be everywhere at once. 
Further, the rights holders played a role in enforcement, as they would contact law 
enforcement if they witnessed poaching activities. 
All fishers indicated that the closure of the abalone fishery is intensifying pressure on 
the West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL) resource. Fishers indicate that rights holders, 
poachers and crew are forced to dive out WCRL in order to "keep going". In addition, 
fishers indicate that whilst abalone is still being harvested, WCRL is easier to access. 
Fishers noted that fewer and fewer WCRL are being caught, indicating that poaching 
must be intensifying. One fisher pointed out that he would usually catch 800kg-l 
tonne per day in Zone D; but now has to spend a whole day on the water and only 
catches 9-30kg. 
One fisher pointed out that poaching is part of the culture and not necessarily 
occurring due to the quotas being too small. He says that due to short-term thinking 
and poor money management; fishers take out a few WCRL and use the money to 
"keep going for a while". Only one fisher indicated that the closure of the fishery "can 










There is a concern that poaching activity will continue and even increase now that the 
ban is in place. The opinion is shared amongst rights holders that poaching will be 
worse than before because people need money and abalone obtains a good price on 
the black market. As long as there is a market for abalone, people will take the risk to 
harvest abalone illegally. One fisher indicated that when the policing increased 
directly after the ban, poaching did decline; but as soon as policing 'eased up' 
poaching continued as per usual. 
Current state of the resource 
The response of fishers to the current state of the abalone resource was mixed. Most 
fishers felt that the resource is able to sustain a viable fishery and that it is not 
threatened. They claim researchers are "not looking properly" and that there are still 
many undiscovered beds of abalone. However, some do feel that the resource is 
threatened due to poaching, too many fishers for the resource to support, bad 
management on the part of MCM and a lack of enforcement. 
Compliance and Enforcement 
When it comes to compliance issues and poaching, fishers are adamant that policing 
and enforcement should be more visible. Currently, compliance officers need to be 
dispatched from Hermanus. The community should be able to report poaching to a 
satellite station, so that compliance officers can be more readily sent out. Fishers 
suggest that a rubber-duck should be allocated to the area, so that response time can 
be minimised. 
Many compliance officers have little or no history of involvement with fishing, and 
thus know very little about the industry and often are unable to identify species. 
People with adequate experience and knowledge should be appointed. Fishers feel 
that there needs to be more cooperation between police, local monitors, compliance 











Fishers are concerned that general crime, such as break-in's, will increase due to the 
ban, because of the drug-element inherent in poaching - many bag carriers and 
lookouts get paid in drugs. This concern was validated by MCS Officials who stated 
that house break-ins and other 'general' criminal activity has increased in the 
Overberg areas when increased patrolling over a period of 2-3weeks prevents people 
from harvesting. Further, a FCO for Kleinmond claims that since the ban, there has 
been an increase in house breaks. 
MCM 
MCM Officials were generally wary of giving opinions on the closure but many stated 
that the ban was "a along time coming" and that it was the "right thing for the 
resource". 
Compliance and Enforcement 
Whilst the closure of the fishery and the dive ban may prove to be good deterrents, 
resulting in less poaching, a MCS Official (pers comm. 2008) did not think closing 
the fishery was the right decision. He highlights that the closure will result in a 
number of other problems. He highlighted that not only the quota holder is affected, 
but also his crew and even the factory worker who shucks the abalone may be left 
without a job. The official believes that instead of the ban, resources should have been 
allocated for enforcement to boost capacity. Then a trial period should have 
commenced, and if in that time poaching could not be controlled then the closure 
could have been implemented. Consequently, he believes rights holders are being 
punished; yet the poaching is not being addressed and there is "more abalone for the 
poacher". Further, enforcement measures need to be sustainable and need to have 
continuity. He also points out that a ban on harvesting will have no impact unless it is 
coupled with enforcement measures ensuring that the conditions of the closure and 










Immediately after the closure, enforcement presence was high and included the 
involvement of police and additional MCM officials. However, it has tapered off 
since and police withdrew on the 151 of June - mainly due to outbreaks of xenophobic 
violence and because marine resources are not their priority (MCS Official pers 
comm. 2008). SAPS do have an important role to play, as they are responsible for law 
enforcement in general. 
Transfer of pressure to other resources 
When MCM officials were asked whether the dive ban and fishery closure would be 
successful in decreasing poaching, responses varied. An ICM Official (pers comm. 
2008) indicated that the diving ban at Cape Point was transferring the poaching of 
WCRL to Kommetjie and that there has been a shift in abalone poaching activity to 
other areas, particularly the Eastern Cape, for example at Dwesa-Cwebe (ICM 
Official pers comm. 2008). In addition, diving activity has increased between 
Kleinmond and Rooiels as this area is still open to diving (pers comm. Fishery 
Control Officer 2008). However, there has been a two-thirds decline in poaching in 
the Gansbaai-Quoin Point area (ICM Official pers comm. 2008) and an overall 
decline in poaching of 60% was estimated (MCS Official pers comm. 2008). 
Research and MCS officials were firmly of the opinion that the success of the ban 
with regards to curbing poaching depended on the investment by government in 
enforcement; and unless enforcement efforts were significantly increased, the 
resource will continue to decline (Research Officials pers comm. 2008; MCS Official 
pers comm. 2008). However, officials do indicate that MCMs concentration of 
enforcement on key areas is a good use of limited resources. Another view is that 
change in a system is good and perhaps the drastic nature of the decision to close the 
fishery may serve as a "wake up call". 
A concern is that due to the high number of low income earners in coastal 
communities, there will always be poaching, and the attitude is often that getting 
caught is "bad luck" as opposed to "wrong". Others feel it is too early to tell whether 
the ban will be successful in the long run (MCS Official pers comm. 2008; Resource 










Local law enforcement 
Local enforcement, including a Fishery Control Officer and a Sea Watch member, 
believe that the closure was the right decision. A member of Sea Watch (pers. comm. 
2008) believes that fishers will always claim that the resource is abundant, but agrees 
that the fishery had to be closed to allow small populations to recover. A local FCO 
agrees but believes that the Kleinmond area should also have been included in the 
dive ban as the resource is still strong in some areas. He states that all rights holders 
poach and that with only 6 staff, it is difficult to patrol the entire area. A SeaWatch 
member (pers comm. 2008) states that poaching is on the increase due to the increase 
in the black market value of abalone as a result of the closure. 
VCT Scientists 
A UCT Researcher believes the closure of the fishery was inappropriate. Firstly, it has 
broken any trust that had developed between the ASWG, MCM and rights holders. 
Secondly, the researcher does not believe the ban will decrease poaching because of 
the lack of policing. Third, the researcher stresses the importance of having a 
continuation of CPUE and other data for resource assessment purposes and that the 
closure prevents the collection of this data. Lastly, there are no longer "eyes on the 
water". The researcher goes on to state however, that if MCM can stop poaching the 
fishery will be viable. 
A social scientist based at UCT believes that other steps could have been taken 
instead of the fishery closure (UCT Researcher pers. comm. 2008). By virtue of the 
fact that the poaching is continuing suggests that government has a poor 
understanding of the drivers of illegal harvesting (UCT Researcher pers. comm. 











5.2.3 Impacts and Implication of the ban 
5.2.3.1 Loss of income and impact on livelihoods 
The closure of the fishery has resulted in a drastic loss of income for rights holders. 
Rights holders who only had an abalone quota were earning between R3500 and 
R8000, depending on their allocation. The loss of all or a substantial portion of their 
income has had numerous repercussions on the lifestyle of rights holders, particularly 
with regards to the education of their children. Impacts include transferring children to 
different schools or not being able to continue with tertiary education. Rights holders 
also raised concerns about basic needs, such as putting food on the table and paying 
their water and electricity bills. Fishers were visibly distraught when they discussed 
having to pay their debts or in relation to their familial responsibilities. 
In addition to their role as the head of the household, rights holders consider 
themselves responsible for their crew and their immediate families through being their 
employer. The majority of rights holders provide their crew with work outside of the 
abalone season, such as gardening, painting or maintenance work. One fisher 
indicated that although he has always "kept his crew busy", he can no longer afford to 
provide them with "other" work. Fishers did indicate that some crew work on the 
building sites and others are working on WCRL or other fishing boats; but that the 
income they received from abalone harvesting was a substantially contribution to their 
household income. Rights holders fear that crew would be tempted to steal, poach 
marine resources or become involved in other criminal activity. Further, there has 
been a tendency to resort to drug and alcohol abuse where people have lost jobs or 
sources of income Two rights holders indicated that their crew are now involved in 
poaching activities out of necessity, as there are no other options available to them in 
Kleinmond. 
Only one fisher went further to say that the local school, church and businesses are 
also impacted as a result of him having lost his quota, for instance, he can no longer 










Fishers feel that the abalone processing factories will not be impacted by the closure 
of the fishery since they had had time to look at other options to make up for the loss 
in income and are generally buying from commercial abalone farms in the area. 
However, smaller buyers, such as Ocean Star, have had to decrease their staff. One 
fisher indicted that his buyer also buys from the illegal fishers and as such will not be 
affected. However, profit margins have been affected, as abalone fetches a much 
higher price on the international market. Abalone fetches between $50-55 per 
kilogram, whereas WCRL fetches in the region of $23-24 per kilogram. Whilst 
Combined Abalone has not had to layoff any permanent statf, they are encouraging 
their seasonal staff to look for other work. 
Another group of stakeholders that will be affected by the ban would be those selling 
and repairing diving equipment. Rights holders chiefly buy equipment from Magson 
Marine in the Strand but also support Anchor Marine (Salt River), Boat Anchor 
(Pardon Island) and Leons in Cape Town. Again, fishers' responses were mixed. 
Some indicated that boat shops would be impacted, as motors and diving equipment 
will no longer be needed. Others claim the impact will be negligible as boats are still 
in operation for linefish and WCRL; and that the poachers will still be purchasing 
goods. It is clear that there are smaller businesses that will be impacted by the closure. 
5.2.3.2 Impact on Lifestyles 
Many abalone rights holders were historically amongst the poor, yet due to years of 
involvement in the abalone fishery (some started out as divers for processing 
factories); they have managed to improve their standard of living. Abalone rights 
holders earned a reasonable income (prior to the closure) which has resulted in an 
improved socio-economic status. 
Fishers have been involved in the harvesting of marine resources since a young age, 
and consider it to be an important part of their heritage. Most learned from their 
fathers and assisted them with fishing and providing for their family from about 14 
years of age. As a result, many left school at a young age to pursue the "family 
businesses". The cultural aspect of fishing is particularly important, as most fishing 










"they are born fisherman and they will die fisherman". This clearly indicates the 
strong ties to fishing activities, and the feelings of belonging, fulfilment and job 
satisfaction that cannot easily be replicated. 
5.2.3.3 Lack of identification of suitable alternatives 
The decision to close the fishery was top down and technocratic and there was a lack 
of consultation with rights holders regarding the way in which the closure should be 
implemented. Rights holders feel they are being punished for MCMs lack of ability to 
curb poaching and the closure has no support from rights holders. In addition, there 
was no consultation with rights holders with regards to possible alternative livelihood 
opportunities or feasibility studies to determine the suitability of the proposed 
alternatives in the local context. Further, at the time of the closure, there were no 
alternatives available for rights holders. Alternatives proposed are long term and 
require substantial financial investment. Rights holders have a lot of anger, resentment 
and mistrust toward MCM as a result of the way the decision was taken and because 
no plans were put in place to provide them with alternative income earning 
opportunities. Rights holders would have liked a phasing out period, similar to what 
had been given to the abalone processing factories. The failure to identify alternatives 
has resulted in many rights holders having no income as many only had an abalone 
allocation. 
Some rights holders indicated that poaching of abalone and WCRL was occurring, but 
that many rights holders and crew had little alternative and were forced to resort to 
illegal activities to support their families and pay their debts. Rights holders feel as 
though they have been pushed aside by government and feel totally helpless. 
The alternatives that were proposed by the Minister in his press statement are not 
particularly suitable for rights holders. Shark cage diving and boat based whale 
watching require substantial financial investment, whilst Working for the Coast will 
not provide a sufficient income for rights holders. Although rights holders do show an 
interest in abalone mariculture, this is a long-term plan and cannot provide rights 










5.2.3.4 Alienation of fishers and disregard for the law 
The top down manner in which the decision was taken has resulted in right holders 
harbouring animosity and mistrust towards MCM. From the court proceedings and 
interviews with rights holders, it is clear that many believe reports were tampered 
with and that MCM officials had been dishonest in certain circumstances. This is due 
to the lack of transparency of the decision and the fact that the ASWGs 
recommendation was not taken into account. 
Fishers were informed of the closure along with the rest of the public via the radio, 
newspaper and television. Fishers were of the opinion that that they should have been 
consulted regarding the intention of the department to close the fishery and that they 
could at least have been notified in writing or through their TURF Reps of this 
intention. Fishers feel that the decision to close the fishery came without warning and 
was made without adequate consultation with the industry. Despite rumours of 
closure, rights holders still believe that they should have been consulted regarding any 
intentions to close the fishery. Thus closure without any consultation came as a huge 
shock. Abalone rights holders should have been informed and consulted regarding the 
intention to close the fishery. MCM should have arranged meetings in which they 
presented the findings of their research to support the closure and then stimulated 
discussion around this issue, allowing fishers to highlight their concerns and present 
their solutions. The top-down nature of the decision taken by the Minister has further 
alienated the industry and created animosity towards MCM. The fact that the fishery 
was closed without warning (cf. 'warning signs') and with no alternatives in place has 
left many fishers bitter and angry with MCM. They feel that they are being penalised 
for MCMs lack of enforcement capacity to protect the resource. 
Instead of the closure, fishers suggest that the fishery should have been gradually 
closed over a period of a few years, during which alternative livelihood options for 
fishers could have been phased in. Alternative/s should have been in place when the 
fishery was closed. Alternatively, WCRL quotas could have been provided as an 










The nature of the decision making process and the resultant alienation of rights 
holders will significantly hamper the success of any future collaborative efforts, 
particularly the implementation of alternative livelihood initiatives. Right holders are 
sceptical and weary of being "let down" again. This alienation has also possibly led to 
many rights holders and crew poaching, as they do not regard the decision or the 
decision-making process as legitimate. This could be detrimental to the resource, as 
they may feel little responsibility or ownership over the resource now that they are no 
longer allowed to exercise their long-term rights. 
5.2.3.5 Psychological Impacts 
Rights holders generally felt "hopeless" and many were not sure where they were 
going to find money to pay their debts, or put food on the table. Rights holders are 
generally the bread winners and thus they are solely responsible for the financial 
stability of their household. Many were afraid that they would lose their house. These 
issues all impact of their sense of dignity and self-worth. As the sole income earner 
for their families, the decision to close the fishery and the lack of alternatives has left 
many rights holders concerned for the well being of their families and crew. Rights 
holders are most concerned about their children's education. 
The nature of the decision process and the lack of suitable alternatives for rights 
holders further illustrate the poor understanding of the cultural role of fishing for these 
rights holders and their crew. Rights holders and their crew are historically associated 
with marine resource harvesting and consider the sea to be "in their blood". Rights 
holders are generally not willing to engage in alternatives outside of fishing, and 
many lack the skills and finances to do so. Thus although they possess all the skills 
necessary for resource harvesting and are good at what they do, they are unable to put 
these skills to use and this impacts on their feeling of worth. Being unable to provide 










5.3 Potential alternatives to abalone harvesting 
5.3.1 Alternatives proposed by Government 
Alternatives that were originally proposed by the Minister in his press statement 
included boat based whale watching and Shark Cage Diving. An ICM Official (pers 
comm. 2008) maintains that there is more opportunity for growth in the boat-based 
whale-watching sector, as shark cage diving is already saturated. An obstacle to 
getting involved in these industries is that there is the requirement to provide a quality 
service in 'high end' markets (ICM Official pers comm. 2008). There are also 
possibilities for mariculture development in the Gansbaai and Kleinmond areas but 
this would require capital and expertise CICM Official pers comm. 2008). 
There are currently two boat based whale watching operators in Hermanus, namely 
Southern Right Charters (SRC) and Hermanus Whale Watching (HWW). The 
consensus was that there is not much room for growth in the industry, particularly in 
Hermanus. This could be attributed to fears that current operators would lose 
business. However, it was indicated that there might be space for growth in the 
Gansbaai area. Boat-based whale watching requires a large financial investment. 
However, it was interesting to note that the perception existed that "fishers in dinghies 
would go chasing after whales" (SRC pers. comm. 2008). Further, SRC (pers comm. 
2008) indicated that too many boats in an area could "scare" the whales or threaten 
their well being. Further, Hermanus Whale Watching felt that the Minister should not 
have raised expectations relating to the industry by indicating that there was room for 
new entrants as this has resulted in a false perception of the industry. 
The owner of Hermanus Whale Watching used to be an abalone diver and explained 
how the boat-based whale watching industry was not easy to enter. Tour guide 
training courses are necessary as well as good financial management and an 
understanding of the quality of service required. He only realised returns on his 
investment after 8 years and indicated that many fishermen do not think "long-term". 
The boat-based whale watching industry is different to fishing, in that you do not 










The Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods sub-directorate is responsible for identifying 
alternative opportunities for abalone rights holders. They admit that providing 
alternatives that are as lucrative as abalone will not easy. They are of the opinion that 
abalone harvesting provides a lucrative income in relation to the time spent 
harvesting, and that perhaps other jobs would require more time to be spent working 
for the same income (lCM Official pers comm. 2008). Thus there is a perception 
amongst MCM officials that fishers are not willing to pursue alternatives that require 
year round work to obtain a sufficient income as opposed to getting a lump sum for a 
few days' work. An ICM Official (pers comm. 2008) feels that fishers are not willing 
to pursue the alternatives offered by MCM, perhaps for the reasons above. 
The policy for boat-based whale watching is currently awaiting approval and current 
operators are running their operations under exemptions. Once the policy is approved, 
the permit application process will be opened and existing as well as new entrants can 
apply. First priority will be those fishers who lost abalone quotas; second, will be 
those fishers involved in fisheries where stocks are dwindling; third, those adjacent to 
MP As and lastly new entrants. Those already operating in the industry will be issued 
with permits to continue to do so. Whale watching and shark cage diving operations 
are mostly in Cape Town, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. People are 
encouraged to join these industries, but there is recognition that many do not have the 
training, equipment and financial backing to get involved. 
There is awareness on the part of the SCL sub directorate that alternative livelihood 
projects need to be context specific, and that blanket livelihood options would not be 
suitable for the entire coast. 
An interview with a Resource Management Official indicated that MCM are now 
aware that their proposed alternatives are not entirely feasible. In terms of alternative 
livelihoods, MCM considered aquaculture, boat based whale watching, shark cage 
diving and enterprise opportunities within harbours. However, after some time it was 
realised that there were numerous problems with these proposals. Firstly, aquaculture 
is a medium to long-term initiative and could not serve the short-term needs of rights 
holders. Secondly, boat based whale watching and shark cage diving have little scope 










5.3.2 Alternatives proposed by Rights Holders 
Interviews with fishers indicated that in terms of alternative occupations, fishers 
largely want to remain in the fishing or diving industries. The feeling amongst fishers 
is that "we are born fishermen and we will die fishermen". Most would not change 
their occupation even if they could secure the same income. Some claim they are "too 
old to do something else" and were worried about "learning new skills from scratch". 
Alternative options (with the same monthly income) that were proposed during the 
focus group meetings and interviews, included working for an abalone factory or 
doing diving work. Abalone rights holders feel that MCM should be involved in the 
start up of an abalone farm, providing finance and skills training (such as management 
and accounting) to fishers, and that once the farm is "up and running" it should be 
transferred to the quota holders for them to manage. Fishers' main concern regarding 
abalone farming is the initial start up period (up to 5 years) during which they will not 
be earning any income. They worry where their income will come from during this 
time. 
A further concern is land availability for the construction of the abalone farm. Much 
of the land around Kleinmond is privately owned and this land will need to be bought 
(pers comm. Fredericks 2008). The construction phase will be labour-intensive, but 
the operational phase will not be. Further, an aquaculture venture is a long term 
"solution" and fishers are preoccupied with immediate needs, such as daily household 
expenses and paying debt. The abalone farm owned by Global Ocean at the harbour 
closed down recently, because it was too small to make a profit. Thirty permanent 
jobs were lost because of the closure. It is important to understand why ventures such 
as these failed so that future initiatives can avoid these. 
In terms of getting more involved in the construction or building business, fishers 
highlighted concerns that building work is tapering off in the area, and that most 
developments have their own contractors. In addition, considering the time spent 
working and the remuneration; one fisher pointed out that he was not willing to work 










used to a "higher" standard of living and R1600 per month will not be comparable to 
what they were earning from abalone harvesting. 
The two alternatives that were originally put forward by the Minister in his press 
statement, included shark cage diving and boat based whale watching. Fishers are 
wary of getting involved in well-established industries where the market is already 
saturated. To enter these industries with no prior experience or the financial means is 
seen as a large risk. The harbour at Kleinmond is in poor condition and has a 
reputation for being dangerous; and when the sea is rough, it is difficult to get through 
the harbour. Fishers are concerned about where they will land their boats in these 
conditions. Abalone rights holders are adamant that any alternative options should be 
geared towards those persons who do not have alternative means of employment61 • 
In general rights holders are of the op111lOn that that there are few or no work 
opportunities in Kleinmond. In 2001, unemployment in Kleinmond was in the region 
of 22% (Overstrand lOP 2008/09), and it has increased to between 25 and 30% in 
2007 (TV3 2007), with a figure of 76% in the Overhills settlements (Masifundise 
2007). It is clear that work opportunities need to be created in this area. 
As an interim measure to allow fishers to have an income whilst negotiations are 
underway between MCM and rights holders and alternatives are being investigated, 
some fishers suggest that areas such as Bird Island, Dyer Island, Verwoerd Reserve, 
Robben Island, Cape Point and Saldanha should be open to abalone harvesting over 
the short term. Fishers indicated in meetings with MCM (Resource Management 
Official pers comm. 2008) and with the author, that they wanted WCRL quotas as an 
alternative or as an interim measure. However, according to MCM scientists this 
resource is also declining and it is thus not feasible to allow new entrants. 
5.3.3 Economic opportunities available in Kleinmond 
A number of economic initiatives were identified in Kleinmond during the research. 
Only those that are suitable for rights holders or their crew members are elaborate in 
below. Fishers were however unaware of organizations which are involved 111 
61 Meaning that those individuals who have alternative forms of employment outside of the fishing 










identifying or Supp0l1ing economic opportunities for tishers. In Kleinmond "we must 
do our own thing". 
There are very few alternative economlC opportunities available for fishers in 
Kleinmond and this was contirmed by officials from the Chief Directorate: Social 
Responsibility, Policy and Projects (SRPP)62 who claim that there are no poverty 
alleviation programs or projects in the Kleinmond area that have focused specifically 
on fishers. Further, fishers lack the capital to invest in other businesses, and even 
within the fishing and building industries; people from outside of Kleinmond are 
taking these jobs. 
Initiatives currently underway in the Overstrand include: 
(i) The development of economic spaces (beehive facilities) to promote enterprise 
development and promotion of the second economy to facilitate trading by making 
available infrastructure to assist in growing the second economy. In Kleinmond this 
initiative will take the form of a formalised market area in Proteadorp where local 
produce e.g. fish can be sold. Abalone rights holders who have access to other marine 
resources could potentially benefit from this infrastructure development by marketing 
their products here. 
(ii) In terms of "Fishing Industry Sector Support" the IDP recognises the development 
of an aquaculture sector strategy, which includes the identification of suitable land 
and partnerships; and the development of harbours. Although the IDP recognises the 
need for "aquaculture based economic initiatives to address the loss of quota's to 
harvest abalone"; a SWOT analysis63 revealed that Kleinmond was the least suitable 
coastal town for marine aquaculture. A report, "The Technical Viability and 
Opportunities for Aquaculture Development in the Overstrand Municipal Area" 
which was commissioned by the Municipality, ranked Gansbaai as the most suitable 
62 SRPP has been mandated to deal with the Expanded Public Works Programme within DEAT and are 
responsible for investing money for training and job creation in key focus areas, including (1) Working 
for the Coast; (2) People and Parks; (3) Sustainable Livelihoods and (4) Tourism. 
63 SWOT is an acronym for 'Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats' and is a form of analysis 
to evaluate, and in this case compare, a number of alternatives to determine which has, for example, the 










area, followed by Hawston, Buffeljags and then Kleinmond (MAN Consulting 
Services 2008). 
In addition, the following initiatives in Kleinmond have been identified as possible 
avenues for the initiation of alternative economic opportunities: 
Kleinmond Harbour Development 
The proposed Kleinmond Harbour Development is a collaborative effort between the 
Overstrand Municipality, Kleinmond Community Investment Holdings (representing 
the interests of the historically disadvantaged sector of Kleinmond) and Wharfside 
Developments. The project is supported by and has received funding from the 
Provincial Department of Economic Development and Tourism, as well as the 
Development Bank of South Africa. 
The Harbour Development will include: the reconstruction of demolished historical 
structures, residential flats, public parking, business premises, a slipway and boat 
parking, public open space and an abalone hatchery. There is also a potential for a 
"fish market,,64 and residential units, which can be used for visitor accommodation 
and managed by local community members. 
However, during discussions with members of the fishing community only one fisher 
identified the Harbour Development65 as a potential economic opportunity. It is 
assumed that most fishers are aware of this development; but it is interesting to note 
that they do not consider it as a potential source of alternative income. This is most 
likely due to the fact that the development has been in the pipeline for 11 years, and as 
such initial enthusiasm or support for the development has waned. Further 
investigations indicated that another similar development is on the cards for the 
Kleinmond harbour. This development is known as the "Kleinmond Visbaai Harbour 
Redevelopment" and is limited to the redevelopment of demolished buildings to be 
utilised as restaurants, curio shops and a fresh fish market. This development has the 
support of certain members of the community and probably originated because of a 
lack of progress with the original development. This venture is being headed of 
M This could serve as a means to formalise the selling and marketing of marine resources. 










SAMD (South African Mariculture Developments). There is an indication that 
different factions in the community support the different developments and this need 
to be looked into. 
Mthimkhulu 
The Grail Centre Trust is an international body, which is focused on development and 
transformation processes and has been working in the Kleinmond community since 
200l. The project they are currently running is known as Mthimkhulu, where they 
provide training and skills development, including Adult Basic Education and 
Training (ABET), Job Skills Development and Training and Small Business 
Development. 
Although Mthimkhulu will be providing the Kleinmond Community with skills 
training, they are more focused on training unskilled persons so that they have the 
opportunity to enter the work force. Although Mthimkhulu can provide skills training, 
they cannot create work where there is not a demand for it. One of their biggest 
concerns is that there is a general lack of work opportunities, even for semi-skilled 
persons. This venture would be more suitable for crew members. 
Mariculture Col/ege and Multi-species Ranching 
There are plans for a Mariculture College on the Mthimkhulu site, which will serve 
the whole Overberg region. Here students would learn life skills as well as expertise 
in the field of mariculture. For practical experience, a multi-species66 on shore 
hatchery is being proposed in Hawston, where stock will be bred for ranching 
activities along the coast (also based in Hawston). Ideally, a TURF system is 
proposed, so that individuals! groups will have ownership over sections of the coast. 
The hatchery and ranching activities are aimed at a wide sector of the community i.e. 
from commercial divers and 'poachers', through to the "poorest of the poor". 
The Chinese Academy of Fisheries Scientists is supplying the technology, and a 40ha 
portion of provincial land has been earmarked for the hatchery. The hatchery and 










ranching activities will be realised through a joint venture between the South African 
Mariculture Development organization, Premier Fishing and Dalian Zhangzidao 
Fishery Group Co. Ltd (a Chinese Mariculture and Fisheries Company). 
Recently, MCM has decided to allow ranching to take place on a "TURF" basis 
between Cape Hangklip and Hermanus. As yet there are no dates set for completion, 
but a number of meetings have been held with SAMD, MCM and rights holders and 
this seems to be a promising initiative. Business plans are in the process of being 
developed. 
Working for the Coast 
This is a national programme aimed at cleaning up the coast, rehabilitating degraded 
areas, repairing and maintaining public amenities, support of tourism, monitoring etc. 
This programme is implemented through the Expanded Public Works Programme 
which aims to alleviate poverty through the creation of temporary job opportunities, 
training and SMME development. There is a CoastCare Project planned from Strand 
to Quoin Point; in which fishers could get involved. CoastCare is moving away from 
'picking up paper' toward infrastructure development e.g. walking trails, board walks. 
Due to its focus on temporary job provision; its suitability and relevance with regard 
to the creation of long term alternative livelihoods is questioned. This would be the 
ideal vehicle for crew members. 
Whilst there are clearly a number of initiatives in the Kleinmond community, rights 
holders did not identify any of these as being suitable alternatives to abalone 
harvesting. To a large extent, these initiatives cannot supply rights holders with the 
income and lifestyle that they are accustomed to. Further, none of these initiatives are 
specifically aimed at fishers who have lost access to marine resources and fishers are 
generally overlooked in LED ventures. Further, rights holders are not considered to be 
the "poorest of the poor" and will be last in line to benefit from any economic 
development in Kleinmond, as others are seen to have a greater need. A number of 
initiatives are potentially suitable for crew members and other fishers who are 










5.3.4 Opportunities and constraints associated with pursuing alternative 
livelihoods and assets identified by rights holders 
When rights holders were asked to identify opportunities and constraints associated 
with pursuing alternative income earning opportunities most struggled to identify any 
opportunities. However, a number of constraints that would prevent them from 
getting involved in alternative livelihood opportunities were identified. This clearly 
indicates that rights holders are uncertain of their assets and are wary of getting 
involved in something that they are unfamiliar with. One fisher pointed out that if 
fishers are too enthusiastic about alternatives, they would be implemented at the cost 
of their existing quotas. Rights holders do not want to give up and they want to fight 
for what they believe they have a right to. 
Rights holders stated that their lack of formal education is a stumbling block that 
prevents them from getting involved in a different occupation. Most rights holders did 
not finish school, as they started diving or catching fish with their fathers at about 14 
years of age. Rights holders have expressed interest in abalone aquaculture, but they 
feel that they are not receiving the necessary technical expertise or financial support 
from government to take this forward (EEU 2008). 
Rights holders do not have access to sufficient financial capital to invest in other 
business opportunities. Rights holders have made substantial investments in 
equipment, which are worthless now as they cannot be used or sold, and many have 
debts to repay. Further, initiatives such as mariculture require a large capital 
investment, which is unrealistic for most fishers. 
Mistrust between MCM and rights holders is a major constraint to economIC 
development or alternative livelihood provision in Kleinmond. Fishers complain that 
MCM never wants to communicate directly with them or listen to their concerns. 
MCM always sends consultants on their behalf to deal with the community. Rights 
holders are also concerned that research conducted is tampered with before reaching 
the Minister. Whilst fishers have made repeated attempts to get involved in research, 
MCM does not seem to be interested. Fishers also question the validity of the research 










was done by people who did not know the area well, and even though fishers offered 
to become involved, their offers were ignored. This lack of trust between MCM and 
fishers will hamper future research. 
Key informants identified further constraints. Firstly, conflict within the community 
between different factions has resulted in vested interests impacting negatively on 
broader community benefit. This tension in the community is mostly due to what is 
perceived to be an unfair rights allocation process. Consequently many bona fide 
fishers have been excluded, whilst new entrants have large or more than one quota. 
Personal agenda's are also impacting negatively on the permit allocation system, as 
those who are better educated and well connected are benefiting. 
Secondly, an ICM Official (pers. comm. 2008) indicated that whilst MCM would 
facilitate entry into aquaculture, whale watching and shark cage diving, MCM would 
not be able to fund these initiatives. In other words, MCM is not able to provide 
tangible support in terms of training, skills development or facilitating access to 
credit. They are only identifying and suggesting alternatives. This coupled with rights 
holders' lack of access to financial capital and training, may result in few initiatives 
being realised. 
Further discussion with fishers revealed that they did not see many opportunities in 
the Kleinmond area in which they could get involved, but did identify the following 
assets that could help them to become involved in an alternative income earning 
opportunity. 
Fishers have a vast amount of practical experience and knowledge regarding the sea -
which should be seen as their greatest asset when getting involved in other livelihood 
options. Skills such as diving could be put to use by teaching others how to dive, for 
example as a scuba diving instructor or by getting involved in underwater welding. 
Knowledge and experience of the sea could be put to use, for example by taking 
people out to sea; 
Abalone rights holders also feel their familiarity with abalone will stand them in good 










getting involved in an abalone farm is a long term plan, yet at the moment they are 
preoccupied with the their present needs - which cannot be met by an abalone farm or 
any other alternative which will only be fruitful in a few years 
5.3.5 Willingness of rights holders to pursue alternatives 
Rights holders love their work and derive satisfaction from fishing related activities, 
which another job may be unable to provide. Fishers explain of the excitement of 
discovering a new bed of abalone, of diving with friends and being able to learn new 
"things" everyday, whilst at the same time being able to teach others. A particularly 
important aspect of their work is "being their own boss" and to not have anyone 
telling them "what to do or how to do it" - because they are good at what they do. For 
many, being on the water is relaxing and it is a place where no one bothers them and 
where they are at their most content. These are intangible feelings of job satisfaction, 
which cannot easily be replicated by offering fishers alternative forms of income, 
specifically if not related to fishing. Many feel that their knowledge and expertise as it 
related to the sea is their greatest asset (EEU 2008). 
Job satisfaction is an important element of the fishers 'job' and stems from the fact 
that they are good at what they do, and have been doing it all their lives. Many fishers 
would not change their jobs if offered an alternative that provided the same income. 
Reasons for not wanting to change their occupation include: being too old to do 
something else and having to learn new skills 'from scratch'. 
However, some fishers are open to the idea of changing their occupation, as long as it 
is still related to the sea, and if MCM can guarantee that it will be a secure form of 
income. Those that recognise that the fishery may be closed for good are open to the 
idea, but only because they have no other choice. Fishers were generally reluctant to 
explore alternatives that took them away from the sea. Fishers are most willing to 
explore aquaculture initiatives, to obtain access to WCRL quotas, or to pursue diving 
related work (research, commercial diving, underwater welding, diving instructor). 
There is a lot of frustration due to the fact that alternatives were not explored sooner. 










Deputy-Director General. Why didn't they tell us they didn't have a plan?" Those 
fishers that have done some research into alternatives are concerned that whale 
watching and shark cage diving both require long term and substantial financial 
investments. Further, they are concerned about who will benefit, as there is not space 
for all the rights holders in these industries. 
5.3.6 Perceptions regarding who IS responsible for alternative livelihood 
provision 
Fishers 
Interviews with fishers indicated that they consider government to have a major role 
to play in identifying and supporting alternative economic opportunities for fishers. 
They believe that MCM and rights holders should work together and discuss ideas 
relating to alternatives and solutions to the current situation. MCM should provide the 
financial means to allow fishers to become involved in alternative income earning 
opportunities. Fishers are of the opinion that MCM is chiefly responsible and did not 
perceive any other government departments to have a role. 
They believe that MCM should establish an abalone farm or provide the finances to 
set up the farm. Further, they should provide the necessary training in order for fishers 
to manage and operate the farm. MCM should be involved and share responsibility for 
the development of any venture, particularly during the start up of an abalone farm. 
Only once it is clear that the fishers have the necessary skills to run the farm, should 
MCM "pull out". 
Abalone rights holders feel that they still have rights until 2014 and therefore lay 
claim to the resource - fishers feel that they are owed the remainder of their long-term 
right and MCM should pay them the value of the remaining time. Then once the 
resource has recovered, they feel they should be allowed to harvest abalone again with 











MCM officials are generally of the OpInlOn that the provlSlon and support for 
alternative livelihoods is not the responsibility of DEA T: MCM. Reasons given 
include that MCM lacks the infrastructure and expertise to deal with alternative 
livelihoods (MCS Official pers comm. 2008) and that officials feel that MCMs 
mandate is to sustainably manage resources and that alternative livelihoods is beyond 
the core responsibility of MCM (Resource Management Official pers comm. 2008; 
rCM Official pers comm. 2008).There are other departments who are geared toward 
the provision and or identification of employment opportunities and MCM can assist 
in so far as employment options are marine related e.g. mariculture (Research Official 
pers comm. 2008). A Research Official (pers comm. 2008) did however indicate that 
MCM should playa role in identifying alternatives in collaboration with communities 
and that in addition MCM has a role to play in bringing on board other government 
departments. The Resource Management Official (pers comm. 2008) feels that 
government at large is responsible owing to that fact that the decision was not taken 
by MCM; but by Cabinet - and feels that MCM does not have the expertise to act as 
lead agency. 
The SCL sub-directorate was created to identify alternative opportunities (livelihoods) 
to marine resource harvesting in coastal communities. Yet in reality, the sub-
directorate identifies possible opportunities and assists only in so far as supplying 
fishers with the criteria needed to get involved and assisting them with the rights 
allocation process by providing information e.g. information session on a new policy. 
"We do not assist anyone to get involved in the alternative livelihood opportunities" 
(ICM Official pers comm. 2008). An rCM Official (pers comm. 2008) feels that 
fishers themselves are responsible for their future and they should have made 
provisions. She goes on to state that fishers are self-employed and thus DEAT is not 
responsible to them, as MCM cannot control nature. 
The SCL sub-directorate is a new unit within MCM and this is the first time that 
MCM has attempted to embrace socio-economic and livelihood issues. As a result, 
there is still much uncertainty regarding the mandate of the sub-directorate as MCM 










It is clear that government had a limited understanding of what the implementation of 
alternative livelihoods would entail. Alternative livelihood implementation is a long 
term process that requires the buy-in of communities and the commitment of 
government. Apart from funding, livelihood implementation requires training, 
capacity building and ultimately empowerment. The social and economic exclusion of 
fishers continues today and many still lack access to resources as well as the capacity 
to develop alternative livelihoods (Masifundise 2006). 
Although there seems to be consensus as to whose responsibility it is not; MCM 
officials do not have a clear idea of who should be responsible. 
SRPP 
SRPP specialise in project management and they will likely manage implementation 
of any abalone farming initiatives. Currently mariculture is the responsibility of 
MCM; However, Mariculture will most likely become the responsibility of SRPP in 
the future. 
With regards to the provision of alternative livelihoods, the government departments 
that need to be involved will have to be determined on a project-by-project basis, as 
each project will require different expertise. DEA T: MCM should playa leading role, 
but should not be the only role player. Potential role players include: MCM, SRPP, 
Labour, Health, Social Services, Economic Affairs and Government created 
institutions that deal with economic development. Obstacles include: getting role-
players "around the table"; the lack of neutrality in the public service (DA vs. ANC); 
and the ineffectiveness of current institutional arrangements. 
In terms of government policy, economIC development is largely devolved to 
Provincial and Local government. Provinces have Provincial Gro\V1h and 
Development Plans, whilst Local Governments have Integrated Development Plans 
(lDPs). lOPs promote actual projects and thus SRPP should link to Provincial and 











This thesis has looked at the decision making process that culminated in the closure of 
the fishery, the impact of the closure on the rights holders as well as possible 
alternative livelihood opportunities that could be explored. 
6.1 Recognising the cultural context of fishing 
For abalone rights holders and their crew, fishing activities are an integral part of 
daily life. Most have been involved in fishing activities since a young age, and many 
left school to assist their fathers with fishing and harvesting of marine resources. 
Whilst some rights holders and their crew are involved in non-marine related 
activities, the majority have always made their living from the sea. When discussing 
possible alternatives with rights holders, all would rather pursue alternatives that did 
not remove them entirely from the sea or from fishing. It is thus important to 
recognise that the harvesting of marine resources is a livelihood strategy integral to 
the cultural identity of these rights holders and their crew (EEU 2008). Rights holders 
enjoy fishing and it provides them with a sense of fulfilment and satisfaction, which 
they may not easily find in another occupation (Cinner and Pollnac 2004). 
The development of alternative livelihoods for fishers needs to be sensitive to their 
traditional and cultural attachment to the sea (EEU 2008). Thus, it is suggested that in 
order to relieve pressure on marine resources, measures should be designed around the 
concept of complementary rather than alternative livelihoods (EEU 2008). This 
concept may be more acceptable to fishers, as they will not be totally removed from 
participating in fishing activities, and will at the same time acquire skills in a different 
occupation. Complementary livelihood activities may over time replace some fishing 
related activities, but this should be in consultation with fishers (EEU 2008). In 
addition, fishers will feel more confident to pursue non-fishing related activities over 
time as they will have developed confidence in their ability to perform other activities. 
A study conducted by the Environmental Evaluation Unit emphasised that a blanket 
approach to the implementation of alternative livelihoods cannot be applied (EEU 










resources differs between communities and that this is informed by their SOClO-
economic circumstances as well as their historical and cultural involvement with 
fishing (EEU 2008). Thus some coastal communities will have much stronger cultural 
and historical links to fIshing than others. In addition, abalone rights holders are 
involved in the harvesting of a lucrative resource, which is a factor in their reluctance 
to stop harvesting all together. 
6.2 Need to adopt an holistic and integrated approach to small-scale fisheries 
management 
South African is signatory to a number of international conventions and agreements 
regarding the management of the sea and coast (EEU 2008). All of them refer to the 
need for an integrated approach to management of the marine and coastal 
environment. The UN F AO Code of Conduct encourages States to take into account 
economic, social and cultural factors in decision making. The SADC Protocol on 
Fisheries requires a balance between social and economic objectives in fisheries 
management. The NEMA also states that the social, economic and environmental 
impacts of activities must be considered and that decisions must be appropriate in the 
light of these considerations. Further, the White Paper promotes a people-centred 
approach and a management style that involves integration and cooperation across 
disciplines, sectors and interests thus transcending legislative boundaries (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003; Witbooi 2006). 
It is clear from this study that in South Africa, management decisions pertaining to the 
marine and coastal environment are still centralised and science based, with very little 
concern for the socio-economic or cultural context of coastal communities (EEU 
2008; Hauck 2008). This resource-based approach indicates a lack of understanding 
regarding the links between effective resource management and addressing the socio-
economic problems facing coastal communities (EEU 2008). 
Firstly, there is a need to incorporate socio-economic information as relevant to the 
particular context into fisheries management decisions (EEU 2008; Hauck 2008). 
Secondly, fisheries managers need to understand that the long term protection and 










economic difficulties facing fishing communities (EEU 2008). As long as coastal 
communities experience high rates of unemployment and poverty, there will be illegal 
harvesting of marine resources (Research Official pers comm. 2008). A vital role 
MCM must therefore fulfil is the identification and implementation of alternative or 
complementary livelihoods. This will decrease the reliance of coastal communities on 
marine resources, and thus the overall pressure on marine resources. 
Another major factor is the reluctance of MCM fisheries scientists to engage with 
socio-economic and cultural dimensions related to fisheries management (EEU 2008). 
During the post-democratic transition, there was a lack of fisheries policy and analysis 
within MCM. At this time, few otTicials had experience in policy making and 
implementation and resource management continued as previously - despite the 
imperative to redistribute rights and broaden access. To this day, few MCM officials 
realise that social and economic goals need to be incorporated into fisheries 
management and decision making. As a result, the top-down style of managing 
fisheries has persisted through 14 years of post-democratic policy making. 
Consequently, a shift in thinking towards a more holistic approach to resource 
management is required, one that is not solely based on the biological sciences, but 
also includes the social sciences. Fisheries management decisions are currently being 
made by fisheries scientists and managers, who often fail to consider the social, 
cultural and economic implications of their decisions (EEU 2008). Thus whilst 
decisions are biologically sound, they often fail to take into account the relationship 
between fishers and marine resources (EEU 2008). Further, fisheries management 
considers its function to be the determination of quotas, bag limits, gear limitations 
and fishing seasons; and that socio-economic issues are the responsibility of a 
different directorate or government department (EEU 2008). However, fisheries 
managers need to realise that in order to manage resources sustainably, they also need 
to engage with resource users. Without the consideration of socio-economic factors, 
which impact on resource use, management will not be effective in ensuring the 










6.3 Lack of Participation in management and decision-making 
The world over there has been a tendency to move from top-down to more 
collaborative and participative decision-making processes. South African laws and 
polices highlight the need to involve resource users and other stakeholders in 
decisions that will impact on their lives. Further, various pieces of legislation require 
transparency, consultation and participatory governance (EEU 2008). The UN F AO 
Code of Conduct encourages States to promote participation in management processes 
by those affected. One of the principles of NEMA is the equitable participation and 
inclusion of interested and affected parties in environmental governance. Further, 
"broad and accountable participation" of resource users and relevant stakeholders in 
fisheries management has been stressed in the fisheries White Paper and the Marine 
Living Resources Act. Further, the White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development 
adopts a participatory and cooperative management approach. Feedback from fishers 
and other stakeholders indicates that this has not been the case in the abalone fishery. 
The need for participatory management, particularly in small-scale fisheries, has been 
documented for over a decade in South Africa, and much longer internationally 
(Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Hauck and Sweijd 1999; Hauck and Sowman 2003; 
Jentoft 2006; EEU 2008). There is a need to develop or strengthen existing local level 
structures that can provide a forum for fishers and government to interact (EEU 
2008). Further, the lack of a participatory approach can in part be due to capacity 
constraints within MCM (EEU 2008). A Resource Management Official indicated that 
a lack of capacity and resources prevents her from spending time "on the ground" and 
that she considers this to be an obstacle to effective resource management. 
In recent years, the concept of shared responsibility between stakeholders has become 
a widely accepted approach to managing small-scale fisheries (Hauck 2006). The 
Abalone Policy although giving lip service to co-management has not resulted in any 
"real" shared responsibility or delegation of powers to resource users in the 
management of the abalone resource (Hauck 2006). The transformation of the abalone 
fishery (Refer to Section 4.1) was a serious attempt by MCM to apply the objectives 
of the Marine Living Resources Act (namely sustainability, equity and stability), but it 










decision making to rights holders. Thus, despite attending scientific working group 
meetings and the implementation of the TURF based system in 2003, rights holders 
have not participated meaningfully in the management of the abalone resource. The 
implementation of the TURF system was ineffective due to the sharing of zones 
between rights holders from different areas, as well as the lack of skills and will 
within MCM to 'make it work'. There was also a lack of consultation and engagement 
with stakeholders in order to develop meaningful co-management arrangements. 
Without education and capacity building to instil a sense of ownership and protection 
over resources, management systems will not be effective. Further, fishers need to be 
trained and empowered so as to enable them to participate effectively. This is 
explicitly laid out in NEMA Section 2 (4) (f). 
Although a number policies and laws highlight the need for participation 111 
management and decision-making it seems this has not been the case in the abalone 
fishery. The lack of a participative approach can be attributed in part to capacity 
constraints, but also to the lack of willingness on the part of fisheries scientists to 
engage with socio-economic and cultural issues relating to resource management 
(EEU 2008). 
The co-management continuum provides the perfect 'tool' through which fishers can 
become involved in management and decision-making. Responsibility is devolved 
based on the ability of stakeholders; and over time, as capacity is built and skills 
transferred, fishers can start assuming more and more responsibility (Hara 2003; 
Hauck and Sowman 2003; Symes and Phillipson 1999). Enhancing the capacity of 
user groups to assume co-management responsibility does however take time, effort 
and finances (Hara 2003; Frangoudes et af. 2008). The building of trust will take time, 
particularly in the abalone fishery, yet is vital as co-management is based on mutual 
respect and trust and each stakeholder must respect the autonomy of the otherls (Hara 
2003; Symes and Phillipson 1999). 
The involvement of resource users in the management of fisheries is key to ensure 
buy in and compliance (Hauck 2006). There is also recognition of the benefits of 
including rights holders in the research process. Not only does this develop skills and 










of the research findings and increases stewardship over the resource (Hauck 2006). 
Rights holders have on numerous occasions requested to be involved in research and 
have offered their time and equipment. Had fishers been involved in research as they 
had requested many times, the research results would have had more legitimacy 
amongst rights holders. 
The top-down nature of the decision to close the fishery, further highlights the lack of 
participation on the part of rights holders in resource management decisions. Rights 
holders were not adequately consulted regarding the decision to close the fishery and 
played no role in the decision-making process relating to the closure. As a result, the 
closure of the fishery has no 'buy in' from rights holders. Despite having information 
and recommendations relating to the socio-economic implications of a possible 
closure, very little was done by MCM to put in place effective mechanisms to prevent 
these. Hauck (2006) stressed that any scenarios relating to the management of the 
fishery should to be discussed and negotiated with key stakeholders from the outset, 
as this would facilitate 'buy-in' as well as the exploration of other possibilities. 
6.3.1 Implications of the decision process 
The nature of the decision making process was top down, secretive and based 
predominantly on the biological sciences. This is contrary to the participative 
approach which is required by South African laws and policies, as well as to the 
approaches being advocated at an international level. The decision was largely 
informed by fisheries scientists in MCMs Research Directorate, who tend to have a 
largely conservation-orientated view. MCMs mandate is to ensure the sustainable use 
and management of resources but they failed to take a holistic perspective, 
specifically with regards to the consideration of socio-economic factors. 
There is a growmg awareness of the benefits of including local user groups in 
management and decision-making and that this can lead to better management (Beem 
2007). These include: better information about the resource, including local 
knowledge suited to the context and broadening the amount of knowledge that would 
influence decisions; improved compliance with management protocols due to support 










involvement and in turn, buy-in from the people they are trying to regulate decreases 
transaction costs67 (Hauck and Sowman 2001; Hara 2003; van Sittert 2003; Defeo and 
Castilla 2005; Beem 2007; Berghofer et at. 2008). 
However, Rights holders in Kleinmond have a considerable amount of mistrust and 
animosity toward MCM - which will hamper any co-management initiatives. In turn, 
MCM officials are unsure if all rights holders comply with their permit conditions. 
Any future co-management initiatives as well as the implementation of alternatives 
will be significantly hampered due to the level of mistrust that has resulted from the 
way in which the decision was taken. Rights holders are of the opinion that MCM 
underestimates their abilities and does not perceive their contributions to be valuable 
and therefore MCM does not consult with them. Alienation of resource users and 
other stakeholders will increase the animosity that currently exists towards MCM. 
Rights holders feel that they are being punished for the activities of illegal fishers and 
the inability of MCM to control poaching. 
A number of implications of a top-down decision to close the fishery were highlighted 
by Hauck (2006), in a report that was made available to MCM prior to the closure. 
Many of these have since "come true". Apart from the alienation of rights holders, 
legal fishers may protest the decision by continuing to harvest abalone illegally 
(Hauck 2006). This may be more of necessity than a choice for some, who need an 
income to pay day-to-day household costs. Protest fishing may have severe impacts 
on the resource in certain areas. Hauck and BUrgener (2007) pointed out that unless 
rights holders are involved in the discussions and decisions regarding the abalone 
crisis there is unlikely to be support and buy-in for the decision or the rebuilding of 
the resource. 
Additional impacts of the decision include the fact that the closure may increase the 
demand, and thus the price, for illegal abalone (Hauck 2006). This in turn increases 
the incentive to poach. Similarly, during a 3-year ban on the loco, Concholepas 
concholepas, in Chile, the illegal fishery was exacerbated due to the increased price 
for the product on the black market (Hauck 2006). Further, key long-term data for 











scientists to monitor the status of the resource will be lost (UCT Researcher 2 pers 
comm. 2008). 
It seems that the closure is less about a declining resource, and more about a lack of 
capacity and know-how to effectively curb poaching. However, closing the legal 
fishery will not prevent the large-scale illegal harvesting of abalone. The government 
lack a long-term strategy to manage the fishery and have a poor understanding of the 
drivers of illegal trade (BUrgener and Hauck 2007). Management of the resource has 
been focused on policing at the expense of co-management arrangements, despite the 
fact that the collaborative management of marine resource is highlighted in numerous 
international agreements as well as local policy. Experience has shown that law 
enforcement initiatives in South Africa cannot be sustained for long periods of time, 
and that illegal fishing continues as soon as policing effort decreases. Whilst the ban 
will only be successful if supported by an adequate policing strategy this should not 
be in place of the development of a collaborative agreement between stakeholders 
regarding the way forward. 
Even though the Minister had the right to declare a zero T AC for the abalone fishery 
in terms of the provisions in NEMA and MLRA, the decision making process should 
have been participative rather than a top down decision by senior government 
officials. Further, the Right of Access to Information Clause and the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act (P AlA) are relevant as they are useful for determining how 
decisions were reached, for instance how the T AC was determined and portions 
allocated (Witbooi 2006). Further, both the NEMA and MLRA contain sections that 
relate to the right to access to information and transparency, respectively (Witbooi 
2006). 
6.3.2 The development of a Social Plan and Alternatives 
The Social Plan that was developed (but not released) was prepared without 
consultation with rights holders and secrecy remains regarding the contents of this 
Social Plan. This, despite the fact that the Minister claimed to have a Social Plan in 










Due to the lack of consultation with rights holders, the alternatives proposed were not 
suitable or feasible when taking into consideration the assets of rights holders or the 
local context. Alternatives proposed required large capital investment and goes 
against the recommendations of the Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Framework, 
which highlights the importance of working with the assets that fishers have access to 
as opposed to concentrating on what they do not have. 
There has been a lot of 'talk' about alternatives, but in reality identifying a possible 
alternative livelihood is only the very beginning of a very lengthy process. There 
follows a process of investigating whether the alternative is feasible; whether there is 
a skills match; whether the required capital is available; and eventually the drawing up 
of a business plan. 
6.4 Application of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework to the case study 
The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) was developed as a tool to help gain a 
better understanding and aid analysis of the livelihoods of the poor, and to allow 
holistic thinking about livelihoods that orders the complexity of the various factors 
(DFID 1999; Allison and Ellis 200 1). If management or other forms of intervention 
are based on an incomplete understanding of livelihoods, it can result in 
recommendations that are incompatible with resource conservation as well as the 
social and economic goals of management (Allison and Ellis 200 1). The SLF can be 
useful in assisting in the identification of the various factors that influence livelihoods. 
Governance (i.e. policies and institutions) plays an important role in livelihoods and 
determines access to capital and livelihood options and the SLF can help in the 
identification of those factors that inhibit or facilitate access to assets and thus to 
livelihoods strategies. Decentralization and participation is essential to successful 
resource management, whilst top down management practices are not responsive to 
trends and shocks, and lack adaptability. 
6.4.1 Livelihood diversification versus specialization 
A livelihood is composed of the assets, the activities and the access to these that 










Poor people often pursue a diversified livelihood strategy, as this provides security 
and resilience in the event that one activity should fail. Diversified livelihoods thus 
often cope better with shocks and stresses and are less vulnerable as risks are spread 
across more than one activity (EEU 2008). In the case of the abalone fishery, rights 
holders were encouraged to specialise by investing in equipment and as a result few 
have other activities to fall back on. Some of the equipment is specifically for abalone 
harvesting, such as a compressor. Although some abalone rights holders also have 
WCRL quotas, the TAC has been decreasing over the past 3 years, and there are 
legitimate fears that this fishery may too be closed in the near future. The government 
encourages rights holders to invest in the industry and allocated rights for 10 years. 
Due to the lucrative nature of the resource, it also was not necessary for rights holders 
to diversify. This illustrates how government policies, particularly the Abalone Policy, 
have resulted in livelihoods which are not resilient to external shocks and trends. 
Instead, policies should be encouraging livelihood diversification, both within and 
outside of the fisheries sector, thus increasing the resilience of livelihoods and 
decreasing the dependence on marine resources. 
Diversified livelihoods can further be beneficial to resource protection (Allison and 
Ellis 200 I) and should be encouraged over specialization. Policies should encourage 
part-time fishing instead of trying to professionalise small-scale fishers and ban part-
timers (Allison and Ellis 2001). The promotion of specialization by investing in 
capital-intensive technologies or assets will result in part-time fishers becoming full-
time fishers, as they have loans to repay and need a return on their investment 
(Allison and Ellis 2001). As a result, fishers become more reliant on fishing, and 
during times of resource scarcity they will be less likely to revert to non-fisheries 
based livelihoods - this can have a negative impact on the resource as they will 
continue to harvest (Allison and Ellis 2001). Diverse sources of ll1come can 
potentially buffer people in the event of one activity failing (Sievanen et at. 2005). If a 
wide range of assets is drawn upon, it can minimise susceptibility to shocks and 
minimise poverty (Glavovic et at. 2002). 
Further, interviews with scientists indicated that there has been concern over the state 










of long term rights. Why then were fishers encouraged to invest in an industry that 
was considered to be in some from of 'crisis'? 
Whilst the White Paper on Sustainable Coastal Development encourages the 
diversification of coastal economies and opportunities, the 2003 Abalone Policy 
encouraged abalone fishers to invest in the industry and encouraged specialization. 
This is not inline with international thinking, which encourages livelihood 
diversification (particularly in non-industrialised nations) and thus resilience to 
stresses, trends and shocks, such as resource decline or fishery closure. 
6.4.2 Skills and assets 
Rights holders had difficulty when asked to identify their assets, with most 
considering their knowledge of the sea and diving skills as their biggest assets. In 
order to strengthen the 'asset platform' Allison and Horemans (2006) list numerous 
interventions. Thus to strengthen each of the five indentified capital assets, the 
following is necessary: human - skills training and education; natural - rehabilitation 
of degraded environments; assisting communities to use their resources more 
sustainably; financial - improved access to credit and savings mechanisms; physical -
improved access to infrastructure; and social - strengthening of community 
organization skills; building trust; and the inclusion of marginalised groups. These are 
all relevant to the Kleinmond community. In order for fishers to get involved in 
alternative livelihoods, they require training and education. This will give them 
confidence and a better chance of succeeding at new ventures. If the abalone fishery is 
to be reopened in the future, fishers should be involved in the protection of the 
resource to allow recovery. This in turn will lead to feeling of ownership. A problem 
that was highlighted by many fishers was poor money management skills, thus access 
to saving mechanisms and financial education is vital. Lastly, by building trust and 
including marginalised groups, you are reducing the conflict in the community and 
encouraging buy in - be this in terms of the protection of the resource or the 
implementation of alternatives. 
It is clear from interviews with abalone rights holders that they would be more 










holders were sceptical and hesitant to become involved in alternatives that did not 
utilise their existing skills. Some were afraid of "trying new things" or learning "from 
scratch". Thus activities that built on, or utilised existing skills would have a greater 
chance of buy-in and success (EEU 2008). Fishers considered one of their biggest 
challenges to getting involved in alternative livelihoods to be their lack of formal 
education. Their greatest asset was considered to be their knowledge of the coast, the 
sea and the abalone resource. 
The alternatives suggested by the Minister were not well researched and were 
identified without an understanding of the context, peoples' assets and interests. Some 
rights holders feel that they are too old to do something else. Alternatives suggested 
by fishers include diving work or being involved in the operation of an abalone 
factory. These two alternatives indicate clearly that fishers want to be involved in 
economic opportunities in which they have skills and knowledge. This supports the 
view that alternatives need to be tailored to the needs of the community and should 
focus on what assets fishers have - rather than what they do not have (Allison and 
Ellis 2001). 
6.5 Alternative livelihoods 
Alternative livelihoods that are developed need to provide some of the same job 
satisfactions as fishing (Cinner and Pollnac 2004). Rights holders spoke passionately 
about fishing and that it is "in their blood". Rights holders show most interest in those 
activities that are related to abalone and that do not remove them entirely from the 
sea. 
However, whilst mariculture is an alternative suggested by government and the most 
supported by rights holders, it does not come without problems. Low levels of 
education, lack of experience, poor technical support and a lack of access to capital 
are challenges to the successful implementation of aquaculture ventures (Van Hue and 
Scott 2007). Careful consideration must be given to the distribution of benefits from 
aquaculture initiatives and the local context must be taken into account (Van Hue and 
Scott). In Kleinmond, where tensions already exist between those who have and those 










benefits the local elite, may cause more tension. Successful ventures also attract 
outsiders and this needs to be controlled (Sievanen et al. 2005). 
In reality however, abalone fishers lack the skills to be "aquaculture entrepreneurs" 
and would most likely be employees in capital intensive aquaculture projects. 
Abalone ranching, however, creates an opportunity for abalone fishers' skills to be 
used in rehabilitating depleted abalone beds in a model similar to fishing. These 
would be true TURFs, with guaranteed recruitment. In addition, abalone fishers could 
also playa role in the monitoring of these beds. 
The implementation of alternative livelihoods reqUIres social, technical and 
institutional feasibility studies (Pomeroy et al. 2006). Livelihoods that evolve in 
response to local skills and available resources are more likely to be sustainable 
(Pomeroy et al. 2006). Further, livelihoods are preferable if they require low levels of 
capitalization, are low risk and are at a level that can be managed by the people 
(Pomeroy et al. 2006). Livelihoods need to be sustainable even after external 
organizations phase out (Pomeroy et al. 2006). Further, the sustainability of a 
livelihood option "will depend on the availability of supporting infrastructure and the 
enabling environment, including credit, inputs, markets and technical assistance" 
(Pomeroy et al. 2006). Alternatives thus need to be suited to the local context and 
must be in line with the skills and capabilities of the fishers. If not, these skills need to 
be developed and supporting structures must be put in place. 
Lastly, one of the goals of the White Paper on Sustainable Coastal Development is to 
"alleviate coastal poverty through proactive coastal development initiatives that 
generate sustainable livelihood options". Specific objectives to fulfil this goal are the 
proactive identification and development of opportunities that seek to eliminate 
coastal poverty and that coastal planning and management efforts shall promote 
meaningful and sustainable livelihood options. 
6.5.1 Local context 
The procurement of rights to harvest abalone has been a huge opportunity to fishers, 










However, many have specialised in the abalone fishery and the closure of the fishery 
has left them with few alternative job opportunities. In addition, rights holders have 
little formal education. Lastly, they are receiving little SUppOlt from government with 
regards to alternative livelihoods. These factors are all driving forces of poverty and 
are constraints that need to be addressed. This can in turn also have a negative impact 
on the status of the abalone and west coast rock lobster resources, because hungry 
people will always choose to survive in the short run, as opposed to protecting a 
resource that they do not benefit from (FAO 2002). Unless rights holders and the 
Kleinmond community in general are involved in the recovery of the resource and 
stand to benefit, they will have no incentive to protect the resource. 
The abalone fishery plays an important role in terms of job provision in Kleinmond. 
Thus any alternative livelihood opportunities need to be aimed at rights holders, their 
crew, and those who are fishing illegally. If the overall aim is to reduce the pressure 
on marine resources, then opportunities need to be available to all who utilise marine 
resources, because targeting only rights holders will not be sufficient to protect the 
abalone resource. 
However, the fishing community in Kleinmond is generally sceptical and hesitant to 
become involved in alternative livelihood options, especially outside of fishing. 
Research identified that numerous factions operate within the community and could 
potentially hamper the success of alternative livelihood initiatives, and thus their 
agendas need to be identified and discussion between factions facilitated. It is clear 
that in Kleinmond, similar economic and development initiatives are running in 
parallel with very little collaboration between proponents. For instance, there are two 
similar development proposals for the Kleinmond Harbour being designed by 
different proponents, and being supported by different factions within the community. 
As a result, different community factions are aligning themselves with a particular 
"side" of similar projects, resulting in further conflict and tensions. As a result, 
projects are delayed and there is uncertainty surrounding who will benefit from new 
economic opportunities. 
Key factors that may constrain the success of alternatives include poorly understood 










Kleinmond have failed due to mistrust between stakeholders, a lack of commitment 
from MCM and the lack of long term funding (Hauck and Hector 2003). It is thus 
vital to develop a legitimate local level structure in Kleinmond, which will provide a 
forum for rights holders and government to interact (EEU 2008). 
However, a forum of this kind may be difficult to establish due to the contentious 
rights allocation process and factions present in the Kleinmond community. The first 
step would be to identify the various factions and to get them to talk to one another. 
Only then should government be involved. If tensions and conflicts within the 
community are not addressed, it could potentially undermine any progress between 
rights holders and government. 
6.5.2 Responsibility for alternative livelihood provision 
Abalone rights holders operate within a broader economic area, yet tend not to be the 
focus or beneficiaries of development or economic initiatives. This is because many 
initiatives are aimed at the "poorest of the poor" and because fishers "already have a 
job". Thus, these projects are not suitable alternative to abalone harvesting, primarily 
because they cannot provide a similar income and thus standard of living. 
There are clearly very different perceptions with regards to who is responsible for the 
provision of alternative livelihoods. MCMs Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods (SCL) 
sub-directorate is responsible for the identification of alternative livelihoods. 
However, they were not consulted until after the decision to close the fishery was 
made and they have limited resources in terms of supporting fishers to get involved in 
alternative livelihoods. It seems that the SCL sub-directorate has very low status and 
few available resources. 
With regards to implementation, MCM is required to assist the community 111 
developing a funding proposal and provide technical skills relating to the use of a 
marine and coastal resource if a proposal obtained funding (EEU 2008). However, it 
is unclear who will take responsibility for the generation of alternative livelihood 
opportunities for fishers as there is currently disagreement regarding whose 










mandate. Despite the argument that decreasing people's reliance on marine resources 
will in turn decrease pressure and facilitate preservation of marine resources. Thus, in 
order to reduce fishing effort and conserve marine resources, alternative livelihoods 
must be developed for fishers (Cheung and Sumaila 2007). Sowman and Cardoso 
(2008) state that it is government's responsibility to explore alternative employment 
opportunities, and rights holders agree. As early as 1999, Hauck and Sweijd predicted 
that there would be severe economic repercussions should the abalone resource 
collapse, resulting in a need to seek alternative forms of income. Not only would 
rights holders be affected, but also those who indirectly depend on the fishery for their 
livelihood (Hauck and Sweijd 1999). 
Government depmiments that need to be involved in the development of alternative 
livelihood options for fishers will need to be determined on a project-by-project basis, 
since they may require different expertise. In this case, DEA T: MCM needs to playa 
leading role in the development of alternative livelihoods for the fishers in 
Kleinmond. Other government departments that could play an important role include: 
SRPP, Labour, Health, Social Services, Tourism, Agriculture, Economic Affairs and 
any other government created institutions that deal with economic development. 
In terms of government policy, economIC development is largely devolved to 
Provincial and Local government. Provinces have Provincial Growth and 
Development Strategies, whilst Local Governments have Integrated Development 
Plans (lOPs). lOPs promote actual projects and SRPP should link to Provincial and 
Local Government to fund and manage specific livelihood initiatives and projects. 
Despite the existing policy framework, MCM has failed to effectively partner with 
other government agencies. Similarly, van Sittert et al. (2006) state that an important 
practical step to improve fisheries management is better cooperation amongst 
government sectors and devolution of authority where possible. It is vital that MCM 
consults and works closely particularly with local government, as well as fishers, as 











However, getting different role-players in government to "sit around the table" 
generally does not happen. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 Of 
2005 governs the way different spheres of government should work together and 
integrate their actions. Yet even though certain institutional arrangements exist by 
law, they do not get implemented at a managerial level. Most government 
departments have very little knowledge regarding what goes on outside of their 
department. There is a lack of coordination and a lack of understanding regarding who 
is responsible for which actions. 
What is necessary is for the vanous department involved to have a common 
understanding of the end goal, as well as to know what each department's specific 
role is in reaching that goal. The implementation and effective functioning of 
institutional structures should be part of managers' performance assessments - by 
making it an important part of their job to communicate effectively with other 
government structures, it can go a long way in ensuring that these structures work 
effectively. Furthermore, the public service is not neutral and political friction 
between opposing provincial and local spheres affects their ability to work together. 
In summary, this chapter has highlighted most importantly that the decision to close 
the abalone fishery was top down, non-consultative and was done with very little 
understanding of the local and cultural context. Further, there is little understanding of 
the assets available to and constraints faced by rights holders in terms of getting 
involved in alternative income earning opportunities. The decision to close the fishery 
has little or no buy-in from rights holders, or the community in general, and the 
animosity that has resulted will further hamper any collaborative initiatives in the 
future. 
Lastly, although much emphasis has been placed on the need to find alternatives to 
abalone fishing in this thesis, the fact remains that government needs to explore and 
indentify innovative management measures and development interventions to address 










7. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This dissertation provided an overview of the decision to close the abalone fishery and 
the impacts of the closure on the abalone rights holders in the Kleinmond community, 
South Africa. The research set out to identify the range of stakeholders that have been 
affected by the abalone ban, the role of marine resources in the livelihood strategies of 
fishers and the extent to which the ban has impacted on the livelihoods of fishers in 
Kleinmond. The dissertation then went on to document and discuss the decision-
l 
makmg process that led to the closure of the fishery. And finally, the research 
identified opportunities and constraints associated with alternative livelihood 
opportunities. 
The decision-making process that culminated in the closure of the abalone fishery was 
not consultative or transparent. In light of the rhetoric about co-management and the 
laws and policies in support of this approach, the decision making process is 
considered to be flawed and inadequate. The implications of the flawed decision 
process include an increase in mistrust and animosity toward MCM. Fishers feel 
sidelined with regards to their livelihoods and many may continue to harvest illegally 
due to the lack of legitimacy of the decision-process. The decision also indicates the 
lack of understanding on the behalf of MCM of the drivers of the illegal trade. If 
MCM does not fully understand poaching, they can never hope to manage the fishery 
effectively. 
The management of the abalone fishery has not been participative or collaborative, 
and decisions that have been made in relation to resource management have been top 
down and science based. This despite both international and local conventions, laws 
and policies advocating a participative, decentralised and holistic approach to resource 
management and decision-making. Further, proposed alternatives to abalone 
harvesting seemed to be reactive and were not feasible given the local context and 
assets of rights holders. 
There has been limited interaction between the various role-players and there needs to 
be a mechanism to share information in order to develop an agreed strategy. The way 










the perspective of the fishers. There was no phased-in approach of alternatives; no 
active engagement with stakeholders concerning their current and future role in the 
fishery; and decisions made lacked any form of consultation. Instead, decisions and 
the implementation of initiatives should be participative, collaborative and 
decentralised. It is important that fishers themselves identify complimentary 
livelihoods. 
In order to sustainably manage marine resources, particularly lucrative abalone, buy in 
from rights holders and the adjacent community is vital. However, rights holders have 
not played a meaningful role in resource management, nor were they consulted with 
regards to the intention to close the fishery. This has resulted in animosity and 
mistrust toward MCM. This, in addition to the tension and conflict already present in 
the community, will impact on the success of future initiatives. MCM needs to build 
trust with the Kleinmond community by involving them in plans to rebuild the 
resource. A co-operative management structure will need to be developed so that 
fishers can participate effectively in management and decision-making. In addition, a 
socio-economic feasibility study should be conducted in order to better understand the 
conflicts within the community and the dependence of the community on the resource. 
This study should identify the different stakeholder groups; conflicts; and vested 
interests. It will also be necessary to form an institutional structure that will bring 
together the various stakeholder groups. Factions within the community that work 
against each other will undermine alternative livelihood initiatives, especially if it is 
perceived that one group is the recipient of all the benefits. It is therefore imperative 
that mechanisms to address this are put in place, with the aim of bringing conflicting 
stakeholder groups together. It is vital to understand this so that initiatives can be 
sustainable, and that benefits can be distributed equally. 
Socio-economic problems, such as poverty and diversification of livelihoods needs to 
be better understood and actively addressed by MCM (EEU 2008). In order for MCM 
to manage marine resource sustainably, they need to adopt an integrated and holistic 
approach to resource management. This entails the inclusion of social and economic 
information in management and decision-making processes. Social and economic 
scientists need to be employed in fisheries authorities, so that these issues are properly 










Further, it is necessary for fisheries managers and scientists to understand the cultural 
context of fishing. Many fishers have a strong cultural identity that is linked to fishing 
and marine-related activities (EEU 2008). This makes it particularly difficult for them 
to get involved in alternatives outside of fishing. Many do not have the skills, finances 
or confidence to leave the fishing industry and to pursue an alternative occupation. 
Therefore, supplementary livelihoods, in addition to fishing should be pursued - in 
this way, fishers retain their link to the sea, but fishing pressure is reduced. 
Livelihood opportunities need to be sensitive to the socio-economic context of fishing 
activities and it needs to be recognised that there are different scales of economic 
benefit and dependence associated with different fisheries. Abalone, for example, is 
very lucrative in comparison to WCRL or linefish. Therefore, initiatives that are 
aimed at the "poorest of the poor" are not applicable to fishers who harvest abalone; 
and interventions need to be contextualised. Alternatives that are proposed need to be 
relevant and suitable to the local context and need to provide a sufficient income to 
meet the needs of the fishers. Livelihood opportunities need to be tailored to the skills 
and assets available to fishers, as these ventures are more likely to receive buy in and 
thus be successful. In addition, however, long term skills training and support is 
required to encourage fishers to diversify their livelihoods. 
In order to protect marine resources, effective policing will need to be put in place 
with the cooperation of the community. The "sense of ownership" that was the goal of 
the long-term rights has not been realised and as a result illegal resource harvesting is 
still a problem in Kleinmond. Fishers are desperate to be involved in the protection of 
the resources, but feel that MCM is not responding to their concerns. If fishers do not 
have "ownership" over the resource in their area, they will have no incentive to 
protect it. This could potentially have an adverse impact on the remaining resource. 
An important factor that should be considered before closing a commercial fishery is 
the availability of alternative sources of income in the local community for fishers. 
For many, their only source of income is a quota for harvesting a particular species, 
and if it is taken away they have no other source of income. It is also important to 










interventions. This can assist in developing projects or programmes that are more 
resilient. 
There needs to be a proactive approach to the identification and implementation of 
alternative livelihoods (EEU 2008). This will require an in depth understanding of 
socia-economic issues facing coastal communities. Thus, suitable alternatives can be 
put in place before resources are in crisis. Also, institutional arrangements need to be 
clarified with respect to who should be involved in realising alternative livelihoods for 
fishing communities. Once this is made clear and the various departments are aware 
of their responsibilities, initiatives are more likely to be successful and sustainable. 
Fishers find it difficult to look at opportunities beyond marine resources and therefore 
initiatives need to be related to fishing and take into account the skills that are 
available. Fishers do believe that MCM has a responsibility and are consequently 
looking to MCM for guidance. Fishers believe that government, particularly MCM, 
has a role to play in identifying and supporting economic opportunities for fishers. 
Further, it is critical that government maintains their involvement to ensure that the 
initiative is sustainable. In addition to MCM, other government departments also need 
to be involved in the development of alternative livelihood options for fishers and 
these will need to be determined on a project-by-project basis. A strategy for 
collaboration within and between departments should be developed. 
The closure of the abalone fishery has highlighted a number of issues that need to be 
addressed in the future management of marine resources in South Africa. Resource 
users need to be involved in decisions that affect their lives, particularly in the day-to-
day management of marine resources. Any decisions that are made need to be open 
and transparent and must be made in consultation with resource users. Further, co-
management arrangements need to be implemented so that fishers playa meaningful 
role in management and develop a sense of ownership over marine resources. 
Fisheries authorities need to be aware of the local context and the cultural and 
historical role of fishing; and most importantly they need to understand that fishers 
want to fish! In addition, socio-economic information must inform all management 
and decision-making processes in order that an integrated and holistic approach to 










fisheries are composed of both human and biological systems and these cannot be 
managed in isolation. 
Finally, the biggest challenge facing the sustainable management of marine resources, 
particularly abalone, is the institutional failure and lack of coordination within and 
between government bodies. Whilst one cannot accept MCMs failure to manage the 
fishery sustainably as a motivation for 'pushing' fishers into alternative livelihoods, 
there are a number of opportunities that can be explored if small scale fishing is 
addressed creatively both in terms of the resource and market opportunities. Small 
scale fishers as a group require a certain level of developmental support even though 
they possess traditional knowledge and skills. Government needs to find creative 
technical solutions to the issues facing small scale fisheries. This will require 
innovative thinking, collaboration with stakeholders and political will on the part of 
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1. Resources/Assets and Resource Users 
• Who are the resource users/ fishers in the case study area? 
• How many people are involved in the fishery (formal & informal)? 
• What marine resources are people harvesting (what species) and why 
(to sell or to eat)? 
• How/ what methods are being used? 
• What is the current state of the resource(s)? 
• What are the assets (social, economic, ecological, physical) in this 
case? 
2. Livelihood Strategies 
• What are the past/ current livelihood strategies employed by coastal 
resource users? 
• What incomes are being derived from these activities? 
• What other (non marine) activities are they involved in to support their 
livelihoods? 
Are there people in this community who were previously reliant on 
marine resources, but no longer have access? What livelihood/s are 
they depending on now? 
3. Potential Livelihood Options 
What are the potential livelihood options that could be developed and 
implemented? 
Identify opportunities and constraints associated with pursuing these. 
• What are peoples' willingness to pursue alternative livelihoods? 
• What are the factors that have led to success or failure of other similar 










4. Mechanisms to Explore Feasibility 
• What are the steps that need to be taken to determine the feasibility of 
implementing alternative livelihoods and community support/ interest? 
• Who should be involved? 
• Clarify the institutional arrangements that are required to facilitate 
development and implementation of feasible alternatives. 
• What Institutional arrangements exist to pursue sustainable alternative 
livelihoods? Where are the conflicts/ overlap? 










9.2 Questionnaire Survey 
The Investigation of Present and Future Livelihood Strategies 
Employed by Marine Resource Users: Kleinmond 
Date of Interview 
Interviewee's Name 
Place of Interview (community name) 
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON INTERVIEWEE 
1.1 What is the interviewee's gender? / Wat is die geslag van die respondent? 
[1] V roulik [2] Manlik 
1.2 Age of interviewee/ Ouderdom van respondent? ................................ . 
1.3 Interviewees educational background [1] Nooit skool toe gegaan nie 
[2] Laer Skool: Std ....... 
[3] Sekondere School: Std ...... . 
[4] Tersiere: .......................... . 
1.4 Are you a member of any organisations? Particularly, fisheries related/ Is u 'n 
lid(maat) van enige vissers-organisasies? 
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON MARINE RESOURCE 
HARVESTING (Pre-closure) 
2.1 Do you harvest marine resources (circle)? / Yang u enige vissoorte? bv. kreef, 
perlemoen 










2.1.1 If NO, did you harvest marine resources in the past? / Indien nee, het u 
tevore enige vissoorte gevang? 
If Yes (indicate species/ Indien JA, wat het u gevang?) 
2.2.2 If YES to Question 2.2.1, why do you no longer harvest marIne 
resources (and go to Section 3)/ Indien JA vir vraag 2.2.1, hoekom yang u 
nie meer hierdie vissoortel visbronne nie? 
2.2 What speCIes are you harvesting? (Including prIor to the abalone fisheries 
closure)/ Watter vissoorte yang u? Insluitent daai vissoorte wat u ge-oesl gevang 
het voor die sluiting van die perlemoen-vissery. 
2.3 Do you have permits or quotas for harvesting? Which species? (Indicate the fish 
species next to the permit to indicate which permits are used for which species. Also 
indicate which species are being harvested with no permit)/ Het u 'n permit of 
visreg vir visvangl of om visbronne te yang? Watter spesies? 
[1 ]CommercialiKommersieel 











[4] Interim Relief Permit 
[5] No permit/Geen permit 
2.4 Which months out of the year do you harvest? / Watter maande van die jaar 
vang jy vis? 
2.5 Which months do you harvest the most? / Watter maande van die jaar vang jy 
die mccste? 
2.6 Do you have a crew that work FOR you? Ie: depend on you for their income/ Het 
jy 'n bcmanning (bakkiemaat) wat VIR u werk? (Wat afbangend van jou is vir 
hulle inkomste) 
[1] JA [2] NEE 
2.6.1 If YES, how many crew members do you have? / Indien JA, hoeveel 
mense is daar in jou bemanning? .......................................................... .. 
2.7 When you harvest, what fishing gear/ techniques do you use? (give species and 
indicate gear - boat, line, nets, etc - for each species)/ Wanneer u visvang watter 
soort toerusting of tegnieke gebruik u? (Noem die spesies en dui ook aan die 










2.8 What are your catches PRIMARILY used for (circle)? / Wat word hoofsaklik 
met die vangste gedoen (sirkel)? 
[1] Share it with neighbours/ Deel dit met die bure 
[2] To sell/ verkoop die vis 
[3] To eat/ eet die vis 
[4] Eat some of the catch but sell most of it/ eet van die vis en verkoop die 
oortollige vis 
[6] Other uses (Please specify)/ Ander gebruike (Dui asseblief aan) 
2.9 Which is the most abundant species in your area? / Watter spesie is die mees 
volop in jou area? ..................................................... . 
2.10 If your catch is sold, to whom do you sell it to (circle)? Indien u die vangste 
verkoop, aan wie verkoop u? 
[1] Informal buyers in community (ad hoc people living in community, 
restaurant etc)/ Informele kopers in die gemeenskap (enige iemand in die 
gemeenskap sowel as restaurant eienaars ens) 
[2] Informal buyers outside community (tourists, ad hoc people coming into 
community)/ Informele kopers buite die gemeenskap (Toeriste, of enige 
besoekers aan die gemeenskap) 
[3] Organised buyers in community (organised agreements with people living 
in community)/ Formele kopers in die gemeenskap (mense met wie u 'n 
ooreenkoms het) 
[4] Organised buyers outside community (organised agreements with buyers 
outside community)/ Formele kopers buite die gemeenskap (mense met wie 











2.11 How much money do you receive from your catch (indicate value, amount and 
species)? (for example, R25/per bundle/harder OR R150/kg/abalone etc)/ Hoeveel 
geld kry jy vir jou vangste/ dui asseblief die waarde aan, hoeveelheid en spesie: 
[1] Fresh fish! vars vis 
[2] Dried fish! droe vis 
[3] Rock lobster whole/ kreef heel 
[4] Rock lobster tails/ kreef sterte 
[5] Abalone/ perlemoen 
[6]Mussels/mossels ........................ '" ......................................... . 
[7]Other/ Ander .......................................................................... . 
3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
3.1 How many years have you been involved in fishing activities? / Hoe baie jare 
vang u al vis? 
3.2 Was your father a fisher? / Was jou pa 'n visserman? 










3.3 Was your grandfather a fisher? / Was jou oupa 'n visserman? 
[1] JA [2] NEE 
3.4 Were fishing activities an important part of your childhood? / Was 
visvanvenvante aktiwiteite 'n belangrike aspek/ deel van u opbrengs? 
[1] JAA [2] NEE 
3.5 How long have you lived in the area? / Hoe lank / baie jare lewe u al in die 
area? ..................................... . 
4. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AND INCOME 
4.1 How many people live in the household? / Hoeveel mense bly in die huisgesin? 
4.2 How many adults, older than 18, live in the household? / Hoeveel volwassencs, 
ouer as 18, bly in die huis ............ . 
4.3 How many people, younger than 16 live in the household? / Hoevccl mense, 
jongcr as 16, bly in die huis? ................ . 
4.4 How many household members are fishers? / Hoeveel mcnse tuis/in die 
huisgesin is vissers? .................... . 
4.5 Is the household head: 
[1] Fisher/ visser 
[2] Employed/ het 'n werk 
[3] Pensioner/ pensionare 
[ 4] Self Employed/ werk vir eie gewin 
[5] Unemployed/ werkloos 










4.6 What is your household monthly income (pensions, grants, other sources of 
income incl?)/\Vat is u maandlikse huishoud inkomste? (Sluit pensioen, toelaag, 
en ander bronne van inkomste in) 





[6] Meer as R3000 
4.7 To what single activity does the majority of your income go (circle one)? Op wat 
spandeer u die mecste van u inkomstc? 
[1] Buy food/ kos koop 
[2] Purchase equipment and supplies for fishing activities/ Koop van 
toerusting en voorraad vir visvang-aktiwiteite 
[3] Clothing! Klcrc 
[4] School fees/ Skoolgeld 
[5] Debt/ Skuld 
[6] Other, please specify/ Ander, dui asscblief aan 
5. LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
5.1. What activities contributed towards your monthly income BEFORE the abalone 
ban (tick all)? / Watter aktiwiteite het bygedra tot u maandlikse inkomste, 
VOOR die sluiting van die perlemoen-vissery? 
5.2. Did any of these bring in more than half of your income (highlight with *)/ Ret 
enige van hierdie aktiwiteite meer as die helfte van u inkomste ingebring? 
5.3. Rank level of importance in terms of bringing in income (1 being highest)/ Dui 
aan in terme van mees belangrik wat die meeste inkomste inbring (1 is die 
hoogste getal) 










[2] Employment through commercial fishing (crew)/ kommersiele 
visvangaktiwiteite 
[3] Processing/marketing of fish/marine resources/ V env erking en 
Bermarking van vis/visbronne) 
[4] Sale of crops (fruit, vegetables)/ Verkoop van oeste (vrugte, groente) 
[5] Sale of livestock (poultry etc)/ Verkoop van vee (hoenders etc) 
[6] Industrial Work (e.g. working in factories etc)/ Industriele werk (e.g. 
werk in fabrieke ens) 
[7] Labour (construction etc)/ bouwerk 
[8] Tourism/ Toersime 
[9] Farm Work! Plaaswerkl Seisoenale werk 
[10] Pension! Pensioen 
[11] Grants (disability, child)/ Toelaag (disability, child) 
[12] Others (please specify)/ Ander (dui asseblief) 
5.4 In your household, what activity was the MOST IMPORTANT in terms of 
monthly income BEFORE the abalone ban (circle one)?/ In u huishouding watter 
aktiwitiete sou u as die MEES BELANGRIK beskou in terme van u maandlikse 
inkomste - VOOR die perlemoen-sluiting? 
[1] Harvesting fish/marine resources/ visvang 
[2] Employment through commercial fishing (crew)/ kommersiele 
visvangaktiwiteite 
[3] Processing/marketing of fish/marine resources/ Verwerking en 
Bermarking van vis/visbronne) 
[4] Sale of crops (fruit, vegetables)/ Verkoop van oeste (vrugte, groente) 
[5] Sale of livestock (poultry etc)/ Verkoop van vee (hoenders etc) 
[6] Industrial Work (e.g. working in factories etc)/ Industriele werk (e.g. 
werk in fabrieke ens) 
[7] Labour (construction etc)/ bouwerk 
[8] Tourism! Toersime 
[9] Farm Work! Plaaswerkl Seisoenale werk 
[10] Pension! Pensioen 










[12] Others (please specify)/ Ander (dui asseblief) 
5.5 What activities are you CURRENTLY pursuing in order to derive an income? 
5.5.1 What activities contribute towards your monthly income (tick)? / Watter 
aktiwiteite maak OP DIE OOMBLIK 'n bydra tot u maandlikse 
inkomste? 
5.5.2 Do any of these bring in more than half of your income (highlight with 
*)/ Bring enige van hierdie aktiwiteite meer as die helfte van u inkomste 
in? 
5.5.3 Rank level of importance in terms of bringing in income (1 being 
highest)/ Dui aan in terme van mees belangrik wat bring die meeste 
inkomste in (1 wat die hoogste getal is) 
[1] Harvesting fish/marine resources/ visvang 
[2] Employment through commercial fishing (crew)/ kommersiele 
visvangaktiwiteite 
[3] Processing/marketing of fish/marine resources/ Verwerking en 
Bermarking van vis/visbronne) 
[4] Sale of crops (fruit, vegetables)/ Verkoop van oeste (vrugte, groente) 
[5] Sale of livestock (poultry etc)/ Verkoop van vee (hoenders etc) 
[6] Industrial Work (e.g. working in factories etc)/ Industricle werk (e.g. 
werk in fabrieke ens) 
[7] Labour (construction etc)/ bouwerk 
[8] Tourism! Toersime 
[9] Farm Work! Plaaswerkl Seisoenale werk 
[10] Pension! Pensioen 
[11] Grants (disability, child)/ Toelaag (disability, child) 










6. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE ABALONE FISHERY 
6.1 Did you have an abalone allocation? IHet u 'n perlemoen-toewysing? 
[1] JA [2] NEE 
6.1.1 If YES, how many kg's? I Indien JA, hoe baic kg? ........................ . 
6.2 How long did it take you (days) to harvest your allocation? IHoc lank neem dit 
jou om jou toewysing te oes? .......................... . 
6.3 What did you do for the rest of the year to obtain extra income? IWat doen jy/ 
waarmec hou jy jouself bcsig vir die res van die jaar om 'n ekstra inkomste tc 
maak? ......................... . 
6.4 Do you think the abalone resource is threatened?/ Dink u die pcrlemocn-bron is 
bedryg? 
7. ISSUES SURROUNDING THE CLOSURE OF THE ABALONE FISHERY 
7.1 What percentage of permit holders do you think are involved in informal fishing? / 
Watse pcrsentasie van permit-houers dink u is betrokke/ betrek met informele 
visvang? ............... . 
7.2 Do you think informal fishing will continue now that the fishery has been closed? 
/ Dink u dat informele visvang sal voortsit/ aanholl nOll dat die perlemoen-vissery 
gesluit is? 










7.2.1 If YES, do you think it will be more or less than before? / Indicn JA, 
dink u dit sal minder or meer/ beter of erger wees as tevore? 
7.3 How do you think the ban should have been put in place? What would you have 
liked to see happen! how would you have liked to have been approached? / Hoe dink 
u moes die sluiting van die perlemoen-visscry plaas gevind het? Hoe sou u 
benader/ingelig wou gewecs het? 
8. ALTERNATIVE PRESENT AND FUTURE LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
8.1 Do you believe that fishing/harvesting resources is a secure form of income? / 
Dink u dat visvang en visvangverwaante aktiwiteite 'n vastc vorm van inkomste 
is? 
[1] JA [2] NEE 
Why or Why not? Hoekom/ Hoekom nie? 
8.2 What do you like about fishing compared to other jobs that you could do? / Wat is 










8.3 If you could make the same income in an occupation other than fishing, would 
you change your job? / Indien u dieselfe inkomste kan maak deur 'n ander werk, 
buite visvang, dink u dat u, u werksberoep sal verander? 
[1] JA [2] NEE 
Why or Why not? Hoekom/ Hoekom nie? 
8.3.1 If YES, what options would you consider? / Indien JA, watter ander 
opsies sal u oorweeg? 
8.4 Are any of these economic opportunities available in your community? / Is cnige 
van hierdic ekonomiese geleenthedc beskikbaar in u gcmccnskap? 
[1] JA [2] NEE 
If YES, which ones? / Indicn Ja, watter enes? 
8.5 Do you know the names of any organisations inside or outside your community 
who are involved in identifying or supporting economic opportunities for fishers?/ 
Ken u die name van enige organisasies binne of buite die gemeenskap wat 
betrokke is in terme van identifiseering van ekonomiese geleenthede vir vissers? 











8.6 Do you think government has a role to play in identifying and supporting 
economic opportunities for fishers? / Dink u dat die Regering 'n rol moet speel in 
terme van identifiseering en ondersteuning van ekonomiese geleenthede vir 
vissers? 
[1] JA (if yes, indicate how they should be involved)/ Indien JA, kan u 
aandui hoe hulle betrokke moet wees 
[2] NEE 
8.7 What do you consider your greatest ASSET that would help you to become 
involved in another economic opportunity (skills, social or economic capital etc)/ Wat 
sou u sc is u grootse eienskap wat u sal help om betrokke te raak met ander 
ekonomiese aktiwiteite? (skills/vaardighede, social/ sosiale eienskappe or 
economic capital / finansies etc) 
8.8 What do you consider the biggest CHALLENGE or problem for you to become 
involved in another economic oppOliunity? / Wat sou u beskou as die grootse 











8.9 How would you address this challenge? / Hoe sal u hierdie struikelbloklke 
hanteer? 
9.3 List of persons interviewed. 
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Laura and Linda 
Ovcrbcrg Municipality 
Solomzi Madikane 
Schalk van der Merwe 
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